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Status,  L anguage,  Minorit y: 
an Introduc tor y Sketch
1.  Background to  the Study
This research is conducted for an academic dissertation for the 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree in Finno-Ugrian studies and con-
sists of this publication, that includes an introductory sketch and 
a summarizing report, and six previously published peer-reviewed 
scientific articles divided into four thematic parts corresponding to 
the research objectives as listed below. Collectively they form a sin-
gle treatise on the problems of language politics in the Finno-Ugric 
Republics of post-Soviet Russia (Karelia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, 
Udmurtia).
The articles were published elsewhere: in the collection of arti-
cles Equally Diverse: Comparing Language and Culture Minorities in 
the Russian Federation and the European Union and in internationally 
refereed journals Finnisch-Ugrische Mitteilungen, Journal de la Société 
Finno-Ougrienne, Journal of Ethnology and Folkloristics, Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. In this publication the 
articles are not listed in order of appearance, but in an order that is 
most logical from the point of view of their content, as will become 
clear in the introductory sketch.
The articles have both an empirical and theoretical dimension. 
Although the articles are empirically based and provide, first of 
all, insights into Russian politics, they also have clear theoretical 
implications that specify the application of some concepts. While 
addressing the problem of applicability of the concept of ‘official sta-
tus’ to minority languages, the study draws upon factual material 
from the Finno-Ugric Republics of Russia.
This dissertation is the first comprehensive study on the for-
mation of language policies in the Finno-Ugric Republics for more 
than two decades. It is not restricted to the exploration of the formal 
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solutions but also provides some insights into policy implementa-
tion. This study could be of interest to scholars working in the fields 
of Finno-Ugrian and Russian studies. Scholars interested in Russia’s 
language policy and nationalities policy may find this study espe-
cially useful. Also, those scholars who study ethnicity and national-
ism as well as ethnic and national dimensions in political science 
and law may find it interesting.
The study is written within the framework of Finno-Ugrian 
studies, but it can be characterized as an interdisciplinary project 
that also utilizes the relevant viewpoint of the language policy theo-
ries and nationalism studies.
1.1.  His tor ical  Contex t
The historical narratives concerning the rise of the nation-state, such 
as those of Benedict Anderson (1983), Ernest Gellner (1983) or Erik 
Hobsbawm (1992), bear witness to the fact that in the Age of Empires 
the state did not penetrate so deeply as to significantly influence the 
lives of ordinary people (Gellner 1983: 38). The nobility was supposed 
to speak a ‘sacred language’ of the holy text common for dynasties 
in different empires, first of all Latin or, later, for example, French 
and German were used in the Russian Empire; the peasants typi-
cally continued to use the local vernaculars (see Kappeler 2001 for 
the Russian case). The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman 
and Russian Empires after the First World War signified the further 
march of the idea of the nation-state throughout Eastern Europe. 
Rearrangement of post-war Europe in line with Wilson’s principles 
included the self-determination of ‘second-generation’ nations and 
the creation of a number of new states. The congruence of the cul-
tural, linguistic and political entities became the pattern in state 
formation in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman empires. The nation-states typically promoted one domi-
nant culture and one dominant language: the latter altered its previ-
ous role from the mere language of bureaucracy and administration 
to that of the national language, the knowledge of which was obliga-
tory for all (see Section 3).
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The developments in the territories of the former Russian 
Empire took a more complicated twist. There are many studies (see, 
e.g., Martin 2001, Hirsch 2005) on the formation of the Union of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) that take different 
views on the place and importance in this process of the ‘national 
question’ (as the problem of the need to accommodate multinational 
diversity was termed in Marxist writings). Scholars usually recog-
nize, addressing the ‘national question’, that the Bolsheviks hoped 
to gain the support of non-Russians, who composed about half of 
the population, and also intended to spread the World Revolution by 
incorporating emerging Soviet Republics into a communist state. To 
solve the ‘national question’, the founders of the USSR, too, inserted 
the nationality principle at the very core of its state structure in the 
Soviet Constitution of 1924 and preferred federalization to auton-
omization (see, e.g., Martin 2001, 25–26, Hirsch 2005: 3–4, Connor 
1984: 38).
Soviet federalism had, as one of its cornerstones, the principle 
of ‘national self-determination of the peoples’ that was exercised 
depending on the place of an ethnic group in the hierarchy of the 
peoples in the form of the Union Republics (SSRs) and Autonomous 
Republics (ASSRs) as well as Autonomous Regions and National (later 
Autonomous) Districts, and, in its early years, even National Rural 
Districts and Administrations. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) became the biggest Union Republic. The RSFSR 
itself was a federation that hosted national-territorial units titled 
after non-Russian peoples. Among the other units, the political enti-
ties in Russia’s North-West and the Volga Area titled after the peoples 
speaking Finno-Ugric languages emerged in the form of Autonomous 
Regions in the 1920s. The creation of ethnically defined units was con-
joined with the early Soviet policy of ‘nativization’ (‘korenizacija’), 
according to which non-Russians had to be promoted to bureaucratic 
positions in the state apparatus. In addition, unprecedented Soviet 
language planning encouraged the expansion of the official use of 
autochthonous languages in the public sphere of particular regions 
and envisaged for this purpose the development of the standardized 
written forms that sometimes was accompanied with the creation of 
new identities (see Martin 2001: 23–24, Hirsch 2005: 7–8).
S t A t u S ,  l A n g u A g e ,  M i n O r i t y :  A n  i n t r O d u c t O r y  S K e t c H
1 4
Even if through formal federalization, Soviet Russia and from 
1922 the Soviet Union, soon annexed most territories of the for-
mer Russian Empire and became a de facto imperial state. When it 
was realized that the World revolution was not going to happen, it 
was postulated that the state had resolved the ‘national question’. 
However, despite all its ‘affirmative action’ and internationalist 
rhetoric, from the mid-1930s the Russian language started to be 
promoted among non-Russians, initially out of practical consid-
erations, such as the need for a common language. Since the late 
1930s and especially since the Second World War, the dominant 
position of ethnic Russians, along with their culture and language, 
started to be emphasized, which marked the gradual shift of state 
policy from diversity promotion to Russification (Hirsch 2005: 185–
186, Martin 2001: 463–464, Slezkine 1994: 445).
Yet, these developments were not reflected in the nominal 
state structure: in the mid-1930s Autonomous Regions titled after 
Finno-Ugric peoples were even upgraded by their transformation 
into ‘titular’ Autonomous Republics and the Karelian, Komi, Mari, 
Mordovian and Udmurt ASSRs emerged. The Karelian ASSR was 
even temporarily transformed into the Karelian-Finnish SSR in the 
period between 1940 and 1956. The ASSRs existed throughout the 
Soviet times from the mid-1930s until the late 1980s. Yet, in the late 
Soviet years, more and more, economic considerations began to 
prevail over national issues. Due to a number of reasons, including 
the modernization of society through the policies of collectiviza-
tion and industrialization initiated in the 1930s, urbanization and 
deliberate migration policy, and, finally, outright Russification, the 
share of non-titular populations was increasing in the SSRs and 
ASSRs. By the late 1980s, the Finno-Ugric peoples were in a numer-
ical minority in their titular ASSRs (see, e.g., Kreindler 1989). Thus, 
the existence of the titular ASSRs within the RSFSR somewhat sus-
pended but did not prevent the processes of accelerating language 
shift to Russian and ethnic assimilation.
Unsurprisingly, then, the national resentment among non-
dominant groups ignited a new wave of national liberation in the 
1980s that triggered the processes of disintegration of the Eastern 
European multinational states, including the USSR, Yugoslavia and 
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Czechoslovakia. Yet, while all 15 SSRs became independent states, 
all the ASSRs stayed within the newly formed Russian Federation. 
In fact, as a part of the disintegration and decentralization pro-
cesses in the USSR, the attribute ‘autonomous’ was dropped and 
the ASSRs of the RSFSR became the national-state formations and 
formally equal to the SSRs. In effect, in 1990–91 the political status 
of the ASSRs was once more upgraded to that of the ‘constituent 
republics’ of Russia and even nominally ‘sovereign states’.
As one of the Soviet legacies, the federal structure of con-
temporary Russia is based on a mixed principle, because it has 
both ethnically and administratively defined federative units. 
Geographically ethnically defined units are concentrated in three 
large areas of Russia: 1) the European part of Russia (the North-
West and the Volga Areas), 2) the North Caucasus, 3) Siberia and 
the Far East. These units include the national-state formations 
(Republics), national-territorial formations (Autonomous Districts 
(Okrugs) and Autonomous Regions (Oblasts)) as well as ordinary 
territorial formations (Regions, Territories (Krais) and the Federal 
Cities). According to the Russian Constitution (12 December 1993), 
among the different types of regions only the Republics have the 
right to have their constitutions and the right to establish their 
state languages (Art. 66 and 68). Autonomous Districts can intro-
duce only some official functions for their titular languages.
Since a new epoch in the political history of post-Soviet 
Russia started with the turn of the millennium, there is a grow-
ing scientific interest in the processes of the rapid social changes 
of the 1990s. Nowadays Russia faces problems similar to those 
that emerged in the late Soviet times, including the aggravation 
of inter-ethnic tensions. What went wrong at that time that the 
democratization failed? More than two decades have passed since 
then, so from that distance some results of these processes can 
already be seen. An important layer in the understanding of these 
processes could be provided by the assessment of the consequences 
of the process of ‘sovereignization’ and of the implementation of 
national and language revival projects in the SSRs and ASSRs dur-
ing the perestroika years and up to the present date that crystal-
ized, inter alia, in the official status of languages.
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1. 2.  General  Contex t  and the Key  Concepts
The collapse of the Communist bloc and the abandonment of the 
bi-polar international system intensified the debate concerning 
nationalism and the roles of languages in society. The transitioning 
Eastern European countries had to harmonize the interests of the 
state with the position of languages. The solution used most fre-
quently has been designating languages as the official languages. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that, in the nationalizing states, the 
designation of some languages with the official status has usually 
given them a privileged position in comparison to other languages. 
Speakers of minority languages, on the contrary, have typically 
found themselves in a disadvantaged position.
Yet, while the official language may serve as an instrument 
of state language policies forcing minorities to abandon their lan-
guages, it may also encourage the minorities to maintain them. The 
latter scenario is probable when the minority languages are given 
an official or co-official status in an autonomy/province/other ter-
ritorial unit or in the whole country along with the majority lan-
guage, as it was done, notably, in Russia. However, the theoretical 
conceptualization of the phenomenon of the official designation of 
minority languages and its implications is still needed. This study 
tackles the possible contradictoriness in application of the concept 
of ‘official status’ to minority language. Why does it happen and 
what does it imply when a minority language is designated as offi-
cial? To answer this question, one should understand what an offi-
cial language is and, furthermore, what is a minority language.
1. 2.1.  O f f ic ia l  Language,  Nat ional 
Language,  State  Language
The focus of this study is on official languages of states and outside its 
scope are some other situations, where languages are made official, 
for example, in international organizations. There are no interna-
tional standards or scholarly consensus to what the official status of 
a language should mean. The Concise Oxford Companion to the English 
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Language defined official language rather broadly as a language that 
is given a special legal status in a particular state or other territory 
(see ‘official language’ in McArthur 1998). One strength of this defi-
nition is that it is inclusive and can also be applied to minority lan-
guages. Its problem is that it does not reveal what it is in particular 
that makes the status of an official language special. Basically, any 
respective political or legal decision makes the language official. The 
vagueness of this definition limits its functionality.
Somewhat better definitions are those which provide more 
descriptive accounts. According to a recent edition of the Oxford 
Companion, an official language is a language used for official 
purposes, particularly as the medium of a national government 
(McArthur 2012). A definition used in the UNESCO context (UNESCO 
1953: 46) is even more descriptive: an official language of a country is 
one ‘used in the business of government – legislative, executive and 
judicial’. The problem with the latter definitions, however, is that 
typically minority language is either not used as working language 
or used only symbolically (see Sallabank 2011: 280).
The terms ‘official language’, ‘national language’ and ‘state 
language’ are sometimes used synonymously, but essentially they 
are distinguishable. UNESCO experts, on the one hand, point out 
the practical role of ‘official language’ as the working language of 
public authorities and institutions; while on the other, they define 
‘national language’ as a language of a political, social and cultural 
entity (UNESCO 1953: 46). Hence, they emphasize a primary func-
tion of ‘national language’ as a symbol of unity and as a tool of inte-
gration in political, social and cultural spheres, where integration 
means that minorities preserving their own culture acquire major-
ity culture.
‘National language’ is associated, first of all, with a nation and 
does not have necessarily to be designated official language of the 
state. Yet, when a country constitutes itself as a ‘nation-state’, it typi-
cally designates ‘national language’ also as an official language. In 
effect, official language in some countries is called a ‘national lan-
guage’. A ‘national language’ is considered then one of the national 
symbols to represent the national identity of a people in the modern 
nation-state, but it also does its practical work as ‘official language’.
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In some European countries with a ‘state-nation’ tradition, offi-
cial language is directly associated with the state and usually bears 
the name ‘state language’ (‘Staatssprache’). ‘State language’ simul-
taneously has both practical and symbolic functions. In the same 
manner, Russian scholars, while disagreeing on some issues, also 
typically draw the distinction between the terms ‘official language’ 
(‘oficialʹnyi jazyk’) and ‘state language’ (‘gosudarstvennyj jazyk’), 
recognizing a dual character of the latter (see, e.g., Djačkov 1996, 
Krjučkova 2002, Neroznak 2002, Pigolkin 1992, Truškova 1994, and 
others). As the USSR and post-Soviet Russia were established not as 
a ‘nation-state’ but as a multinational state, the term ‘national lan-
guage’ (‘nacionalʹnyj jazyk’) was reserved there for the languages 
of the ‘peoples’ (‘nations’, ‘nationalities’ or ethnic groups) and is not 
directly comparable with its English counterpart (see further dis-
cussion on terms in the Russian context in Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
1. 2. 2 .  ‘O f f ic ia l ’  Minor i t y  Language and 
‘De Fac to’  Minor i t y  Language
There are numerous case studies on the official and co-official status 
of minority languages in individual countries and some comparative 
studies on minority languages that take into account their ‘official-
ity’ (see, e.g., Fishman 1991). Yet, the generalization in the applica-
tion of the concept of official language towards minority languages 
might be problematic, because such application strongly depends on 
the context of political culture and legal culture in a country. This 
is partly so, because the use of the term ‘minority language’ also 
varies greatly. The term ‘minority language’ is often used to refer 
to a language spoken by a minority of the population of a country, 
even if the language is given official status. An important aspect is 
that the minority languages are often also ‘threatened languages’ 
or ‘endangered languages’, because they are at risk of falling out of 
use as their speakers (are forced to) shift to using the dominant lan-
guage (see Grin: 1995: 37–38, Austin & Sallabank 2011: 1).
The picture is further complicated by the existence of the 
term ‘official minority language’ used in some countries, e.g., in 
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the context of the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages (ECRML). This notion is applied to those minority lan-
guages recognized with such a status by the State Parties of the 
convention. The purpose of the Charter is to promote minority lan-
guages that are those languages traditionally used in a particular 
territory and distinct from the official language of the country. 
However, the Charter and some other documents foresee the situa-
tion when some minority languages are simultaneously also official 
languages. Depending on a country’s policy a minority language 
can be given the status of an official language, regional language, or 
officially recognized minority language. The Charter uses the terms 
‘minority languages’ and ‘regional languages’ as synonyms (see 
Charter’s Explanatory Report, pp. 15, 51), although in some coun-
tries, like Germany or Poland, the latter term refers to a language, 
whose speakers typically do not have a separate ethnic identity, e.g., 
Low German or Kashubian.
At the same time, in other cases, e.g., in post-Soviet countries 
and, notably, Russia, speakers of non-dominant languages have sep-
arate ethnic and even national identities, reinforced by the existence 
of political units and official status of languages in question. For that 
reason, ethnic activists typically reject the application of the term 
‘minority language’ to their language, even if this was correct in 
sociolinguistic terms, and prefer the term ‘national language’ that 
was traditionally used for that purpose in the Soviet discourse (see 
previous Section). To avoid this problem, this study uses the term ‘de 
facto minority language’.
2.  Study Design
Along with China and India, Russia has the largest amount of offi-
cial languages, which include the minority languages designated 
official in Russian regions, notably, in its Republics. A paradox of 
the nationalities and language policy in Russia is that it is intended 
simultaneously to promote Russian nation-building and to preserve 
the traditionally established linguistic diversity. It might be that in 
Russia, despite the proclaimed linguistic diversity, official status of 
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minority languages is just a result of previous policies conducted 
in the early 1990s and no longer reflects the current political situa-
tion, but rather signifies a temporary compromise on the way to the 
unification of the federation into a nation-state. So the concept itself 
could cover up reality, being merely a simulacrum to show ‘visible 
diversity’.
2.1.  Aims and Objec t ives  of  the Study
This study is focused on the phenomenon of the official status for de 
facto minority languages in the Russian context. For the purpose of 
the empirical study, the theoretical question about the applicability 
of official status for minority languages has to be slightly modified: 
why were the de facto minority languages designated the state lan-
guages of Russia’s Republics? The aim of this research is to exam-
ine the formation and configuration of the official status of state 
languages in national Republics of the Russian Federation in order 
to understand whether this status was established as a symbol in 
identity politics, as an instrument in political rivalry, as an ethnic 
institution and/or as a mechanism of language maintenance.
According to the principle of federalism and vertical division 
of powers, state policy formation is divided in Russia between the 
federal center and regional authorities as the two major power lev-
els. Federal legislation has supremacy over regional legislation and 
serves as a framework for regional policies. The study on regional 
developments would be very limited unless it is addressed within 
this general framework. For this purpose, the study as a whole 
explores the following questions:
The first question: why was status planning chosen as the main 
policy device at the federal level not only in regard to the domi-
nant Russian but also to some non-dominant languages in Russia’s 
Republics? (See Section 6.)
The second question: what were the reasons for establishing 
the state languages at the regional level? (See Section 7.)
Furthermore, based on the distinction between the federal and 
regional level, the research pursues the following four objectives: 
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1) to ascertain the significance of state languages of Republics for 
Russia’s language policy, 2) to observe the position of state lan-
guages in regional political landscapes and to study regional poli-
cies towards titular languages in Russia’s Finno-Ugric Republics, 
3) to elucidate the positions of different languages depending on 
their statuses in language-in-education policy as the most impor-
tant branch of language policy in Russia and its Republics, and 4) 
to evaluate what impact official status had on language mainte-
nance in language-in-education policies of the Republics. For the 
purpose of evaluation of the policy impact, education was chosen 
among the domains of language use, because it is the most trans-
parent sector that is accessible to both qualitative and quantitative 
methods.
The objectives are addressed in the corresponding parts of the 
dissertation, where the study proposes some answers to empirical 
questions in the individual articles:
1) What is the ideological basis of Russia’s language policy and 
how does it accommodate the official status of the state lan-
guages of the Republics? What determined such a visible role 
given in the new political system to state languages? How did 
language status planning become a dominant approach of lin-
guistic diversity management in Russia? (Articles 1 and 2, see 
the structure in Section 5.)
2) What were the driving forces and different interests behind the 
twenty years of efforts towards the official designation of state 
languages in Republics? How was the institutional solution for 
establishing the state languages reached also in the Republics 
where the titular groups were in a numerical minority? Is the 
instrumentalist argument for the designation of the state lan-
guages valid for understanding the processes in this category 
of Republics? What were the possible instrumental uses that 
the official status could bring? To what extent are alternative 
(or complementary) legal, sociolinguistic and other explana-
tions applicable? How does the official status of the state lan-
guages fit into the context of language revival? (Articles 2, 3 
and 4.)
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3) How have the positions of different languages in the educa-
tional process diverged depending on their statuses? How has 
education reform affected the institutional status of lan-
guages in Russia’s education system? In what ways were 
the different modes of language teaching dependent on the 
official status of a language? (Article 5.)
4) What was the policy impact on the teaching of the titular 
languages in the Finno-Ugric Republics? Did the official sta-
tus enhance this teaching? What influence did the different 
configurations of the official status have on the expansion of 
language teaching in the education systems of Republics? Why 
were some Republics more successful in promoting and sus-
taining their titular languages in education? (Article 6.)
The study does not pretend to provide exhaustive answers to all 
aspects of the issues raised but strives to create a coherent narrative 
of the development of official language policies in the Republics. 
Further, the empirical study raises a number of theoretical ques-
tions. Although the articles do not always provide direct answers, 
they shed light on possibilities in addressing the following issues 
from the perspective of the theories of language policy: What pur-
poses does the officialization of the languages serve? What are the 
differences in official statuses of majority language and minority 
language? What is the rationale behind granting a de facto minor-
ity language an official status? How does the official status of lan-
guages correlate with the territoriality principle and the personal-
ity principle of linguistic diversity management? How do language 
rights and obligations correlate in the official status? How does the 
concept of official-language rights fit this context? From the per-
spective of the studies on ethnicity and nationalism: How do the 
symbolist, revivalist, instrumentalist or institutionalist arguments 
explaining the rise of nationalism respond to the question about 
the reasons for official designation of languages? Can the designa-
tion of a language with an official status be the means of language 
revival? Does an official status given to a minority community 
indeed promote diversity in a deeper sense? (See Section 8.)
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Finally, the theoretical question is repeated once more as the 
third question for the whole study: What might be the reasons for 
official status in the case of minority languages? (See Section 9.)
The central argument advanced in this study is that the dis-
tinction between the primary functions of the official language as 
language in office, on the one hand, and national language as a 
symbol of identity, on the other hand, provides a necessary frame-
work for understanding the specifics of the official status in the 
case of minority languages. The designation of language with an 
‘official status’ in a political and legal act is a historical one-time 
event and as such symbolic, while in practice an official language 
operates as a continuing state, ‘legal regime’. A language spoken 
by the majority population usually already functions as language 
in office anyway and designating it with an official status often 
is a formal act, but in addition it might be provided with an extra 
meaning to signify national identity – in that case it is usually 
called ‘national language’ or ‘state language’. On the contrary, the 
official status of a minority language always functions as a national 
symbol and only in addition it might function as language in office 
– in the latter case the process of implementation of its function as 
a working language is typically protracted in time.
2. 2.  Methodology and the Posi t ion of  the Researcher
The phenomenon of official language can be approached with the 
help of methods of both social sciences and humanities. As the 
official designation of languages in Russia in the 1990s is already 
history, one cannot always exclusively rely on methods of social 
sciences but should involve a wider perspective of human sciences. 
While the official documents are within direct reach of the instru-
ments of political science and law, the motivation of the political 
actors behind them is not directly attainable. The intention of the 
political actors that gives the meaning to the act of official desig-
nation could be understood in the context of the social change of 
the time through historical reconstruction of the developments in 
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the early 1990s. What simplifies this task is the fact that the state 
languages are present in a continuing state also nowadays, which 
enables figuring out the reasons for their officialization by induc-
tive logic in terms of its consequences for inter-ethnic relations and 
language maintenance or shift.
This section will introduce the utilized methodologies and 
develop the approach and limitations of the study. The study under 
consideration is an interdisciplinary treatise that does not limit 
its interpretation tools to those of theories of language policy but 
involves a wider perspective of the studies on ethnicity and national-
ism. Common perspectives for both interdisciplinary fields are sym-
bolist, revivalist, instrumentalist and institutionalist approaches 
that explain the social phenomena connected to ethnicity. These 
theoretical approaches are employed in the interpretation of results 
of an empirical study on the state languages in post-Soviet Russia 
and its national Republics.
Reliable present-day research material on the sociolinguistic 
situation of Finno-Ugric languages in Russia is often lacking. To 
address this problem, the study of official documents is not sufficient 
and had to be supplemented by case studies. One immediate source 
of data would have been the knowledge of the people involved in 
designation – members of elites themselves. Yet, due to a number 
of circumstances, including the uncomfortable political situation in 
Russia and its regions for ethnic activists and dependent position of 
officials, this is often a biased source providing personal, sensitive 
and not-to-be-disclosed data. For ethical considerations, interviews 
with members of political and cultural elites as well as other key 
figures are not accentuated as one of the formalized methods of this 
study. However, a lot of data used in the study is based on the per-
sonal communications and consultations of the author with mem-
bers of regional elites. The anthropological method of participatory 
observation was used for obtaining the data, including informal 
interviews, visits to political and cultural events as well as analyses 
of documents from personal and public archives.
One of the advantages of the research project is the researcher’s 
personal knowledge of the political situation in Russia and its regions 
as well as his contacts with ethnic activists and politicians. Before 
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starting my academic career I worked as a lawyer of the Committee 
of Nationalities Affairs at the Government of the Udmurt Republic, 
later the Ministry of Nationalities Policy of the Udmurt Republic 
(1996–1999) and prepared one of the last drafts of the language law of 
the Udmurt Republic. Later, I worked as an information officer and, 
later still, as acting head of the Information Center of Finno-Ugric 
Peoples SURI in Tallinn (2004–2006). After the start of this research 
project on official status of minority languages, I participated in 
2010 as a researcher in the team that conducted an in-depth study 
on the language situation of Karelian in the titular Russian Republic 
of Karelia (case-specific study report, executive summary of which 
was published as an ELDIA Working Paper (see Klementyev et al. 
2012, Karjalainen et al. 2013) in the framework of the EU project 
European Language Diversity for All (ELDIA).
The federal framework for the officialization of languages in the 
Republics is studied in the context of the historical narrative of Soviet 
and post-Soviet developments. In the current research, the legal-
institutional approach is applied in the articles on the institutional 
and legal framework of Russia’s language policy (see the structure 
of the study in Section 5: Part I, Article 1) and language-in-education 
policy (Part III, Article 5). The reasons for the choice of this approach 
instead of the rights-based approaches are as follows. It is stated in 
the Russian Constitution that ‘the universally recognized norms of 
international law and international treaties and agreements of the 
Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system’ 
(Art. 15). Among the international treaties on language protection, 
Russia is a party to the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and has signed but not yet ratified the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. However, these doc-
uments lay down the State Parties’ obligations but not rights. The 
system of language rights protection in Russia remains rather unde-
veloped despite their partial recognition (see Bowring 2012). The 
Russian legislation acknowledges some minority language rights, 
most notably the right to education in the mother tongue. Typically, 
these rights are not self-executing directly through the judicial sys-
tem; their guaranteeing requires transformation into the legislation 
and systemic enforcement measures under the state policy. Therefore, 
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in studying the Russian legislation, the legal-institutional approach 
would reach deeper than the linguistic human rights approach or the 
normative political theory approach (see Leontiev 1995 for an exam-
ple of a rights-based study; also Section 4.1).
The focal point of this research is on regional developments 
regarding the official status of languages. The study intends to 
ascertain the reasons for officialization of languages in individual 
Republics through the analysis of diverging popular and elite inter-
ests. Popular concerns with the state of inter-ethnic relations were 
transformed in the mid-1980s into cultural and linguistic demands 
for change presented on the side of national movements. With the 
introduction of glasnost (transparency) as the core component of 
perestroika (restructuring), it started to be possible first to discuss 
ethnic issues and later also to present political demands. The pro-
grammatic documents of ‘national organizations’ and ‘national con-
gresses of the peoples’ also included the demand for the designation 
of state languages of the Republics. Even if presented as the popular 
demands, in the ASSRs these political goals were first and foremost 
promoted by the ethnic elites who participated in formulating first 
the sovereignty declarations and later the constitutions and lan-
guage laws and pursued in this their own interests (see Section 4.3 
and Article 2 for the discussion on national and ethnic elites). The 
hypothesis is that the public formulation of political demand for the 
official status of languages was an indispensable precondition and 
the demand itself was the immediate cause for the designation of 
state languages in the official documents. However, the demand did 
not go straight to the official documents but went through the politi-
cal process, where alternative economic, political, legal and ethnic 
interests competed and segment of regional elites had to bargain for 
their own vision, which also influenced the resulting formulations.
The study employs inductive and deductive reasoning to find 
out the reasons for the official designation of languages and other 
variables that influenced the outcome of the political process. In this 
respect, one limitation of the study is that it does not strive to present 
an all-inclusive survey of the political landscapes in the Republics 
or of the dynamics of political processes in the transition period in 
connection with the ethnicity. It provides only some necessary facts 
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about the framing of national movements in the Republics, which 
were the main driving forces behind the presentation of cultural 
and linguistic demands. The study discusses in some detail the rela-
tionships between the activists of the national movements and the 
nationally minded politicians represented among regional political 
elites. It is argued that the elites typically strived for official recogni-
tion not for the sake of language(s) per se, but for language as an attri-
bute of identity or even a nation (see Toivanen 2007: 105). The study 
discusses briefly how the language shift was identified by elites as 
a problem and status planning as its solution but virtually does not 
explore grass-root activism (see for a possible perspective on minor-
ity language activism: Zamjatin et al. 2012, also Saarikivi & Toivanen 
2014, Tanczos & Puura 2013).
The study of the developments in regional languages policies 
(Part II, Articles 2, 3 and 4) and language-in-education policies (Part 
IV, Article 6) is based on both the legal-institutional and the policy 
analysis approaches. The policy analysis approach differs from the 
other methodologies in that it concentrates not so much on the ques-
tion ‘why’ a certain policy goal should be chosen, but instead pro-
vides some insights concerning ‘how’ the chosen policy should be 
achieved in terms of its effectiveness. In that, this approach is of lim-
ited use for the purpose of the current study: indeed, economic cost 
arguments were used as a pretext that regional officials presented 
to explain non-implementation of language revival policy, but these 
arguments were not decisive for the policy adoption. At the same 
time, an important contribution of the policy analysis approach is 
that ‘it helps to compare (and select) between ways of reaching a 
certain goal’ (Kymlicka & Grin 2003: 16–18, Grin 2003: 38–39), which 
enables the use of a comparative method.
2.3.  Comparat ive  Analysis
The main analytical tool of this study is the comparison of official 
statuses of minority languages in varying contexts and, thus, the 
creation of the framework for an inductive argumentation by pro-
viding evidence from concrete situations. A comparison of minority 
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languages in different countries by the means of comparative poli-
tics would have been valuable for mapping diversity and typologiza-
tion of the linguistic situations in which languages are officialized 
(see, e.g., Words and Worlds 2005: 92–118). Such a comparison would 
have produced some structural explanations of why minority lan-
guages become official, and a bold conjecture would be that this out-
come depends on how ‘powerful’ the ‘push’ is towards officializa-
tion, either ‘from below’, from the group demanding its language, or 
‘from above’, on the side of elites. ‘Strength of demand’ could have 
been conceptualized in a number of variables, starting from mea-
suring ethno-linguistic vitality of a group, the level of popular sup-
port for nationalism or historically conditioned position of regional 
elites and their search for political resources to acquire a stronger 
position in political bargaining with the federal center. However, 
not everything can be attributed to power politics and there is a risk 
that in this way less evident variables connected to human agency 
would fall out of the picture.
In looking for the human motivations, it is interesting how 
minority languages become official even in a situation where it was 
unlikely to happen due to a lack of strong demand ‘from below’. In 
order to pursue this more focused task, the comparative strategy is 
then to induce the hypothetical reasons for officialization by causal 
inference from their correlation to a few explanatory variables and, 
thus, to reduce multiplicity of variables influencing the linguistic 
situations by figuring out and excluding the impact of contingent 
factors on language policy (possible contrasts from a comparison 
among countries are only briefly outlined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
The Russian context fits this task because the regional developments 
provide a rich variety of situations of languages’ officialization 
while keeping institutional settings alike. Synthesizing the results 
in deductive argumentation will then reinforce the validity of con-
clusions drawn from comparative political and legal analysis and 
enable some predictions regarding the development of the official 
status for minority languages in Russia.
The functional method of comparative legal analysis will be 
used in dealing with the legal and political acts and other research 
materials on the Republics. This method makes it possible to focus 
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on legislation in different places providing various solutions to a 
similar problem (Michaels 2006). The comparison is typically used 
to find similarities through dissimilarities, similar trends in dissim-
ilar contexts. The political and legal documents that contain solu-
tions for national and linguistic issues are viewed as manifestations 
and results of political processes. From this perspective, the official 
status of the titular languages is seen as achieved through interplay 
within the system of power relations, the composition of which was 
unique for every Republic. Using the comparative method allows 
the seeing of similarities behind contingencies of political pro-
cesses. The study analyzes dissimilarities in the dynamics of the 
regional political regimes and their positive and negative effects on 
language status planning. It thus becomes possible, with the help of 
the method of comparative analysis, to analyze various solutions to 
similar problems in the legislative regulations of different regions 
(Michaels 2006: 369–372).
Notably, the comparison in this study does not include all 
Russian regions and not even all the republics, although it would 
have been possible. The state languages of the Republics titled after 
the Finno-Ugric peoples will be the focus of this comparison. The 
first reason for this choice is that the cases of Finno-Ugric Republics 
prove to be a representative sample for a study of the official des-
ignation of languages in Russia’s national Republics. Their politi-
cal regimes and the sociolinguistic situations of their communities 
differ in many ways. This sample includes a republic that did not 
declare its sovereignty (Mordovia), a republic that adopted the lan-
guage law as early as 1992 (Komi) and a republic that postponed 
the adoption of such a law until 2001 (Udmurtia). It also includes a 
republic that introduced language requirements for the presidency 
candidates in the constitution (Mari). Furthermore, it includes a 
republic (Karelia), where it proved to be impossible to establish titu-
lar language as another state language, which makes it an outlier 
case for the purpose of comparison.
The second reason is that the positions of Finno-Ugric lan-
guages in Russia’s Republics also have many features in common. 
These are languages with relatively large numbers of speakers: from 
approximately 25,000 speakers in Karelia up to more than 300,000 
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speakers in Udmurtia, yet their speakers are in the minority in all 
the Republics. Due to language corpus planning, these are relatively 
well developed languages from a linguistic point of view. At the 
same time, these are languages still spoken predominantly in a 
rural environment. According to the data of population censuses, 
despite the efforts spent at language planning since the early 1990s, 
there is a wide language shift going on especially during the last 
two decades (see, e.g., Saarinen 2008, Strogalʹščikova et al. 2008). 
Despite the attempts to expand these languages in the public sphere, 
there are still few signs of a reversed language shift and the mainte-
nance of the Finno-Ugric languages in the longer perspective is not 
guaranteed.
Finally, the third reason is that the field of Finno-Ugrian stud-
ies includes not only cultural studies and linguistic studies but also 
area studies that can provide rich empirical material. It is also an 
important fact for the comparative analysis that the Finno-Ugric co-
operation was not restricted to scholarly activities but had a strong 
international political dimension and became a mode of social real-
ity that deserves academic attention in its own right (see Section 4.4). 
Presidents and other top officials of Estonia, Finland and Hungary 
attended the Finno-Ugric fora, expressing their support for ‘kindred 
peoples’ in Russia. Due to political co-operation, some transnational 
bodies were established such as the International Consultative 
Committee of Finno-Ugric Peoples, an executive body of the World 
Congresses of Finno-Ugric Peoples (1992), a NGO that acquired con-
sultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council. As a result of 
activists’, executives’ and expert collaboration, ethnic elites shared 
ideas about language planning methods, which, however, had to be 
tested in the unique conditions of each Republic.
Comparison in this study is organized according to the stages 
of developing and conducting a policy, despite the highlighted 
below problem with the stages approach in the study of political 
process (see Section 3.3). In a stable situation, the stages approach to 
policy analysis might be outdated, but the transition period of the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s was characterized by a clear distinc-
tion of stages in the shaping of policy in sovereignty declarations, 
constitutions and language laws of Republics, its implementation 
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and evaluation. Accordingly, in order to find out what route was 
taken in the formation of their official status, the study employs the 
analysis of the three types of official documents which institute the 
official status of the state languages of the Republics: 1) Declarations 
of State Sovereignty, 2) Republican Constitutions and 3) Language 
Laws of the Finno-Ugric Republics as well as their drafts. The study, 
therefore, does not restrict itself only to a synchronic comparison 
but also involves the exploration of a diachronic development of 
the official status in its different functions (see, on benefits of a dia-
chronic study: May 2005b: 322). This way the study reveals how dif-
ferent types of documents represent different functions of the state 
languages and comes to reassess the question of ‘why’ the language 
status planning was chosen as the policy.
Here is where the perspective of the studies on ethnicity and 
nationalism will be applied in the discussion to interpret the study 
results of what the reasons of the official designation of minority 
languages were. Despite the use of a political and legal analysis in 
dealing with the research materials, the study only tests the applica-
bility of the existing theories and does not propose normative solu-
tions. By looking at the differences and similarities in the political 
and sociolinguistic situations of the languages under consideration, 
it is possible to gain a better understanding why some language 
communities decline despite legal and political support that even go 
as far as to guarantee the co-official status of languages. Language 
planning of de facto minority languages in connection with their 
co-official status is probably the best that could have been done for 
their maintenance in the context of Russia. Although some activi-
ties directed at language standardization and the development of 
infrastructure are also undertaken in the autonomous districts, the 
scale of such activities is much narrower than in the Republics and 
does not ensure the language maintenance.
An important issue, only briefly dealt with in this study, is 
what impact the official status of languages and, in general, lan-
guage policy of the state has on the sociolinguistic situation. While 
language shift is a general tendency, there are some sociological 
research studies in the republics that witness a certain change in 
language attitudes and even in rare cases an increase in language 
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use (see, e.g., Strogalʹščikova et al. 2008). There are various possi-
bilities for employment of both quantitative and qualitative studies 
within the sociological and sociolinguistic research. Due to its lim-
ited scope, this study tackles the problem of the implementation of 
language revival projects only in the context of language education. 
The problem of the evaluation of the policy efficiency by looking at 
implementation of language legislation in the republics is destined 
to be the subject of a forthcoming study (Zamyatin 2014a) that pro-
ceeds in two directions. First, evaluation of the language laws’ for-
mal implementation against their own goals by composing the cata-
logue of those domains of the official status where titular languages 
were actually introduced and, second, the evaluation of the actual 
implementation of language laws in the according domains by look-
ing not only at qualitative but also at some quantitative indicators 
such as the amount of resources spent on the laws’ implementation 
programs.
The rationale for this study is that answering the question 
about the applicability of the official status for minority languages 
allows for better understanding of the role and functions of the ‘offi-
cial status’ of a minority language in a larger context of linguistic 
cultures, language planning and national politics. Furthermore, it 
pinpoints the various situations and sets of domains of its public use 
where applying the official status to a language could be a hindrance 
to development, a temporary solution or a vision for the future. A 
lack of awareness of the problems accompanying the application of 
the concept of official status to a minority language may, in a wider 
context, lead to the overlooking of the limitations of this tool for 
the description of political and sociolinguistic realities. A lack of 
understanding would, in turn, entail the ineffective policies having 
significant consequences such as the disappearance of languages 
and cultures, a decline in the overall diversity, as well as injustice 
and the social and psychological drama for those people who are 
deprived of the right to acquire and use their mother tongue.
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2.4.  Research Mater ia ls
Primary research materials for the purpose of this comparative 
study are, in the first place, a variety of official documents, both 
legal and policy acts, addressing the official status of languages; 
and secondly, analytical sources that shed light on public debates 
around language and other issues that have been ample enough 
to reflect the influence of various domains on the real situation 
regarding language usage. The research is limited to the period of 
the language acquiring its official status, and aims to describe how 
the status is phrased on paper and how it is implemented through 
language policies.
The texts of legal and political acts both of the federal and 
regional authorities are available online (<http://zakon.scli.ru/>). 
Besides the official documents, the research materials include some 
initial analytical sources available, inter alia, in: K Sojuzu suveren-
nych narodov 1991, Abdulatipov et al. 1993, Konstitucii respublik 1995, 
Status maločislennych narodov Rossii 1994, Gosudarstvennye jazyki 
Rossijskoj Federacii 1995, Pisʹmennye jazyki mira 2000, Gosudarstvennye 
i titulʹnye jazyki Rossii 2002, Informacionnyj bjulletenʹ Minnaca Komi 
1994–2003, Sʹezdy naroda mari 2008, Jazykovaja situacija Volgo-
Kamskogo Regiona 2005, Jazykovaja politika v Respublike Tatarstan 
1999, Sovremennye jazykovye processy 2007.
Secondary analytical sources were also used, among them: 1) 
the publication series ‘National Movements in the USSR and in the 
Post-Soviet Space’ by the Center of Research on Inter-Ethnic Relations 
at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Moscow, from 1989 onward that includes 
Karely 2005, Karelʹskoe nacionalʹnoe dviženie 2009, 2012, Štrichi 
etnopolitičeskogo razvitija Komi respubliki 1994, 1997, Nacionalʹnye 
dviženija Marij El 1995, 1996, Obščestvennye dviženija v Mordovii 1993, 
Fenomen Udmurtii 2002–03; 2) Materials of the Political Monitoring, 
Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, Moscow, 1992–99 and 
Regiony Rossii 2000, 2003; 3) Bulletins, Annual Reports and other 
materials of the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early 
Warning of Conflicts (EAWARN), run by the experts of the Institute 
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of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow, from 1998 onward; 4) Materials of the Finno-Ugric Bulletin 
issued by the Consultative Committee of Finno-Ugric Peoples, 
2000–06. Also some monographs were consulted that most nota-
bly depict the development of the national movements and regional 
politics in the individual republics (e.g., Butvilo 1998, Mares eʹv 1996, 
Popov & Nesterova 2000, Belokurova & Denisova 2003, Egorov & 
Matsuzato 2000).
3.  Theoretical  Framework
A century ago Wilhelm Dilthey (1883/1989) famously drew a distinc-
tion between natural and human sciences. According to his view, the 
task of the natural sciences is to arrive at law-based explanations, 
while the task of the human sciences is the understanding of human 
life. Within the latter task, humanities and social sciences also dif-
fer in their methods. The first tends to be more analytic and inter-
ested in individual free will while the second is empirically based 
and thus, could permit some law-based explanations. The problem of 
whether social structure or human agency is the primary source of 
human action is still among today’s most debated topics in the social 
sciences. Among the different disciplines in these two spheres of 
knowledge, respectively, sociolinguistic and sociology of language 
address the relationships between language and society from oppo-
site directions and have different subjects. Sociolinguistics explores 
how languages are influenced by social conditions, while the sociol-
ogy of language explores how societies are influenced by linguistic 
diversity (see Wardhaugh 2009: 13–15, also Spolsky 2011).
The problem of language is central for post-modern philosophy. 
Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/1986) doubts the possibility 
of the use of language as a tool for objectively describing ‘truth’ 
because, according to him, language is socially conditioned. We 
understand the world solely in our linguistic and social constructs, 
i.e., in Wittgenstein’s terms, play ‘language games’. As a way to pro-
ceed, philosophers address the issues of deconstruction, language 
pragmatics and language politics. The official status of both the 
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majority and minority languages could be best approached within 
the context of language politics. Michel Foucault (1969/2002) wrote 
about the power of language and argued that a given discourse 
is a reflection of power structures and that what one deems to be 
truth or valid knowledge is based upon the discourse of a particular 
period of time. While the post-modern philosophers were problema-
tizing the language of knowledge in general, language politics lies 
at the core of their reasoning both within the language system as 
well as between the languages.
Scientists like Pierre Bourdieu (1977) have made an attempt to 
link the social structure and human agency. Bourdieu (1991) crit-
icized the view of linguists on language as a pure structure and 
emphasized its belonging to the world of politics where it has sym-
bolic power. The official language becomes one of the power struc-
tures, because both the dominant and dominated groups ‘misrecog-
nize’ it as a superior language (Bourdieu 1977: 30). Bourdieu shows 
how historically it were members of the upper classes who gained a 
de facto monopoly over political power through literally possessing 
the official language, i.e., through their exclusive linguistic compe-
tence. The official status of language was, thus, linked to the modern 
nation-state. Moreover, the making of the nation forges a standard 
language, in the creation of which ‘the educational system plays a 
decisive role’ (1991: 44–46).
Bourdieu was not alone in emphasizing the link between the 
official language and the modern nation-state. One of the central 
parts of Benedict Anderson’s argument in explaining the emergence 
of the nation as ‘imagined community’ was his stressing of the role 
of print technologies in the dissemination of languages-of-power 
(Anderson 1983: 44–45). Ernest Gellner links nationalism to the 
development of homogenous ‘high culture’, transmitted through a 
written language (Gellner 1983: 55). There are about 200 states in the 
world, and most of them constitute themselves as nation-states, i.e., 
the states that draw their legitimacy from sovereign nations. These 
are the states, in which the principle of nationalism is declared to 
be exercised. Such a state of affairs was famously defined by Ernest 
Gellner as the congruence of the political and geographical unit 
with cultural and ethnic entity (Gellner 1983: 1).
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Moreover, since the Herderian idea of ‘one state, one nation, 
one language’ was first disseminated in the 19th century, the mod-
ern nation-state typically granted the official status to a national 
language. With the arrival of the modern era, language shift and 
ethnic assimilation of minority communities were considered to be 
natural and even needed for the formation of the nation-states. In 
the modern state, official language served the policy of the integra-
tion of minorities by acquiring majority culture at the expense of 
their own culture, i.e., in the long run, the policy of assimilation and 
unification of the population.
3.1.  O f f ic ia l  Language as  a  Pol i t ical  and Legal 
Phenomenon in  the Mult i l ingual  Contex t
Researchers are not tired of repeating again and again that there 
are practically no culturally and ethnically homogenous states. The 
nation-state often designates the language associated with its nation 
as the official language of the country, even though its population 
might be multilingual and often due to the fact that it is multilin-
gual. In recent decades the position of languages in the multilin-
gual contexts has been the subject of extensive academic research. 
Typically these are interdisciplinary projects which often emerge 
at the crossroads of the sociology of language, studies of language 
policy and language revitalization (for example, ELDIA or Poga: see 
Saarikivi & Marten 2012). In the case of the official status of minor-
ity languages such an approach would not suffice precisely because 
of the presence of a political component. This phenomenon could 
be best understood in the interchange of political science, law, soci-
ology, ethnology, anthropology, linguistics, history, economics and 
some other disciplines.
In some countries, e.g. in Australia, the United States, Chile 
or Mexico, the state authorities de facto work in a certain language 
without any official statement regarding its status. In some other 
countries such as Albania, North and South Korea, or Iceland, this 
designation is a trivial act, which does not have any other conse-
quences for the actual official language use, but rather conveys a 
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symbolic message regarding the position of that language in society. 
As there is no common international standard, this formal desig-
nation is, nevertheless, valid, because any special status given to a 
language in a particular state or other territory makes it official, as 
pointed out previously in Section 1.2.
Yet, in other countries two or more languages are designated 
official: more than a third of world’s countries fall into this cate-
gory (de Varennes 2012: 11). In the case of the coexistence of two 
or more languages, the designation of a language with an official 
status often is a decision about its future and no longer a trivial act. 
The decision is in effect pressure from the side of the state upon its 
citizens to use a certain language in certain public contexts at the 
expense of other languages (see de Varennes 1996: 86). It is not sur-
prising then that non-dominant ethnic groups strive to designate 
their languages as official at least in particular regions. That is how 
sometimes multilingual states emerge also as multinational states, 
where two or more nations are politically recognized through the 
territorial solutions such as autonomy or federation, and also the 
functioning of languages is bound through official recognition to 
the territoriality principle (see McRae 1975). In multinational coun-
tries, such as Canada, Switzerland or Belgium, the designation of 
official languages is an important political decision that can be 
understood in the context of relations between the central govern-
ment and regions (see next Section).
The designation of the official language can be accomplished as 
a legal or political act. It is legal if it creates rights and/or obligations. 
Yet, even if it was a legal act, a political decision is usually behind it 
(May 2001). Therefore, in looking for functions of the official desig-
nation of languages in a multilingual situation, the argument could 
be structured against the background of at least two academic dis-
ciplines, where the official status of languages is meaningful, law 
and political science. Accordingly, the phenomenon of the official 
designation of languages as both a political and legal act should 
be studied in the context of interconnectedness of the political sci-
ence and law (see, e.g., Kymlicka & Grin 2003). Moreover, in order to 
provide insights on the dynamics of interplay between the driving 
forces of linguistic politics, the study should not be restricted to the 
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language policy analysis and legal analysis, but should engage the 
perspective of the studies on ethnicity and nationalism. Of course, 
legal and political approaches to finding the place of ethnicity in 
society should not be viewed as a separate strategy, but rather as 
the adjacent processes, when the political decision takes the form 
of a legal act (see for details on approaching the ‘national question’ 
in the relationship between law and politics in Zamjatin 2005: 259).
3. 2.  O f f ic ia l  Languages  and the State  Struc ture: 
A  Perspec t ive  of  Federal ism Theor ies
The political decision on the status of languages will be a part 
in the distribution of political power that takes into account the 
principles of accommodation of ethnic diversity in a country. In 
those countries, where ethnic and linguistic minorities are typi-
cally numerically small and live on territories conjoined to their 
homeland behind an international border, the issue of their lan-
guage protection is solved in legislation on national minorities. In 
other countries there are mixed populations, which consist of dif-
ferent ethnic and national groups, relatively big in numbers and 
often autochthonous to their homeland territories. In the latter case 
the term ‘national minorities’ is not used domestically towards the 
autochthonous groups, even if de facto, numerically and in the con-
text of international law, they could be referred to as such. These 
communities demand public recognition of identity-related differ-
ences and are often integrated in the state structure in the form of 
autonomy or territorial unit of a federal state, which is typically 
interpreted as internal implementation of the right to national self-
determination. In such countries ethnic and linguistic issues are 
typically regulated in constitutional legislation (see Tully 2008: 
186–187, 215–217).
The most widespread way of constitutional regulation of lan-
guage issues would be the designation of languages, usually the 
majority language, but in some cases also minority languages, with 
official status. In federative and multinational countries at times 
official status is given simultaneously to majority language and 
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minority languages, both at federal/central and regional level or 
only at regional level. Countries diverge depending on the level 
and volume of official bilingualism and multilingualism. Typically, 
minority languages with the official status of national language or 
state language are not used by all state’s government bodies and in 
all institutions in public sectors of society. Different countries solve 
the issues of official bilingualism and multilingualism differently.
For instance, in Britain the central government works exclu-
sively in English. Apart from England, other historical adminis-
trative-political parts of Britain are officially bilingual. In Wales 
and Scotland the official languages are English and, accordingly, 
Welsh and Gaelic. The position of Welsh is relatively strong in com-
parison to other minority languages with an official status. For 
example, Welsh is a compulsory subject in school for all students 
in Wales (Huws 2006: 144). In Spain the central government is uni-
lingual too and uses Castilian. At the same time, some minority 
languages are either co-official languages or otherwise officially 
recognized in some autonomous communities. Remarkable success 
was achieved in the revitalization of the Basque language (Arzoz 
2014). In Finland the national languages are Finnish and Swedish, 
and the central authorities use both. Provincial authorities work in 
Finnish and in the province of Åland islands in Swedish. Municipal 
authorities can be Finnish or Swedish, or be bilingual, while some 
municipalities composing the Saami homeland can also use this 
language. Regarding the history of establishing of its national lan-
guages, Finland is an interesting case, because this act was inter-
preted as intended to be only about the languages of the state and 
disconnected from any symbolic recognition of the status of the 
Swedish-speaking minority as another nationality (Modeen 1999).
In Canada the language policy is official bilingualism both at 
federal and regional level (in provinces and territories). The federal 
government works in two languages. In the province of Quebec the 
sole official language is French, in the province New Brunswick and 
also in Manitoba both English and French. In other provinces only 
English is official. In the Yukon Territory both English and French 
are official. In the territories Nunavut, North-West Territories, and 
the northern part of Quebec, Nunavik, the official languages in 
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addition to English and French are the indigenous languages (see, 
e.g., Kymlicka 1995). The situation of Canada with its diversity of 
state-founding nations, first nations, minorities and migrants as 
well as its reflection in the federative structure of the state is the 
closest to the situation in Russia.
The comparison of the federal political systems in Canada and 
Russia is in many respects illustrative of the fact how the norma-
tive concept of federalism as a political ideology might have differ-
ent readings in its practice as an institutional arrangement. Russia 
and Canada are the largest countries in the world by area and are 
also among the most ethnically diverse societies. Both factors rep-
resent a challenge for efficient governance and both in Russia and 
Canada this problem was addressed by the means of federalism, 
which was famously defined by Ronald Watts as a normative con-
cept according to which ‘multi-tiered government’ should combine 
‘elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule’ (Watts 1996: 6–7).
At the same time, the differences in political organization 
between the countries are remarkable. Writing about the origins 
of federalism, William Riker described the formation of the fed-
eration as the process of ‘coming-together’ of political units into 
a single nation under such incentives as existence of an exter-
nal threat and their ability to retain decision-making over some 
issues, which is then a matter for bargaining between the center 
and regions (Riker 1975: 114). Alfred Stepan criticized Riker’s model 
as one based on the American experience and not fit for general-
ization. For example, in the case of Canada the ‘coming-together’ 
model could be applied only towards the British colonies, while 
Quebec represented a territory different by language and claim-
ing its status of a separate national community. Stepan suggested 
to conceptualize the cases when a federalist system emerged as a 
result of constitutional devolution of powers (for example, in post-
Soviet Russia) as a model of ‘holding together’ political units of dif-
ferent linguistic, cultural and religious groups that retain their sta-
tus as national communities, and the cases of forming federation 
by an utterly coercive centralizing power as a ‘putting together’ 
model, of which he names the USSR as an exemplary case (Stepan 
1999: 22–23, Gagnon 2001: 333).
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In interpreting the events of the early 1990s, Russian theorists 
used to distinguish two basic approaches to federalism that were 
conceptualized as ‘constitutional-treaty federation’ and ‘treaty-con-
stitutional federation’, depending on whether the center is said to 
have delegated its powers to regions or vice versa (see Chakimov 
2009). The treaty component stemmed from the declarations of sov-
ereignty and was fixed first in the Federation Treaty of 1992 and 
later in bilateral treaties of 1994–1998 on the delineation of powers 
between the federal center and regions (Kahn 2000: 80–86). Yet, the 
Russian constitution of 1993 was imposed from above and has not 
incorporated the Federation Treaty, and since 1999 the recentraliza-
tion reforms marked a further move towards a pseudo-federation. 
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary note that a ‘coming-together’ 
and genuine democratic federation are more likely to endure than 
a ‘hold together’ undemocratic pseudo-federation (McGarry & 
O’Leary 2005: 285–286).
Among the challenges to the federal government that strives to 
hold together different national communities are, then, also linguis-
tic and ethnic tensions, when the elites bargain for a higher status 
of their regions because they form separate nations. That bargaining 
might result in the creation of a democratic multinational federa-
tion, which, however, does not only reflect power relations but also 
has normative justifications (see, e.g., Gagnon 2001). Since Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s famous work, federalism is typically considered essen-
tial for the creation and maintenance of democracy (Tocqueville 
1835/1840/2000). Yet, democracy is not always a prerequisite for fed-
eralism and in countries with authoritarian regimes, such as con-
temporary Russia, it is used also as a device of diversity manage-
ment, a mechanism of political stabilization and even a method of 
conflict resolution (McGarry & O’Leary 2005). The peculiarity of 
multinational federations as democracies is that, besides individual 
rights, they might recognize also some group rights in national 
sub-units as acknowledgement of alternative forms of belonging in 
‘deep’ diversity (Taylor 1993). Group rights become, then, one source 
of asymmetry between sub-units of multinational federations.
Both Canada and Russia established constitutional asymmetry 
that refers to the differences of the legal status and self-government 
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of sub-units of the federation (Requejo 2001: 313–314). However, in 
terms of diversity management, Canada could be a case of ‘linguis-
tic federalism’ (see typology of the language policies in Kraus 2008: 
95–96), whereas Russia is typically described as a case of ‘ethnic fed-
eralism’ (Roeder 1991, Bowring 2010). Russia’s level of constitutional 
asymmetry is sometimes reported to be higher than in other coun-
tries because of the complexity of its political system (Ross 2002: 
7–8), but the constituent republics have only two additional rights 
in comparison to other regions: the right to have their own consti-
tution and the right to designate their state languages (see Section 
1 above). While Stepan emphasizes that Russia does not work con-
stitutionally as a democratic federation, he admits that its asym-
metrical federalism is not an exception but rather proves the rule 
that nearly all multinational federations are asymmetrical (Stepan 
1999: 31).
Federalism, thus, creates the institutional framework for iden-
tity politics by linking diversity with territorial self-government, 
where sub-national units can pursue their policies according to the 
needs of the respective linguistic or national community. David 
Cashaback argued that Russia’s asymmetrical federal design puts 
no major constrains on regional language policy in Tatarstan 
(Cashaback 2008). It is argued in the current study that the federal 
design had a restrictive effect on language policy in the Finno-Ugric 
Republics, even if the Russian constitution does not institute asym-
metry between the constituent republics. Will Kymlicka notes that 
‘federalism can only serve as a mechanism for self-government if the 
national minority forms a majority in one of the federal sub-units’ 
(Kymlicka 1995: 29), which, however, is not the case in the Finno-
Ugric Republics. The study of regional language policies should be 
conducted, then, in a vertical federal center – regions dimension in 
addition to horizontal dimension of the regional political cycle (see 
Articles 1 and 2).
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3.3.  Theor ies  of  Language Pol ic y  and Their  Approaches
Several other disciplines have at their disposal instruments to tackle 
the problems of understanding how different languages function in 
the public sphere. The closest projects involved in the study of this 
phenomenon are the interdisciplinary academic fields of language 
policy theories and nationalism studies, both of which contribute to 
understanding the subject of this study. The interdisciplinary char-
acter of this study is enhanced by the interfunctionality of these 
two fields that often operate with similar or conjoined concepts.
The distinction between language politics and language policy 
is not immediately evident in some languages as the terms might 
coincide, but the first term relates to interactions between different 
actors in a society regarding language and its place in the political 
arena, while the second signifies an actor’s intention to achieve some 
change with regard to language issues. Depending on the actor, one 
can speak about a school’s language policy, family language policy 
and even individual language policy. Of course, the state is a major 
player in language politics because in the modern and postmodern 
era it can penetrate unprecedentedly deeply into the life of society 
by using such policy devices as the designation of languages with 
an official status.
According to Elana Shohamy’s definition, language policy is 
what a government does either officially through legislation, court 
decisions or policy to determine how languages are used and culti-
vates those language skills needed to meet certain national priori-
ties or to establish the rights of individuals or groups to use and to 
maintain languages (Shohamy 2006: 1–3). In fact, language policy 
can be directed at the promotion and maintenance of linguistic 
diversity or at the elimination of diversity and the promotion of a 
linguistically unified state.
Today, it is widely recognized that languages form an essen-
tially important part of culture and that linguistic and ethnic diver-
sity is a value for human development. For example, linguistic diver-
sity is constituted as a cultural value, that is especially important 
in education, in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity (2 November 2001). Languages of the linguistic and 
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national minorities are typically among the endangered ones (see 
Austin & Sallabank 2011: 3–4). In order to ensure linguistic diversity 
and maintenance of the languages of minorities, steps are taken by 
states either in the form of the protection of language rights or in 
the form of legal regulations directed at the promotion of languages. 
These steps are formulated as the language policy of the state. 
Sometimes language policy and language planning are distin-
guishable: while the former is described as top-down government 
activity, the latter is described as a grass-root activity (Sallabank 
2011: 277–278). Yet, the level of involvement of different actors varies 
rather depending on the type of language planning: status planning, 
corpus planning and acquisition planning. Robert Cooper defines 
language planning as ‘deliberate efforts to influence the behavior 
of others with respect to the acquisition, structure or functional 
allocation of their language codes’ (Cooper 1990: 45). Acquisition 
planning aims at increasing the number of language users through 
education and can involve both state, regional and local educators as 
well as non-governmental organizations. Planners of the language 
corpus aim at changing the structure of language and typically are 
linguists. Status planning implies ‘the allocation of languages or 
language varieties to given functions’ and is a matter of politicians 
(Cooper 1990: 29–34).
If there is an official language in a country, it probably means 
that behind the official status there is a policy of promotion of that 
language in the public sphere at the expense of other languages. 
In the conditions of globalization, the governments will sometimes 
pursue the policy of protection even of world languages, such as 
French, German or Russian, in the face of global English, domesti-
cally and internationally. When languages of national minorities 
are given an official status, this is considered to be a sign of the 
policy for promotion of diversity. Recent history provides some 
examples of successful stories like those of Welsh, Basque or even 
Hebrew when language revival was enhanced by the official policy 
(see, e.g., Fishman 1991).
From the perspective of the theories of language policy, offi-
cialization is a possible tool of status planning that can be directed 
at language maintenance or revival, which in turn is considered a 
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legitimate goal of language policy (Hornberger 2006). The endeavor 
of language maintenance and revival is opposed from the position 
of language rationalization, e.g., by the arguments of economic 
inefficiency and the impracticality of designation of several official 
languages (see, e.g., Pool 1991). Some theorists also presented their 
responses to the instrumentalist critiques (see, e.g., Fishman 2001, 
May 2005a). 
The authorities are often reluctant to give an official status to 
minority language and use the instrumental line of argument: offi-
cials assume that designation of two and more official languages 
would make governance ‘unworkable’ and ‘unmanageable’ and, fur-
ther, that such designation would pose a threat to national unity 
by inspiring minority political aspirations. Jan Blommaert criti-
cized ‘the efficiency assumption’ and ‘the integration assumption’ 
and pointed out that one-official-language policy is rooted itself in 
essentialist views and based in the nation-state model (Blommaert 
1996: 210–212).
Language rationalization and its economic line of argument 
correspond to instrumentalist language planning. The instrumen-
talist approach to language policy sees in revivalist rhetoric marks 
of the primordialist account. The instrumentalist argument goes 
that the language does not represent intrinsic value in itself but only 
as a tool that is valuable to the extent that it helps to achieve some 
other ends (Robichaud & De Schutter 2012: 124). François Grin gives 
a minimum of sociolinguistic criteria for official designation of lan-
guages such as demographic strength of a language, its asymmetri-
cal position etc. (Grin 1995: 37–38). All in all, the theories of language 
policy tend to explain the officialization of languages in sociolin-
guistic terms and for linguistic needs, while largely underestimat-
ing the importance of extralinguistic variables in this process.
Yet, in many instances these are foremost political consider-
ations that prevail at the stage of policy adoption, particularly if it 
takes place in the conditions of the overall changes in the society 
and the rebalancing of the political regime. That is why the politi-
cal discourse sometimes reaches deeper into the dynamics of the 
official language planning. Notably, the problem of understanding 
the political context for officialization remained understudied in the 
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two dominant research approaches to research on language policy 
in the 1990s: the legal-institutional approach and, more recently, the 
linguistic human rights approach. The first is mostly limited to the 
question of compatibility in legal provisions but typically does not 
explore in depth why some languages would be designated official 
(see, e.g., de Varennes 1996, Ruíz Vieytez 2004). The linguistic human 
rights approach places the emphasis on universal linguistic rights 
and does not deal so much with the obligations stemming from the 
official status (see, e.g., Skutnabb-Kangas 2000).
In the 2000s, the role of a minority language as the official lan-
guage was tackled by researchers using new approaches, including 
the approach based on the normative political theory and the policy 
analysis approach. From the positions of the former approach the 
concept of ‘official-language rights’ was suggested as one of the nor-
mative models of linguistic diversity management (see, e.g., May 2001, 
2005a, 2005b, Réaume 2000, Patten & Kymlicka 2003, Patten 2001, 
2006, Ricento 2006, Arzoz 2010). Among the models, de Varennes 
notes that the use of more than one official language in practice of 
most countries is done either through the territoriality principle or 
the personality principle or their combination (de Varennes 2012: 22).
Regarding the policy analysis, the issues of policy efficiency 
and costs are among the most discussed. So far, the policy analysis 
attempts traditionally to consider the policy as a complex phenom-
enon and study it as the political process of the development in a 
sequence of stages. For example, writing about the stages in the lan-
guage policy, Bernard Spolsky (2004: 5–15) distinguishes between 
language practices, language ideology and language planning. 
François Grin, then, perceived also language plan ning as a sequence 
of stages: policy adoption, its implementation and evaluation, in his 
C-O-D model of creating capacity, opportunity and desire to speak 
minority language in the context of its protection and promotion 
(Grin 2003: 47).
From the perspective of political science, language policy is 
one of the public policies, which could be studied in different ways. 
A traditional conceptual framework for the policy analysis was the 
stages approach that divided the policy process into a series of stages, 
which is, however, considered to be outdated, inter alia, because in 
3 .  t H e O r e t i c A l  f r A M e w O r K
4 7
reality all the stages take place simultaneously (Sabatier 2007: 6–7; 
see Section 2.3). This study leaves the process of policymaking in the 
‘black box’ and does not go into details as to how the political deci-
sions are taken. It is rather restricted to the inference of the outputs 
in the form of the official documents from inputs, such as official 
demands of popular movements. The realized problem is that there 
are no perfect methods in social sciences for studies of social actions 
in their connection to human agency and it is also realized that the 
problem of methods should not prevent the study itself.
3.4.  Func t ions  of  the O f f ic ia l  Language and 
Possib le  Just i f icat ions  of  O f f ic ia l  Status 
in  the Case of  Minor i t y  Languages
Eduardo Ruíz Vieytez (2004) considered the official status of lan-
guages as a legal category and, from a comparative legal perspec-
tive, studied constitutions of European countries, suggesting tax-
onomy of groups of constitutional language provisions, such as 
linguistic declarations, non-discrimination clauses, knowledge 
requirements, recognition of linguistic rights and others. His com-
prehensive study across countries elucidated structural components 
that make minority languages official and his taxonomy is useful 
for providing different-level perspectives, such as the policy per-
spective and the linguistic rights perspective. Yet, in order to under-
stand the reasons for the official designation, one should not restrict 
oneself to the structural analysis but should also consider official 
status as a political phenomenon and look for the agency behind it. 
This study combines both strategies: in line with new institutional-
ism it approaches official language as a social institution, but it also 
understands demands for its designation as a social action.
In order to analyze not only official policy, but also de facto pol-
icy, one should look beyond legislative provisions and address their 
institutionalization in the light of language use. Language use is a 
complex phenomenon and its analysis can produce a classification 
of the domains of language use like the one suggested by Joshua 
Fishman (1972, 1991). Fishman’s Graded Intergenerational Disruption 
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Scale (GIDS) can be elaborated on and utilized for the purpose of 
this study as the basis for textual analysis of the language laws in 
looking for the elements of the official status of language (Fishman 
1991: 87–109). His first four stages in reversing language shift refer to 
language use in family and represent steps needed to ensure stable 
diglossia, i.e., bilingualism of a community, when one language or 
dialect has a better position, higher prestige etc. than the other. They 
belong to the private sphere and, thus, are not within the scope of 
the official status. The other four stages are aimed at transcending 
diglossia and normalizing language use in public domains (Fishman 
1991: 400). Based on Fishman’s scale, the four domains that consti-
tute the public sphere of language use are: 1) languages in office of 
authorities and organization, 2) language in the work environment, 
3) languages in mass media, and 4) languages in education.
The distinction between the public and private sphere is 
important in the context of the official status of language. An offi-
cial language not merely is, but has to be used in the work of the 
public bodies. Therefore, in a multilingual context, its official sta-
tus in effect demands the compulsory use of certain languages in 
the public sphere. A qualification has to be made here that ‘the use 
of a language by state authorities does not necessarily correspond 
to its official status’ and that ‘a presumption that the choice of an 
official language should as a consequence carry with it an obliga-
tion on state authorities to use it’ is not correct for all countries 
(de Varennes 2012: 4). Indeed, as it is argued in this study, the offi-
cial status of non-Russian languages in the Russian regions often 
remained symbolic because these languages were not actually used 
or were used only randomly by authorities. Yet, this is rather a mat-
ter of definition.
For example, Robert Cooper distinguishes three types of official 
languages: statutory, working, and symbolic. If the first type implies 
the formal fact of the official designation, the second ‘a government 
uses as a medium for its day-to-day activities’ and the third is ‘a lan-
guage which a government uses as a medium for symbolic purposes’ 
(Cooper 1990: 100). For the purpose of this study, while Cooper’s first 
type constitutes a necessary condition for the official status, the sec-
ond and the third types represent the two main functions of the 
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official languages. In most cases compulsory use is essential for offi-
cial language, while the distinction between ‘official language’ and 
‘national language’ helps to reveal nuances of symbolic and practical 
use (see Section 1.1), which de Varennes categorizes as the distinction 
between the official status and the use of a language by authorities 
(de Varennes 2012: 4–7). It has to be added here that instead of sym-
bol or use sometimes one can speak about symbolic use of official 
languages, which should be incorporated in the two main functions 
rather than ignored in categorization of types or left in the gray zone 
between formal designation and the actual use.
De Varennes further points out that, while the designation of 
the official languages is clearly within a state’s sovereignty, the state 
authorities do not have totally free hands in defining the scope of its 
use. One important limitation is that official language cannot pre-
clude the use of other languages by authorities, if this violates inter-
national human rights. He cites the case of Diergaardt v. Namibia of 
1997 as an example of the situation when official language operated 
in a discriminatory way by unreasonably and unjustifiably prohibit-
ing the use of other languages (Ibid.: 7–10). At the same time, often 
compulsory use of an official language actually restricts individual 
freedoms to choose the language of communication only in the pri-
vate sphere. This latter confinement does not automatically contra-
dict the international standards of human rights protection, because 
they are intended, inter alia, to protect an individual from the state 
and its intrusion in private affairs.
The non-interference is warranted by human rights such as the 
right to privacy and the freedom to express oneself in a language of 
one’s choice (see, e.g., a famous case Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre 
v. Canada, of 1993). Still, the official language can affect language use 
in private life too in the issues that have importance for the welfare 
of the society, but such interference has to be justified. For example, 
in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General) of 1988 the court found viola-
tion of freedom of expression in a legislative demand from private 
business to ensure access to goods or services only in an official lan-
guage (by requirement that food products are labeled accordingly). 
In addition to the right to private life and the freedom of expression, 
international human rights law provides an abundance of cases, 
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inter alia, on limitations of the use of official languages by the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination on the basis of language or the right of 
persons belonging to national minorities to use their languages (see 
an overview of the case law in de Varennes 1996, 2012), but does not 
say much about the content of the official status, which is a preroga-
tive of the state.
What does it practically mean that a language functions as an 
official language? Different classifications could be suggested. In its 
practical function, the official language operates as: 1) a working 
language of state authorities and institutions, 2) a language of com-
munication between authorities and citizens as well as other public 
communications, 3) when public institutions provide public services 
in the official language (which are, actually, the most important 
areas of communications: see Zamyatin 2014a). If the three practical 
functions of official languages are conjoined with the domains of 
official language use, then the distribution of the functional spheres 
is the following. The first domain on language of state authorities 
represents the functioning of the official languages as working lan-
guages and languages of communication. The second, third and 
fourth domains on work environment, mass media and education 
represent the functioning of the official languages as the medium of 
public services.
Further insights into domains and corresponding functions 
revealing sectors of official language use can be obtained by engag-
ing structural analysis of the bodies of state power and other public 
institutions. According to one of the broadest definitions, the offi-
cial language is used in parliament, administration, and the judicial 
system. Further, it is used as a medium of public services in state 
institutions, first of all, in official periodicals and other official mass 
media, including TV and radio broadcasting, as well as state-funded 
public schools, but also in public health, social services etc. Finally, 
it is used in local self-government.
When the state has a federative structure, the official language 
is used at central, regional and municipal level. In countries where 
there is more than one official language, minority languages are 
given an official or co-official status in the autonomy/province/
other territorial unit and/or in the whole territory along with the 
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majority language: in other words, both at central and regional level 
or only at regional level. Given these possibilities, it is important to 
understand what parts of the state mechanism have to be bilingual 
according to the language legislation, interact bilingually with citi-
zens or provide bilingual public services (see Section 3.2.).
What are the reasons for designating a language as being offi-
cial? Language use by authorities is central for the official language, 
but practical consideration that authorities have to operate in some 
language is not sufficient reason for an official language. Neither 
was the need for official language always justified solely by correla-
tion of language and nation in the nation-state and in the ideology 
of nationalism (see Section 3 above). In the context of classical lib-
eralism, it has been argued that the people not only have to share 
common values for democracy to work properly, but also a common 
language is crucial for citizens to be able to participate in public 
debate (Mill 1859/1972). As multinational states became widespread 
in the 20th century, liberal thought had to address the challenges of 
nationality both from within, through communitarian critique, as 
well as from the standpoint of alternative doctrines (see Kymlicka 
1995, Miller 1998; also Article 4: 127–128).
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the official recogni-
tion of a language puts it in a much more advantageous position in 
comparison to other languages in a country. In practice it frequently 
means that this language becomes an obligatory working language 
of authorities and that this language will be the language of their 
communications with citizens. All inhabitants of a country have to 
have good command of this language to be successful citizens. This 
situation was addressed not only in terms of efficiency but also jus-
tice (see, e.g., Kymlicka 1995: chapter 6).
What could be possible justifications for an official language 
in the case of minority languages? One justification for the co-
official status of minority languages is to provide public services 
to those minority members who do not speak the majority lan-
guage or speak it badly. Another justification is that in the condi-
tions of the dominant language serious measures are needed for 
the minority languages protection. So the (co-) official status could 
be given to ensure protection of the minority language. That is 
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why in the case of minority languages not only official designa-
tion, but also the functioning of a language in the capacity of an 
official language is important. The latter implies the need for the 
adoption of language legislation, and first of all, the adoption of a 
language law.
International standards for protection of minority languages 
can include certain measures for ensuring the language use of 
minority languages also in public life, as do, for example, both 
conventions of the Council of Europe directed at minority lan-
guages’ protection. The Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (1995) encourages the states to recognize the 
right of persons belonging to minorities to use their language in 
public and to introduce minority language use in relations between 
these persons and authorities (Art. 9). One of the principles of the 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) is the 
encouragement of minority language use in public life. Substantial 
provisions of the Charter include measures in sectors of education, 
courts, administration, mass media, cultural and economic life, 
i.e., reflecting all domains of official language use. Nevertheless, 
despite all these measures, a minority language receives an official 
status only after it has explicitly been designated to be an official 
language.
Therefore, yet another justification of the (co-) official status of 
minority language, which is connected to the protection, might be 
the need for the symbolic political recognition of a group not as a 
(linguistic) minority, but as a constituent nation/people having the 
right of national self-determination, being in a minority situation 
within a larger society and implementing its right of self-determi-
nation internally in a form of autonomy, a province or other his-
torical territorial unit within a larger state (see previous Section). 
According to the same liberal logic, the territorial community 
needs a common language or languages for its normal function-
ing, which becomes, then, an aspect of sovereignty of this territo-
rial unit. Incidentally, this need is used as an argument by authori-
ties for introducing the compulsory study of official languages of 
this territory by all its inhabitants irrespective of their ethnicity. 
Symbolic recognition becomes particularly important for raising 
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the prestige of a minority language, inter alia, for reinforcement of 
national identity.
An empirical study could test these and other hypotheses and 
produce evidence, whether the official status can work in the case of 
minority languages as a tool of languages protection and promotion 
or symbolic recognition is behind their official designation or it has 
some other reasons.
4.  Framework  for  Empir ical  Study
Soviet language planning of the 1930s produced remarkable results: 
many languages for the first time in history acquired their writ-
ten forms and started to be taught in school. The languages of the 
peoples of the USSR were proclaimed equal, but in the following 
decades their functional distribution and actual use differenti-
ated more and more. In the last years of the Soviet period Russian 
acquired the position of the de facto official language, but the sphere 
of language use remained under-regulated. In Russia and other 
post-Soviet countries, it was precisely the status of languages that 
became one of the most controversial issues around the language 
policy formation.
It is no coincidence that both the SSRs and later ASSRs concen-
trated their language policies and language planning around status 
planning and legal planning. The political status of ‘peoples’ and 
their languages was implanted in the hierarchy of Soviet federalism. 
As a consequence, language policy in both the Soviet Union and in 
the Russian Federation, at least until recent times, was considered 
as an integral part of nationalities policy which in turn was con-
joined to federalist policy. In the processes of the disintegration of 
the USSR, the formation of language policy coincided with wider 
overall policy changes. The transition period of the late 1980s – early 
1990s was characterized by the simultaneous enforcement of the 
new goals in language policy and nationalities policy. One should 
look beyond the language policy goals and take into consideration 
the context of state-building and nation-building, in order to under-
stand the language policy formation in the Russian regions. Area 
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studies may lack a depth of abstraction but they can significantly 
contribute to substantiation of theoretical claims with empirical 
material (Bunce 1999: 162–164). This part will outline the dimensions 
of empirical study of languages’ officialization within Russian stud-
ies and Finno-Ugrian studies.
4.1.  Language Pol ic y  in  Soviet  and Russian Studies
Both the Soviet and Russian cases with their multitude of languages 
are particularly interesting for a study on language policy of a coun-
try from the perspective of the official status of languages. Soviet 
and Russian studies is an interdisciplinary academic field that can 
provide comparative studies with plentiful empirical materials that 
are available since the collapse of the USSR. Studies on Soviet lan-
guage policy and multilingualism have been an integral part of 
Soviet studies (Comrie 1981, Grenoble 2003, Kirkwood 1989, Lewis 
1972 and others). The ideologeme (signifying the ‘right thinking’) 
of the equality of ‘peoples of the USSR’ and their languages prede-
termined the particular use of corresponding termini throughout 
the Soviet period and beyond it. Due to Soviet legacies, in many 
post-Soviet countries the usage of terms connected to languages in 
the public sphere is exceptional (Lallukka 1990: 78–82, Haarmann 
1998: 226). The term ‘minority languages,’ was usually not used with 
regard to the languages of the USSR. Instead, such terms in use were 
‘languages of the peoples of the USSR’, ‘titular languages’, ‘native 
languages’ and ‘language of internationality communication’. The 
term ‘national language’ was reserved for ‘the languages of the peo-
ples’; that is why in the new times, only the term ‘state language’ 
was available (see Section 1.2 above).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, language policies of 
the post-Soviet successor states became the subject of some com-
parative studies (e.g., Hogan-Brun, Ozolins, Ramonienė & Rannut 
2007, Hogan-Brun & Melnyk 2012, Laitin 1996, 1998, Leprêtre 2001, 
Language Policy in the Successor States 2000, Multilingualism in 
Post-Soviet Countries 2008 and others) and numerous case studies 
on individual states appeared. The language policy of the Russian 
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Federation has been the subject of Russian studies. In Russia in the 
early 1990s, along with Russian as the official language of the whole 
country, more than thirty languages were designated official state 
languages of the republics. The complexity of the Russian case is 
usually approached in state-wide surveys and only some studies on 
regional policies exist. Typically, this would be the case studies on 
the republics such as Tatarstan or Bashkortostan (e.g., Cashaback 
2008, Garipov & Faller 2003, Gorenburg 2005, Graney 1999, and oth-
ers) and only occasionally on some other republics (e.g., Grin 2000). 
In contrast with the plentitude of studies in comparative politics on 
the language policies of the former SSRs, there are practically no 
comparative studies on the former ASSRs.
There is a problem with the application of normative approaches 
in studies on Russia’s language policy. The official status of the state 
languages of the republics could be broadly seen as an example of 
the official-language rights model within the normative approach. 
However, these are not individuals but Republics that have the right 
to designate their state languages, and the act of designation does 
not in itself produce individual rights (see Section 2.2). For that 
reason the language rights-based approaches, either in its linguis-
tic human rights or language rights perspective, have rarely been 
applied in research on the contemporary language policy in Russia. 
It should be said that, in the Russian context, these are not language 
rights but political actions defining the core of linguistic politics, 
because not the rights enforcement mechanism but the status plan-
ning of state languages is the cornerstone of Russia’s language pol-
icy. In that sense the normative political theories come closer to the 
Russian realities than studies in language rights.
The official status of languages in Russia could be more ade-
quately approached from the legal-institutional perspective as a 
dimension of the territoriality principle of linguistic management 
within ethnic federalism, in which state obligations are not supple-
mented by the corresponding individual rights (de Varennes 2012: 
18–21). Both international and Russian scholars have addressed the 
issues related to Russia’s language policy, including the status of 
state languages in its republics, from the legal-institutional perspec-
tive (Dorovskich 2005, Galdia 2009, Neroznak 1996, 2002, Oeter 2012, 
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Tishkov et al. 2009, Ulasiuk 2011, Voroneckij 2009 and others). From 
the institutional perspective, the language status provides the key 
for understanding the language policy, because the place of lan-
guages in society is reflected in the hierarchy of their statuses as 1) 
‘state language of the Russian Federation’, 2) ‘language of the people 
of Russia’, 3) ‘state language of the republic’ or ‘titular language of 
the republic or autonomous district’, 4) ‘native language’.
Some Russian legal scholars deny the capacity of languages to 
be the legal subjects and to have rights and, for that reason, reject 
the possibility for the language to have a legal status, suggesting 
substituting the term ‘official status’ with the term ‘legal regime’ 
(e.g., Vasiljeva 2007). Despite its presence in Russia’s language law, 
the concept of legal ‘rights of languages’ is problematic, indeed. 
Yet, semantic fields of the terms ‘official status’/‘legal status’ and 
‘legal regime’ do not coincide and their delineation is meaningful. 
Russian lawyers typically distinguish, on the one hand, ‘legal facts’ 
(of which ‘legal act’ is one type), when change in a life circumstance, 
condition or situation triggers emergence of legal relations, and, on 
the other hand, ‘legal regimes’, when legal relations exist in a con-
tinuing state as long as there is no change. Accordingly, the act of 
momentary designation of language with an ‘official status’ should 
be distinguished from its continuing state-of art as a ‘legal regime’ 
(see Section 2.1 above).
This distinction is useful for a study of officialization as an 
extended in time process. The approaches specific to policy analy-
sis were sometimes employed in research conducted into various 
aspects of language policy in the Soviet Union. For example, in his 
analysis of the stages of language planning in the USSR, Michael 
Kirkwood (1989: 2–5) distinguishes the stages of initial fact find-
ing and procedures, implementation, and evaluation of language 
policy. The approaches specific to policy analysis were sometimes 
used in research conducted into various aspects of Russia’s language 
policy (Alpatov 2000, Djačkov 1996, Guboglo 1993, 1998, Solncev & 
Michalʹčenko 2000, Vachtin 2001, and others). However, no system-
atic research from the perspective of the policy analysis has been 
conducted on the phenomenon of the state languages at the level of 
Russia’s republics.
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4. 2.  Col lapse of  the USSR and Russian 
Nat ion-Bui lding through the Pr ism of 
Studies  of  Ethnici t y  and Nat ional ism
Official designation of language is a political and legal act and at 
least in multinational and multi-ethnic countries it should be con-
sidered not just from the perspective of theories on language policy 
but from a wider perspective of studies on ethnicity and nationalism. 
The studies of ethnicity and nationalism provide the necessary con-
text for understanding of the interactions between ethnic groups, 
the majority-minority relations in society and the impact of the pub-
lic policy on them and, important for this study, the significance of 
language for identity and nationalism (see, e.g., Edwards 2009).
Some specific terminology in the field was historically devel-
oped in the Russian context that often differs from the terms usu-
ally used in academic English to signify the according phenomena 
and in many instances represents translations from Russian (see 
Lallukka 1990: 43–45, Haarmann 1998). The ‘equal-in-rights’ Soviet 
peoples were hierarchically instituted as ‘Socialist nations’ of the 
SSRs and (since the Stalin constitutions of 1936–37) of the ASSRs as 
well as Soviet nationalities, including smaller ethnic groups, which 
could be described as ‘national minorities’ in a narrow sense, which 
is usually used to refer to those ethnic groups that reside behind the 
borders of ‘their national-state’ or ‘national-territorial’ unit or do 
not have one (see Sections 1.1 and 4.1 above). Over the decades dissat-
isfaction with the state of inter-ethnic relations aggravated tensions 
and manifested itself in the conditions of weakening totalitarian 
political regime into violent inter-ethnic conflicts such as those in 
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh or the Fergana Valley.
Whether economic inefficiency and grievances, that motivated 
the political liberalization of perestroika, or the rise of nationalism, 
that followed immediately after it, was the primary reason for the 
disintegration of the Communist bloc and collapse of the USSR, 
remains a disputable issue (see, e.g., Beissinger 2002: 1–11, 441–442, 
Breuilly 1993: 343–350, Suny 1993: 154–160). As importance of dif-
ferent factors is recognized, authors usually write about the chain 
of the events in the cascade effect. Nationalist ideology was one of 
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the grounds for social mobilization as a broad scale movement that 
involved the masses in a struggle for political change through mass 
actions such as demonstrations or even inter-ethnic violence and 
not through political bargaining in the ‘normal’ structured politics 
of political parties.
There are two major lines of scholarly argument that suggest 
interpretation for the reasons of the rise of nationalism. One source 
of disagreement around the events and processes of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s is what impact had democratization through mass 
popular mobilization of ethnicity on the political change in com-
parison with intra-elite conflicts and their consolidation through 
elite settlement. In fact, it is argued in this study that these seem-
ingly opposing views might be partly reconciled by the qualifica-
tion that there was a wide range of variation in the extent of social 
mobilization around the nationality principle in different SSRs and 
ASSRs with a clear tendency that, while in many of the former cat-
egory of republics it was mass politics pushing the change, in auton-
omies inside Russia the role of elites was crucial. Another problem, 
conjoined with the first one, is the question of whether the driving 
force of mass mobilization was national movements driven from the 
grass-root level or inspired from above, in either case, through the 
activities of ethnic entrepreneurs.
At the scholarly level, the debate was reinforced by the shift of 
the scientific paradigm in Russian ethnology, which benefited from 
the Western philosophical debate on the problem of language as the 
tool of knowledge because of its socially constructed nature, and 
its reflection in the studies on nationalism in the works of Benedict 
Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and others. The Soviet 
ethnographic tradition was criticized for its essentialist or primor-
dialist standpoint that treated nations as realistic entities and held 
the ethnic ties as given (see Hirsch 2005: 8).
Social constructivism quickly gained ground and became the 
dominant understanding of the phenomena related to ethnicity. It 
remains in this position despite some post-modernist critics up to 
the present date. From the constructivist viewpoint, national and 
ethnic identities are socially constructed. Within the construc-
tivist paradigm, the ‘instrumentalist’ approach takes ethnicity 
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as a resource for the political mobilization of the masses used by 
the national elites to achieve their own political goals. The ‘insti-
tutionalist’ approach emphasizes the role of social institutions in 
the formation of a group identity. In other words, instrumentalism 
and institutionalism share the view on ethnicity a constructed phe-
nomenon (see Smith 1998 for an overview of nationalism theories). 
However, while instrumentalists see human agency as the driving 
force of construction, institutionalist thinkers argue that the social 
structures create identities. Both variants have found their propo-
nents for understanding the events in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(see, e.g., Beissinger 2002, Bunce 1999, Dallin 1992, Solnick 1998).
Literature on the collapse of the USSR and national mobilization 
is abundant. While some scholars continue to stay in ‘primordialist’ 
positions and point at the importance of cultural nationalism, many 
scholars tend to explain the ethnic mobilization in the Soviet Union 
and Russia either from the ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘institutionalist’ per-
spective. Among the proponents of the second line of thought are 
such scholars as Rogers Brubaker (1996), Dmitry Gorenburg (2003), 
David Laitin (1991, 1998), Philip Roeder (1991), and Ronald Suny (1993). 
Many Russian scholars gravitate to the first position and see mobi-
lization in the republics as the result of activities of ethnic entre-
preneurs. Among them is Valery Tishkov (1996), former head of the 
State Committee for Nationalities Affairs and a long-time Director 
of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, who was among 
the key persons to lobby for the construction of the Russian nation 
as a government agenda. His colleague, the Institute’s Vice-Director 
Michail Guboglo (1993, 1998) adapted the instrumentalist position to 
the study of language status planning in the republics.
It was largely due to the efforts of Tishkov that the scholarly 
debate found its public counterpart. On the one hand, the Russian 
authorities inherited some late Soviet legacies, including the for-
mula of ‘the multinational people’, postulating equality of the 
peoples and their languages. Yet, on the other hand, these legacies 
were criticized for their rootedness in primordialist assumptions. 
In the early 1990s, it was a matter of wide public debate in Russia, 
whether the approach of diversity management should be changed. 
From the second half of Yeltsin’s presidency, the choice was made to 
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follow the way of other Eastern European states and former SSRs to 
the construction of a nation-state, although the question remained 
open which nation should be constructed and whether Russia had to 
become a civic or an ethnic nation. The attempt to reconceptualize 
the political landscape by changes in the use of terminology became 
a part of the further shift in Russia’s nationalities policy since 2000. 
The aspiration was to restrict the use of ‘national’ to ‘federal’ and 
‘state’ level, while the republican and autonomous regions were 
now described as ‘ethnic’. It would appear that behind the ‘word 
play’ the authorities actually intend to deconstruct the alternative 
nations and to shift, in the long run, from ‘multinational federation’ 
to ‘multi ethnic federation’ (see Section 3.2, also Zamyatin 2012b).
However, in recent years the debates on Russian nation-build-
ing shifted under the pressure of the rising ethnic Russian national-
ism. The core demand of this platform is the de jure recognition of 
the status of ethnic Russians as the ‘state-founding nation’. While 
the presence of ‘Staatsvolk’ might be a stabilizing factor in a multi-
national federation (see McGarry & O’Leary 2005: 281–282), change 
in symbolism of identity politics might just cause the next phase in 
the cycle of an ‘ethnopolitical pendulum’ (Pain 2004). It remains to 
be seen whether such an attempt at nation-building would prevent 
the disintegration rather than provoke further resentment in non-
Russian regions (see Zamyatin 2012a).
4.3.  Nat ional  Movements  and El i tes  in  Studies 
of  Ethnici t y  and Nat ional ism
The studies into the processes of disintegration of the USSR often 
put emphasis on the national republics and their authorities in 
their confrontation with the central authorities. However, it makes 
sense to distinguish between the activities of authorities and the 
mass mobilization of population especially in the republics where 
the national demands have only partially become the government 
agenda. To describe the driving force of ethnic mobilization from 
below, international scholars often wrote about ‘nationalist move-
ments’. The term ‘nationalist’ is usually intended in English to be 
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used as a neutral designator in contrast to the negative ‘nationalis-
tic’. Yet, it is not an entirely correct translation from Russian, where 
the according term ‘nationalist’ bears negative connotations, while 
the term ‘national’, that originated from the national liberation dis-
course, bears both positive and neutral connotations (see Gellner’s 
preface to the Russian edition of Nations and Nationalism). In this sit-
uation, the notion of ‘national movements’ (‘nacionalʹnye dviženija’) 
is preferred for use throughout this study as a more accurate and 
neutral term in the Soviet realities. Note also that this study builds 
on Miroslav Hroch’s understanding, who defined national move-
ments as ‘organized efforts to achieve the attributes of a fully-fledged 
nation’ (Hroch 1985: 66).
After the collapse of the USSR, the new authorities in Moscow 
strived to maintain Russia’s territorial integrity. As a result of their 
efforts as well as an ever growing economic imbalance, social 
inequality and other structural factors, the importance of national 
and other public movements in the former ASSRs of the RSFSR 
was diminishing in 1991–93 and after that they entered a period 
of decline in most Republics in 1993–95 (Gorenburg 2003: 68–75). 
Simultaneously, democratization and the transition to a more demo-
cratic regime largely failed to establish the rule of law and to ensure 
submission of authorities under popular control through an insti-
tutionalized system of checks and balances, where one of the bal-
ances could have become genuine federalism. As a result, the elites 
became the main political actors in federal and regional politics.
The failure of democratization and the turn to authoritarian-
ism explains why the study of the elites started to be important to 
understand the political dynamics in post-Soviet Russia. The elite 
theory, which holds that only a small group of people has most of 
the power in the political decision-making and retains it largely 
independently of democratic procedures such as elections, became 
extremely popular in political science and sociology in Russia 
(Gelʹman & Tarusina 2003: 188). According to the classical defini-
tion of Charles Wright Mills (1956), the ‘power elites’ are the union 
of those who hold the military, economic and state power. In the 
Russian case, the military was not as important a pillar as the other 
two (Gelʹman & Tarusina 2003: 193). 
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Thomas R. Dye based his study on the USA realities and argued 
that its public policy does not result from the ‘demands of the peo-
ple’, but rather is reached through the elite consolidation (Dye 2000).
In the late Soviet period, the CPSU and the nomenklatura composed 
‘ideologically unified elite’, where the term nomenklatura refers to a 
list of key political and administrative positions filled through the 
system of recruitment by the CPSU. A Russian researcher of elites 
Vladimir Gelman notes that after the demise of the USSR the main 
development trend was ‘the transformation of elite and political sys-
tems from a disunified elite toward a consensual unified elite’. Based 
on a comparative-historical observation and using John Higley’s 
terms, Gelman suggests that consolidation is possible either as long-
term ‘elite convergence’ or as short-term ‘elite settlement’, i.e., ‘a 
compromise among elite groups regarding the major political insti-
tutions’ (Gelman 2002: 344, Higley 2008). The need for elite settle-
ment came to the forefront in the political life in Russia in the early 
1990s through intra-elite bargaining both in horizontal and vertical 
dimensions (see Dusseault 2010: 60–71).
Who were the elite groups that participated in bargaining? One 
complication for the study of post-Soviet elites is that in the early 
1990s the elites quickly changed their formal characteristics, first 
converting political power to economic status in 1990–91 and then 
back to power around 1993: this way in many republics nomenkla-
tura succeeded in preserving power. Scholars tend to associate the 
fact that authoritarian regimes were soon established in republics 
with the prevalence of nomenklatura over democrats and its turn to 
nationalism rather than democracy to legitimize its rule (see, e.g., 
Ross 2002: 22). Whether this association is correct or not, it witnesses 
the importance of the ethnic dimension that should be taken into 
account in the study of elites. Typically, scholars in Russia, in line 
with the English tradition, distinguish ‘national elites’ and ‘regional 
elites’ (see, e.g., Gelʹman & Tarusina 2003: 190–194). However, this 
dichotomy is not sensitive to the ethnic dimension. In the conditions 
of centrifugal processes in the Soviet Union and Russia of the early 
1990s, it was far from clear which elites would become ‘national’, 
because the elites in the SSRs and ASSRs under the influence of 
national movements, formulated their own national agenda.
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Some scholars regard those elites in the Republics who pursued 
the ideology of nationalism, regionalism and separatism in a sepa-
rate category as ‘nationalist elites’ or ‘nationalists’ as opposed to the 
‘democrats’ and ‘nomenklatura’ (Kondrashov 2000). Yet, for the same 
reason as in the case of popular movements, such a notion would not 
be neutral enough for the Russian case. The term ‘ethnocratic elites’ 
(‘etnokratičeskie elity’) used by some Russian scholars also seems 
to be not neutral enough and being based on misrepresentation of 
regional political regimes as ‘ethnocracy’ (see, e.g., Toščenko 2003). 
Furthermore, both terms describe the situation only in some Republics 
and, in this respect, it cannot be applied to the republics where the 
groups guided by the ideology of nationalism were not significantly 
represented among the ruling elites (see Zamyatin 2012a). To solve 
the complication, this study refers to the according elites as ‘national 
elites’ (‘nacionalʹnye elity’) prior to the disintegration of the USSR.
When it became clear, perhaps after the state coup of October 
1993, and then after the adoption of the Russian Constitution in 
December 1993, that Russia was not going disintegrate in the same 
way that the USSR did, the public discourse changed. With the 
decline of national movements in the Republics, nationally minded 
activists found themselves among the regional elites in a country 
where ethnic Russians became the largest national community. 
While economic, social, political and legal interests were at the fore-
front in drafting the republican constitutions, some issues connected 
to ethnicity also remained potentially dividing for the elites. For 
example, when inter-ethnic splits coincided with economic interests 
in the redistribution of powers, conflicts emerged. In this situation, 
the interests of the elite groups claiming to represent the interests of 
ethnic Russians and titular groups diverged. In this study the differ-
ent segments of regional elites that acted ‘in the name of the people’, 
proposing their solutions to ethnic and linguistic issues in the repub-
lican constitutions and language laws, are referred to, accordingly, as 
(titular) ‘ethnic elites’ vs ‘Russian elites’.
These were ethnic elites who backed the national revival and 
language revival in the republics and initially sought to attach their 
demands to the platform for overall democratic changes. In the con-
ditions of political liberalization some national organizations were 
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created that had as their goals national revival and language revival 
that represented urban intellectuals and rural agrarians. However, 
the co-operation of ethnic elites with regional democrats largely 
failed with the progression of the ‘sovereignty parade’ in the SSRs 
and ASSRs. As a reaction some regional Russian national organiza-
tions emerged. Yet, Soviet ideology of internationalism still governed 
people’s minds and impeded the spread of nationalist rhetoric. In the 
Finno-Ugric republics the population remained largely passive and 
ignorant of their ethnicity and did not join the national movements 
on mass (Lallukka 2003: 266–267). As a consequence, throughout the 
1990s nationalist parties in the Finno-Ugric republics remained rather 
marginal, until regional parties and parties based on ethnic back-
ground were prohibited by law (Federal Law of 11 July 2001). Because 
of the ability of regional nomenklatura to transform and preserve its 
power, the representativeness in the ‘party of power’ (as previously, 
the representativeness in the CPSU) was more important than mass 
popular support (see Article 2). The ramification of political balance 
was a matter of intra-elite settlement and depended on the abilities of 
different segments to bargain for their visions.
The study of national movements and elites are, thus, relevant 
for the exploration into the reasons for the official designation of lan-
guages. Linguistic demands were at the core of the agenda of the 
national movements. Yet, for example, John Edwards cites Anthony 
D. Smith and denies the essential character of the link between 
nationalism and language, because in his view, ‘emphases upon lan-
guage’ follow the rise of nationalism and do not create it (Edwards 
2009: 211, Smith 2009). The question becomes important for the study 
about motivations in revivalist rhetoric of national/ethnic elites and 
national movements, who proclaimed the officialization of their lan-
guages as one of their central goals. In a wider context of the nation-
alism studies the goals of national movements can be conceptualized 
differently depending on the principles of the chosen approach. Both 
the instrumentalist and institutionalist explanations would seek 
the group interests behind the act of officialization and would deny 
the revivalist rhetoric as insincere, because, in their representation, 
it would be primordialist, as it assumes that in certain conditions 
‘rebirth’ or ‘revival’ of nations is possible.
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4.4.  Pol i t ical  Developments  in  Russian 
Regions  and Finno -Ugr ian Studies
Among the republics of the European part of Russia, that are in focus 
of this study, mass mobilization of ethnicity into national move-
ments especially in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan gained intense 
attention among domestic and international scholars, because 
‘[a]mong the polities not granted independence arguably the most 
successful in negotiating sovereignty with Yeltsin’s government and 
consequently under the greatest threat from Putin’s re-centraliza-
tion policies is the Republic of Tatarstan’ (Zaripov & Faller 2003: 
165). National revival in Tatarstan was put on the political agenda 
and formulated as a regional government policy. Even if the imple-
mentation of its language part in Tatarstan was later assessed to 
have failed, inter alia, because of the change in the Russian federal-
ist policy and nationalities policy towards recentralization, some 
scholars evaluated the successful launching of the policies in the 
respective Republics as a potential source for the next wave of mobi-
lization in the future (Gorenburg 2005: 258; he later changed this 
view, see: Gorenburg & Giuliano 2012).
The comparative studies of the nature and extent of the 
national movements in different regions in the early 1990s could 
reveal variables in the vitality of non-Russian communities and, 
thus, shed light on their future and the future of Russia itself. There 
are some comparative studies on the popular national mobiliza-
tion in the ‘titular’ Republics named after the peoples of the Turkic 
language family. For example, Dmitry Gorenburg (2003) undertook 
a comparative study on the ethnic mobilization in Bashkortostan, 
Chuvashia, Khakassia and Tatarstan. His use of the term ‘ethnic 
mobilization’ and ‘ethnic republics’ in the case of the former ASSRs 
is contrasted with ‘national mobilization’ and ‘national republics’ 
used by scholars in the case of the SSRs. The ethnic and linguistic 
processes in the other former ASSRs, where events did not take as 
dramatic a turn as in Tatarstan or Chechnya, have received notably 
less attention in the scholarly literature.
The political developments of the 1990s in individual Finno-
Ugric regions have been the subject of some scientific research. 
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However, no comparative studies have been conducted on the lan-
guage politics in the Finno-Ugric Republics of Karelia, Komi, Mari 
El, Mordovia and Udmurtia that would pay due attention to the 
exploration of their state languages and reveal the systemic vari-
ables behind their designation. It was assumed that the processes 
there were similar to those in the republics like that of Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan, the policies repeated the same pattern on a 
smaller scale and their implementation was a bigger failure. Yet, 
one big difference is that ‘ethnocratic elites’ in the Volga Turkic 
Republics were able to assert their will in policies, while ‘ethnic 
elites’ in the Finno-Ugric Republics were only minor partners in 
the processes of policy formation. In these conditions, how was it 
still possible to achieve similar solutions to the language issues in 
the Finno-Ugric Republics? Evaluation of these policies, the success 
or failure of their implementation, would contribute to building a 
comprehensive picture of the dynamics of Russian identity politics 
in general a decade later.
It was language divisions that largely predetermined the 
development of ethnographic studies along the Russian impe-
rial conquest spreading towards the Orient. The academic field of 
Finno-Ugrian studies emerged from the assumed kinship of Finno-
Ugric languages that was discovered to form a distinct language 
family. Finno-Ugrian studies, therefore, have traditionally dealt 
mostly with linguistics and, to some extent, with ethnology of the 
‘Finno-Ugric peoples’. There are relatively few international studies 
into political aspects of the situation among these peoples in Russia 
(among remarkable exceptions are Lallukka 1990, Taagepera 1999 
and others) and very few into the language policy of the regions 
they inhabit (see, e.g., Bartholomä & Schötschel 2012).
Yet, the need for comprehensive research, especially from the 
beginning of the 20th century, when these peoples emerged onto 
the world’s political map, has grown substantially. While linguistic 
kinship per se, is not reason enough for political categorizations, 
the academic activities throughout Soviet and post-Soviet history 
resulted in the creation of an imagined community out of the Finno-
Ugric myth or, really, a complex of myths. ‘It is not the language 
kinship as such that has united and still unites the Finno-Ugrian 
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peoples. Rather it is the feeling of “other” which can be seen as the 
bond of union’ (Saarinen 2001: 49). ‘The underlying rationale for the 
Finno-Ugrian kinship beliefs has been a shared feeling of isolation 
among Indo-European and Turkic populations. Given such a feel-
ing, it is perhaps a relief to Finno-Ugrians to find another language 
that shares similar grammatical features with one’s own tongue’ 
(Taagepera 2001: 181).
The history of most of the Finno-Ugrian peoples has for centu-
ries been connected to the history of Russia. When Russia became 
an Empire in the 17th century during the rule of Peter the Great, 
it put great efforts to open the ‘Door to Europe’ through the Baltic 
Sea. At the peak of its might in the 19th century, the Russian Empire 
managed to annex Poland, Finland and the Baltic Provinces, where, 
accordingly, Polish, Swedish and German were used as official lan-
guages (Multilingualism in Post-Soviet Countries 2008: 4). Despite the 
attempts of Russification in the late 19th – early 20th century, the 
Empire never succeeded in fully incorporating these territories, inter 
alia, because their nobility had a distinct sense of identity rooted in 
German romanticism and Herderian nationalism that reached the 
periphery of the German world. Openness to the Western world 
through the ‘Door to Europe’ resulted, inter alia, in the import of 
nationalist ideas to Russia.
The imagined Finno-Ugric community was an important source 
of inspirations in the processes of Finnish and Estonian national 
identity formation. The first wave of national self-determination 
after the First World War led to the creation of the independent 
states of Estonia, Finland and Hungary, and of autonomous regions 
of Finno-Ugric peoples in the Soviet Union. These developments led 
to a short rise in Finno-Ugrian studies in the 1930s. The annexation 
of Estonia during the Second World War and the softening of the 
regime in the Khrushchev era led to the reappearance of Finno-
Ugrian studies in the USSR, when Tartu became one of its centers 
(see Kreindler 1989: 51). Since 1960, every five years the International 
Congress of Finno-Ugrists has been held in Finno-Ugric countries 
and regions.
During the perestroika era Estonia and other Baltic Republics can 
be considered to have been the flagship of nationalist mobilization in 
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the USSR. Despite their constructedness, the beliefs of national activ-
ists in common Finno-Ugric ancestry and primordial ties inspired 
networking. The Finno-Ugric political co-operation that originated 
in scientific contacts became one among the important channels 
that enhanced nationalist mobilization and, thus, turned out to be 
a factor in international and domestic politics. Starting with the 
first international meeting of Finno-Ugric writers in Yoshkar-Ola in 
May 1989, many international events were arranged, where leaders 
of national movements borrowed the ideas of language revival and 
national revival from each other. The significance of this channel 
for the comparative analysis is that the same set of ideas, includ-
ing the official designation of state languages, was spread among 
ethnic elites (see, e.g., Appeal of the First World Congress of Finno-
Ugric Peoples to the Parliaments and Governments of the Russian 
Federation and Its Finno-Ugric Republics, 3 December 1992) that 
were tested in the unique situation of different regions.
It is interesting that, while language shift was universally iden-
tified as the problem and language revival as its solution, it was not 
the idea about the reversal of language shift as a grass-root activity 
but the idea of the need of a top-down status planning that was 
spread as the strategy of the national movements across the Finno-
Ugric regions. A strong point in this strategy was that theoretically 
it could lead to the spread of the use of titular language in the pub-
lic domains along with the dominant language, but a weak point 
was that in practice, typically this was the only symbolic designa-
tion and sometimes language teaching in school was all that was 
achieved. Perhaps, the goal was not only to promote the language 
but also to reinforce identity, because language was considered as 
the central element of identity and there were no other significant 
markers available (like world religion in the Volga Turkic republics).
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5.  Struc ture  of  the Study
The study is organized in a way that reflects the federal and regional 
layers of government in Russia: the issues concerning the federal 
level (Parts I and III) and the regional level (Parts II and IV) are con-
sidered separately.
Part I of the dissertation (Article 1) explores the legal and insti-
tutional framework of the language policy in post-Soviet Russia’s 
politics and the status of the state language of its Republics. In order 
to enhance the understanding of contemporary language politics 
in Russia’s republics, Part II of the dissertation (Articles 2, 3 and 
4) focuses on the official designation of the state languages in the 
Finno-Ugric Republics of Russia. The bulk of this part consists of 
a synchronized analysis of the three main stages of the process of 
institutionalization of the titular languages as the state languages of 
these Republics. The argument advanced in Part II is that the official 
designation of state languages reflects three different types of recog-
nition of the multinational nature of republican statehood: symbolic 
declarative designation, formal designation in constitution and legal 
designation by language law.
In assessing the potential impact of language revival projects 
on the actual implementation of the official status of languages and 
on language practices, this study addresses education, because this 
sector among many other domains of language use in the public 
sphere is the most transparent, as it allows both qualitative and 
quantitative studies. Part III of the dissertation (Article 5) explores 
the legal and institutional framework for minority language educa-
tion in Russia and its national republics. Part IV (Article 6) employs 
sociological methods in order to evaluate the implementation of 
the language-in-education policy in regard to the titular languages 
in the Finno-Ugric Republics in contrast with the Volga Turkic 
Republics.
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The publications included in this study are the following:
Par t  I
A r t i c l e  1
Evolution in Language Ideology of Post-Soviet Russia and the Fate of 
State Languages of Its National Republics. Equally Diverse: Comparing 
language and culture minorities in the Russian Federation and the 
European Union. Heiko Marten, Michael Rießler, Janne Saarikivi & 
Reetta Toivanen (eds.). Berlin: Springer. [In print.; pp. 106–152.] 
Par t  I I
A r t i c l e  2
Sovereignisation and State Languages: Early Formation of Language 
Policy of Russia’s Finno-Ugric Republics in the Conditions of the USSR 
Disintegration. Finnisch-Ugrische Mitteilungen, Vol. 36. 2013. Pp. 123–165.
A r t i c l e  3
Finno-Ugric Republics and Their State Languages: Balancing Powers 
in Constitutional Order in the Early 1990s. Journal de la Société Finno-
Ougrienne, Vol. 94. 2013. Pp. 337–381.
A r t i c l e  4
Official Status As a Tool of Language Revival? A Study of the 
Languages Laws in Russia’s Finno-Ugric Republics. Journal of 
Ethnology and Folkloristics, Vol. 7, No 1. 2013. Pp. 125–153. 
<http://www.jef.ee/index.php/journal/article/view/139>
Par t  I I I
A r t i c l e  5
The Education Reform in Russia and its Impact on Teaching of 
the Minority Languages: an Effect of Nation-Building? Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 11, No 1. 2012. Pp. 17–47.
<http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2012/ 
Zamyatin.pdf>
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Par t  IV
A r t i c l e  6
From Language Revival to Language Removal? The Teaching of 
Titular Languages in the National Republics of Post-Soviet Russia. 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 11, No 2, 
2012. Pp. 75–102.
<http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2012/
Vol_2_Dezember_2012/5._JEMIE_Zamyatin.pdf>
An empirical study could assess efficiency of the policy of language 
revival and demonstrate how the expansion of official language 
use actually influenced language practices; this task, however, 
remained largely behind the scope of this study. In a separate study 
the author explores how the titular languages were institutionalized 
in language legislation and how normative provisions were actually 
implemented (Zamyatin 2014a). Also a popular scientific monograph 
was published on issues related to language extinction and revi-
talization, possibilities provided for this purpose by Russian legisla-
tion and existing techniques where the authors attempted to bridge 
the institutional level with enhancing the actual language use in 
revitalization strategies (see Zamjatin et al. 2012).
Another separate quantitative study was conducted by the 
author that compares teaching of all Finno-Ugric and Samoyed lan-
guages in different types of Russian regions: Republics, Autonomous 
Districts and ordinary Regions (see Zamyatin 2013a). This study on 
the basis of the sociological and legal-institutional analysis draws 
the conclusion that the frameworks and amount of teaching of 
the titular languages in Finno-Ugric Republics and Autonomous 
Districts are comparable, despite the absence of the state languages 
in the latter category of regions. Due to the limited scope of the cur-
rent study, this lengthy article was not included in the dissertation.
S u M M A r y
7 2
Summar y:  Status  as  a  Symbol,  an 
Instrument or  an Institution?
The results of the study are presented here on two levels: first, the 
principle results of the individual articles are set out briefly and, 
then, these results are reassessed from historical and structural per-
spectives and discussed in the light of their theoretical implications.
Article 1 depicts the evolution of ideas around language in post-
Soviet Russian politics and the special place occupied by the state 
languages of its Republics. There is a tangible difference in the offi-
cial statuses of the majority language and minority languages in 
Russia. Russian, as the majority language and the state language for 
the whole country, is in a privileged position. The de facto minor-
ity languages, even those that under republican legislations are for-
mally put on an equal footing with Russian as co-official languages, 
enjoy only ‘limited officiality’. Those domains in the public sphere 
where non-dominant languages are used are small in number. 
Moreover, in the same category of state languages of the Republics, 
the status of languages is regionally asymmetrical to a greater or 
lesser extent. In practice, this asymmetry implies a different amount 
of usage domains for different languages.
Article 2 reconstructs the history of the early formation of 
the language policies in the Finno-Ugric Republics and the cir-
cumstances of the official designation of their co-official languages 
in the Declarations of State Sovereignty. It explores what kind of 
documents the sovereignty declarations were, outlines political 
landscapes and the ideological background for the language status 
planning in the Republics, discusses when and how the demands 
for the status of the state language of the Republics were proposed 
in the negotiations among the regional elites and set in the politi-
cal agenda, how the ideas fitted the political landscapes and what 
obstacles the recognition faced. Finally, it summarizes findings con-
cerning similarities and dissimilarities between the Republics. It is 
argued that the instrumentalist explanation for the designation of 
state languages might underestimate the correlation in the interests 
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of elites and the population by unnecessarily setting them in con-
flict with each other.
Article 3 on formal constitutional designation explores the 
demands for ‘ethnic institutions’ that the ethnic elites presented 
in the process of drafting the constitutions and the solutions that 
entered the final texts of the constitutional provisions as the result 
of intra-elite bargaining. It is argued that while the instrumental use 
of language could have been the motive of the ethnic elites behind 
their demand for a language requirement for top officials, the des-
ignation of the state languages itself is better understood as an act 
of institutionalization of ethnicity that fixed the political balance of 
interests of the ethnic groups in constitutions as elite agreements.
Article 4 on designation by language law, addresses in detail 
language revival as the third possible reason for the designation of 
the official languages. The article compares the legal provisions in 
two domains of institutionalization of the official languages: educa-
tion and the work environment. As in the case of the sovereignty 
declarations and constitutions, the adoption of language laws was 
primarily an elite agreement, even if it did not generally touch 
directly the interests of elites and mainly affected the population. It 
is argued that the laws indeed had language revival as one of their 
goals, even though they provided only some additional opportuni-
ties for the expansion of the use of titular languages.
Article 5 is devoted to the study of education legislation in 
Russia and its national Republics. In the Russian education system, 
even those few rights to learn one’s native language that are rec-
ognized are not self-executing and need state policy to back them. 
The available data shows that so far, the compulsory teaching of the 
titular state languages of the Republics is being continued, although 
the current political situation will hardly allow the introduction of 
state language teaching in those Republics that have not yet done so. 
However, further changes are to be expected that would challenge 
the position of the titular state languages in education. 
Article 6 deals with the implementation of the language-in-
education policy with regard to the titular languages in the Finno-
Ugric Republics in contrast with the Volga Turkic Republics and 
employs sociological methods. The results demonstrate there was 
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some growth in the number of children having access to native 
language learning, either as native or state languages, in the 1990s. 
However, the mere attribution of the official status of state lan-
guages to the titular languages of the Republics did not improve the 
situation because it did not entail automatic compulsory teaching. A 
separate decision would have been needed to make language teach-
ing compulsory for all pupils. Since 2000, access to titular language 
learning has been falling in most Republics. Moreover, the com-
pulsory study of state languages actually worsened the situation, 
although indirectly, because after the enforcement of the free choice 
of language teaching, schools have tended to switch their curricu-
lum from voluntary native language to compulsory state language 
teaching. 
All of the articles, in one way or another, deal with status plan-
ning of titular languages. Status planning, as a device of language 
policy, implies designation of a certain language or languages with 
an official status that ensures exclusive use of that language(s) in the 
public sphere. The official designation of the state languages became 
the main element of language policy in Russia and its Republics. 
Why was status planning chosen as the main policy device not only 
with regard to the dominant Russian language but also to some non-
dominant languages in Russia’s Republics? This choice is not evi-
dent, because various ideas were present in the public discourse as 
the possible answer to the ‘national question’, which became acute 
in the USSR in the late 1980s. In connection with the ‘national ques-
tion’, the role of language(s) in society became one of the topics of 
the most heated debate. 
In order to summarize the complex answers to the research 
questions, different aspects of which were provided in the articles 
of which this study is composed, the summary is divided into four 
sections. Section 6 will present the results of historical reconstruc-
tion of recent developments in the language policies of the USSR 
and Russia. It will outline the structural conditions that were ‘exter-
nal’ for Russia’s Republics and framed their language policies. It will 
address the question of why status planning was chosen as the main 
device of language policy both in Russia and its Republics. Section 
7 will present the results of an empirical study in the Finno-Ugric 
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Republics. It will delineate political developments in these Republics 
that led to particular configurations of the official status of their 
state languages. This section will deal with the question of what 
the reasons were for establishing the state languages at the regional 
level. Section 8 will discuss some theoretical implications that the 
case studies provide for understanding the phenomenon of official 
status for minority languages. This section will suggest some propo-
sitions about what specific attributes the official status might have 
in the case of a minority language. Finally, Section 9 will return to 
the theoretical question. This section will overview functions of the 
official status and suggest possible reasons for the official designa-
tion of minority languages.
6.  The Compulsor y  Use of  Language as  a 
Poli t ical  Instrument :  His tor ical  Contex t
Among the possible policy devices, the official status was one that 
did not have a good pedigree in the Soviet context. This section 
reconstructs the historical context of the late Soviet and early post-
Soviet Russia’s language policy formation and attempts to answer 
the following questions: First, what predetermined the choice of 
the officialization of languages as the main approach to regulation 
of language issues in the late Soviet times? Second, how did status 
planning become the dominant approach in the Union Republics? 
Third, why did most SSRs designate sole state languages and most 
ASSRs designated co-official state languages? 
6.1.  Freedom or  Obligat ion of  Language Use 
The origin of the ideas about how to manage ethnic and linguistic 
diversity in Russia could be historically traced back to two traditions, 
which Isabelle Kreindler (1985: 345), somewhat simplifying, names 
after Joshua Fishman, Western and Eastern tradition (Fishman 1982: 
5–6). These traditions can be said to embody the lines of thought 
representing two worldviews: collectivism and individualism. 
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Collectives were assigned with a crucial role in developing the 
communist view that dominated the political landscape throughout 
the Soviet times (Lapin 1973: 425). The extension of the collectiv-
ist viewpoint to ethnic groups, which were also seen as collectivi-
ties, was the essence of the early Soviet nationalities policy of the 
post-Wilsonian 1920s. The policy aimed at solving the ethnic and 
linguistic problems with a strategy that was based on the advanced 
for that times idea about the equality of ‘peoples’ and their right to 
national self-determination. This right had to be exercised through 
the creation of national-state and national-territorial units depend-
ing on the size of the group, the stage of its ‘socio-economic devel-
opment’ and some other criteria. Ethnicity and languages became 
associated with these territorial units of the federative system, and 
later in the Soviet times the attribute ‘titular’ started to be applied to 
Republics, languages and peoples. In other words, the territoriality 
principle for managing ethnic and linguistic diversity became the 
cornerstone of the State structure (see Martin 2001: 21–23). 
At the same time, the use of Russian was not tied to a certain 
territory or group but was promoted, especially since the mid-1930s, 
everywhere in the country and among all citizens. In effect, the eth-
nic Russians had a privileged position because a special device of 
migration policy was employed after the Second World War that 
granted to Russian speakers the possibility to use the Russian lan-
guage throughout the Soviet Union. As a consequence, it was not 
necessary for them to learn any local languages (see Article 1: 108–
113; preliminary page numbering). 
Since the beginning of the era of perestroika and glasnost in the 
mid-1980s, Russian scholars started to reconceptualize the nation-
alities policy of the Soviet Union as one that was based on the prin-
ciple of primordialism, which assumed inborn and insurmountable 
differences between ethnic groups. In the 1990s, the policy’s rooted-
ness in primordialism or essentialism, as the view on the groups as 
entities that really and naturally existed side by side, started to be 
an object of criticism, and the idea of the constructedness of identi-
ties and possibility of social constructivism gradually came to the 
forefront (see, e.g., Tishkov 1996). The communist views were grad-
ually replaced by a new political thought that entered the Soviet 
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political debates and had as one of its sources a complex of Western 
ideas about democratization and individual human rights. In eth-
nology, this turn was marked by the paradigm shift and the import 
from the West of constructivist understanding which considers 
ethnic groups not as really existing collectivities but as ‘imagined’ 
and constructed communities (see, e.g., Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, 
Hobsbawm 1992, and others).
These collectivist and individualist views were not consistent 
with each other, but the coexistence of contradicting ideas is typical 
of countries in the transition periods. It was this dualism that deter-
mined the configuration of Russia’s language policy that was devel-
oped in the early 1990s and had language status planning at its core. 
At first glance, the rootedness of the official language in Soviet 
thinking is not obvious, and might seem even counterintuitive. The 
Soviet practice of state construction denied the official status for lan-
guages, because it would have contradicted the idea about the equal-
ity of peoples. Vladimir Lenin saw in the proposals to make Russian 
the state language a manifestation of Great Russian chauvinism 
(Lenin 1958: 57–58). At the same time, extensive Soviet language plan-
ning of the 1920s and 1930s was not restricted to corpus planning and 
acquisition planning. The 1920s policy of ‘nativization’ promoted the 
official use of non-Russian languages in order to reach equality and 
local Russian officials were required to learn them, but the officials 
were unwilling and the policy was gradually put on hold starting in 
the mid-1930s (see Martin 2001: 526–527, 590–592, Slezkine 1994: 430–
431). At the dawn of the Soviet system, only the Trans-Caucasian 
Soviet Republics had sole state languages designated in their consti-
tutions, which remained more a symbolic statement estranged from 
everyday politics, as was the case for a significant part of the Soviet-
style constitutions anyway (see Simon 1991: 331–333).
New Russia’s language ideology included both liberal and etat-
ist ideas that were fixed in language policy. And it was precisely 
this understanding of ‘peoples’ as collectivities having their own 
interests and even the right to national self-determination exercised 
in form of ethnically defined territorial units that opened up the 
possibility for the official designation of their languages in the new 
era (see Article 1: 108–109).
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As in the USSR, the territoriality principle was supplemented 
by the personality principle, when some individual language rights 
were proclaimed. The execution of rights, however, depended on 
facilities that could be provided only in certain territories. Among 
the individual rights and freedoms, the right to use one’s native 
language and to freely choose the language of communication 
was recognized first in the USSR language law (24 April 1990) and 
soon in Russia’s language law (25 October 1991). Yet, again, as in the 
1920s and 1930s, only ethnic Russians could enjoy language rights 
everywhere in the country, while the rights of other languages’ 
use and official designation of some languages were linked to the 
territories of the ASSRs and Autonomous Districts (see Article 1: 
108–113).
In some years, Russian authorities addressed the problem of 
inequality that stemmed from uneven application of the territo-
riality and personality principles by passing the Federal Law on 
National-Cultural Autonomy (22 May 1996), which theoretically 
created the possibility to ensure minority rights also in non-tit-
ular regions. In many ethnically defined territories, this law was 
perceived as a mechanism intended towards their abrogation by 
non-territorial national-cultural autonomy. In practice, this law 
had only a marginal effect on ensuring the rights of smaller eth-
nic groups because of numerous problems with its application and 
financing and remained rather symbolic (Osipov 2004, 2010).
In the legislation of the Republics, the mechanism was to 
spread the compulsory use of some non-Russian state languages 
for all inhabitants, including ethnic Russians and people of other 
nationalities. It was arguably this element of coercion attached to 
the compulsory character of official languages that attracted the 
attention of national elites in the SSRs and ASSRs. The compul-
sory use, however, was problematized especially after emergence 
of inter-ethnic conflicts around language issues in some SSRs, e.g., 
Moldova. Yet, the non-discrimination clause was not included in the 
original text of Russia’s language law, and was only later enshrined 
in the Russian constitution (12 December 1993). In effect, only later 
the principle of non-discrimination could be employed to chal-
lenge the implementation of the compulsory use of non-Russian 
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languages (see Osipov & Sapožnikov 2004 for the discussion on 
the place of antidiscrimination clauses in the Russian legislation). 
Enforcement of provisions on compulsory use would have 
been problematic in the liberalizing atmosphere of the late 1980s. 
However, memorable injustices and new facts revealed about the 
Soviet period during the glasnost campaign raised awareness about 
falling share of autochthonous populations as a result of deliberate 
mass population transfers and inter-ethnic mixing of the popula-
tions, and became the issues of concern not just for intellectuals but 
for a wider public and inspired nationalist sentiment. In response to 
arbitrary Soviet nationalities policy, language policy and migration 
policy, the national elites, first of all, in the SSRs, envisaged a nation-
state building agenda as a part of a democratization program which 
gained mass public support (see Besseinger 2002).
A country could become a democracy only on the basis of a 
consensus between elites that would be reached by the precondi-
tion of national unity (Rustow 1970: 350–351, 361–362). Historically, 
since the French revolution, through the emergence of the nation-
states after the First World War and in the context of decoloniza-
tion of the 1950s and 1960s, national liberation was associated with 
democratization (see, e.g., Hobsbawm 1992). This agenda, however, 
had to be achieved in the Soviet tradition of a ‘top-down’ approach 
through administrative measures and was, thus, not consistent 
with democratization. Yet, even though the nation-state model 
implied deprivation of the rights of minorities, the national elites 
felt themselves justified when insisting on preferential treatment 
of autochthonous non-Russian populations because of the need to 
redress the injustices of the Soviet era (see Laitin 1998: 93–98). How 
was it possible to enforce such a policy in the Republics?
6. 2.  Sole  State  Languages  in  the SSRs
There is a dispute among historians about the primary cause of the 
collapse of the USSR, whether it was economic incapacity or nation-
alist mobilization. Leaving aside this discussion, it should be noted 
that the Soviet Union disintegrated along the national border of the 
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SSRs. The founders of the Soviet Union wanted to ‘definitively’ solve 
the ‘national question’ once and for all by implanting the principle 
of ethnicity in the very structure of the Soviet state (see Section 1). 
Many researchers point out that the institutionalization of ethnicity 
reinforced or sometimes even created identities (see, e.g., Brubaker 
1996). Generally, scholars agree that ethnic institutions played a 
crucial role at least in predetermining the configuration of borders 
between the post-communist states, if not in the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union itself (see Sections 4.2. and 4.3). 
An important question regarding nationalist mobilization in 
the late 1980s is how much it was an elite-dominated process or 
bottom-up mass movement politics. Those scholars who hold an 
institutionalist view on the late Soviet developments tend to explain 
the disintegration of the USSR as an outcome of the activities of 
the elites. At the same time, when the Soviet leadership started to 
liberalize the country’s political regime, it became possible for the 
grass-root social movements to enter the political debate and repre-
sent themselves on the free market of ideas in order to gain popular 
support. They started with environmental, cultural and linguistic 
demands, which were followed soon by pro-democratic political 
demands. Various ideas about the ways to achieve democratization 
opened up channels of political mobilization through the public 
debate (see also Article 2: 124–125). 
In the Baltic Soviet Republics historical memory of independent 
statehood, the legacy of the Herderian world view inherited from 
the Baltic Germans, old elites in the area, relatively late annexation 
by the Soviet Union and other circumstances led to a conjunction 
of ideas about democratization with the nationalist ideology. These 
republics became the gate through which the nationalist ideas were 
disseminated throughout the Soviet intellectual space. The popular 
national fronts were the driving force of this development and very 
quickly reached the phase of mass nationalist mobilization. Notably, 
grass-root activities found support and sometimes were directly 
inspired on the side of the republican leadership. The republican 
authorities adopted popular demands as the government policy. The 
Baltic Republics were the first that demanded greater self-gover-
nance and then proceeded on this path up to full independence (see 
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Raun 2001; also Article 2: 127–128). The other Republics, including 
Russia, followed the forerunners not only in ‘an attempt to capitalize 
on the prior successes of others’, but also as a result of a deliberate 
dissemination of nationalist ideas (Alpatov 2000).
Despite the extensive language planning of the 1920s and 1930s, 
the language issues in the late period of the Soviet Union’s existence 
remained mostly under-regulated. If there were any regulations, 
then these were typically not laws but administrative decisions or 
Party edicts. This was due to the lack of the rule of law in the Soviet 
administrative-command system. The absence of an official policy 
is also a policy: while acceleration of the processes of language shift 
and ethnic assimilation into Russians remained the de facto policy at 
least within the RSFSR, it was the migration policy that shifted the 
ethnic composition and, thus, changed the sociolinguistic situation 
in the non-Russian SSRs, sometimes dramatically and within a short 
period of time, as in the Baltic Republics. 
Among others, in Estonia, the issue of concern was a rapid 
decline in the social status of the Estonian language (see Raun 1985: 
26–28). The Declaration of State Sovereignty passed in November 
1988 unilaterally proclaimed the supremacy of Estonian laws over 
Soviet ones. In the absence of legal norms, nothing prevented the 
Estonian SSR Supreme Council in the perestroika times from passing 
the constitutional amendment that first designated titular Estonian 
as the sole official state language in December 1988. The constitution 
made the sole state language one of the key elements of political 
order, fixed the new political configuration and redistributed access 
to the political system’s resources in favor of the titular group by 
including the demand to know the local language. The language law 
of the Estonian SSR, adopted in January 1989 and legally designating 
Estonian as the sole state language, was legitimized through legacy 
of the pre-war independence period. It demanded that the knowl-
edge of the titular language be acquired within one to four years by 
all officials and public servants (see Rannut 1995: 189–191, 203–205, 
2004: 4–7; also Article 2: 127–129). 
In some months, the two other Baltic Soviet Republics and 
later most other Union Republics followed the same pattern due to 
the equal status of the SSRs. In practice, these official documents 
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did not outright challenge the official use of Russian but intended 
for the local languages to be used only in addition to it (see Laitin 
1998: 87–91, Beissinger 2009, texts of the laws in Guboglo 1994). 
The territoriality principle of ethnic diversity management 
in the Soviet framework predetermined its use in language status 
planning of the SSRs. The reason for the selection of status plan-
ning as the key solution for rebalancing the political order lay in 
the fact that the republican authorities were careful to present the 
shift not as preferential treatment on the basis of ethnicity but 
as a requirement of language knowledge, which is theoretically 
available to everybody. In Soviet times, the ethnic Russian and 
Russophone populations had no obligation to learn the local lan-
guages and typically had only low or no knowledge of these lan-
guages. Now, the requirement of official language knowledge for 
official and public servants according to the language law limited 
access of Russian speakers to political and administrative posts. 
Besides the immediate goal of changing the sociolinguistic situa-
tion, a covert long-term goal of sole official language policy might 
have also been the endeavor to infuse demographic change in favor 
of the titular group (see Article 2: 129). 
Therefore, these were the pragmatic political expediency 
behind the language policy goals of the SSRs and their instrumen-
talist understanding became the most wide-spread argument in 
discussions about the reasons for official designation of languages 
during the perestroika. According to the instrumentalist inter-
pretation, while pretending to represent public interests, ethnic 
entrepreneurs see in ethnicity a resource for political mobilization, 
which they use to pursue their own political ends (see Article 2: 
124–125, also Section 4.2).
6.3.  Co - O f f ic ia l  State  Languages  in  the ASSRs
The situation inside Russia was influenced by developments in the 
Union Republics, inter alia, because the language laws provoked 
at least in some SSRs an escalation of inter-ethnic tension and, 
in response, the counter-mobilization of Russian speakers took 
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place both in the SSRs and ASSRs (see, e.g., Leprêtre 2001). In these 
explosive circumstances, the ASSRs dared to join the ‘parade of 
sovereignties’ only after the RSFSR itself declared sovereignty in 
June 1990 and Boris Yeltsin, RSFSR Supreme Council Chairman at 
the time, encouraged the elites in autonomies during his tour in 
August 1990 to do the same in hope for their support in his con-
flict with Mikhail Gorbachev and the Union authorities. Passing 
the declarations in the Supreme Councils, most elites in the ASSRs 
did not have separatist inclinations but used sovereignization as a 
way to bargain for more favorable conditions and a higher level of 
regional self-rule in the face of the central authorities (see Article 
2: 132–133). 
In the matryoshka-like federal system, the SSRs and ASSRs 
did not have equal status, because the former were national-state 
formations that had nominal sovereign status, while the latter 
were only the national-territorial units. However, the state-of-art 
in the ‘national question’ was perceived as unjust, for example, 
among Tatars, who numbered more than five and a half million 
but ‘had’ only titular autonomy, while about one million Estonians 
‘had’ a ‘sovereign Republic’. With the liberalization of the political 
regime in the late 1980s, the authorities of the Tatar ASSR looked to 
upgrade the status of their Republic to that of the SSR and unilater-
ally did so in their sovereignty declaration, when the political situ-
ation gave this opportunity in the conditions of the confrontation 
between the Union and the RSFSR authorities (see Chakimov 2009: 
133, also Article 2: 133). 
Again, the other ASSRs felt themselves justified to follow 
on the same path due to the equal status of the Republics in the 
same category, in that case of the ASSRs. However, the upgrade 
in their status did not overwhelm the federal structure in Russia. 
The power centre shifted soon to the new Russian authorities, 
who managed to prevent the centrifugal tendencies by engaging 
regional authorities in negotiations and concluding the treaties on 
power-sharing. The time gap in sovereignization between the SSRs 
and ASSRs resulted not only in the maintenance of Russia’s ter-
ritorial integrity, but also in a certain configuration of language 
policies in former ASSRs (see Article 2: 130–131).
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One can see from the analysis of recent historical develop-
ments in the Republics that the driving forces, the time and cir-
cumstances of the adoption of official language policies diverged in 
the SSRs and ASSRs. In contrast to the SSRs, in the ASSRs of the 
RSFSR the first documents proclaiming the state languages were, 
without exception, the declarations of state sovereignty. The decla-
rations contained only symbolic recognition of the state languages 
and besides this did not bring any immediate instrumental benefits 
to the national elites that advocated for the inclusion of language 
provisions. As in the SSRs, the national movements in some ASSRs 
demanded establishment of the sole titular state language, which 
was supposed not to exclude the use of Russian. This move could not 
at that time be prevented by a non-discrimination clause, as there 
was none in the legislation (see Article 2: 130–131). 
Yet, among the ASSRs, only the Tuvinian ASSR designated 
its titular language as the sole state language of the Republic. All 
the other ASSRs declared both the titular language and Russian 
as their state languages. Even in the Tatar ASSR, with its strong 
nationalist mobilization, both public opinion and national move-
ment after all were in favor of the two-state-language solution (see 
Giuliano 2000: 304–308). Not only Russian but also predominantly 
Russian-speaking Tatar urban elites did not support the idea of a 
sole titular state language. Despite some confrontation, at a certain 
point the compromise was backed by most segments of the regional 
elites, including the Russian-speaking elite, some parts of Russian-
speaking Tatar urban elites, and the Tatar-speaking Tatar agrarian 
elites (see Article 2: 134–136). This outcome was a part of a compro-
mise that was achieved by regional elites in the face of the central 
authorities and could hardly be explained by the instrumentalist 
argument alone (see the previous section).
It must be emphasised that the co-official status of state lan-
guages in the ASSRs proclaimed in the second half of 1990 did not 
yet differ principally from the sole state language status in some 
SSRs (and the Tuvinian ASSR), because the USSR language law made 
Russian ‘the language of internationality communication’, ‘the offi-
cial language of the USSR’ and, in effect, another official language 
also in the SSRs. It is worth to notice that drafters of the USSR law 
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were precarious to designate Russian not as ‘the state language’ but 
as ‘the official language’, i.e., without the reference to national iden-
tity (see Article 2: 130). In other words, the USSR Law was the formal 
reason for the co-official status of Russian. Moreover, the initial des-
ignation of the state languages in the sovereignty declarations did 
not mean the actual compulsory use of languages in public domains 
but conveyed primarily their additional meaning as a symbol of the 
national identity, where the Republics were represented as multina-
tional communities with two co-official state languages. 
Moreover, in some other ASSRs, especially those with a titu-
lar group in the minority, popular support for the designation of 
the titular language as another official language was low and it 
was harder for ethnic elites to advocate such a move because they 
were in the minority among elites (see Article 2: 137–138 and the 
next section). The fact that even in this context the co-official status 
of languages was still extended beyond symbolic recognition can-
not be explained by the instrumentalist theory and an alternative 
explanation is required. Therefore, the discussion about language in 
politics should be broadened beyond its conceptualization as a mere 
policy instrument and possible alternative functions of the official 
language should be explored.
7.  Of f icial  Designation of  Languages  as 
a  Symbolic ,  Pol i t ical  and Legal  Ac t : 
Results  of  the Empir ical  Study
The choice of the officialization of languages is equivocal, because 
official status can be a double-edged tool of nationalities policy and 
language policy. When given to a dominant language, it can be 
directed at the elimination of differences and further unification of 
the population. At the same time, when given to a minority lan-
guage, it can maintain diversity, especially if this becomes the sole 
official language in the region. In either case, a political decision 
is made as to whether the act of official designation is supposed 
to satisfy a common public interest or the interest of a particular 
group. Language is often connected to identity and one particular 
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interest is that of the corresponding ethnic group (Edwards 2009). 
In both its interest-related aspects, the dynamics around the official 
designation of languages is a part of the politics of identities and 
it is discussed in this section, inter alia, as a dimension of political 
recognition. What were the reasons for establishing the state lan-
guages in the Finno-Ugric Republics?
In the current section official language status is analyzed as a 
complex phenomenon and its functions and reasons for its designa-
tion are illuminated, which could have diverging interests behind 
them. The interests and motivations around status planning are 
multifaceted and can only be induced. In this section, I shall con-
centrate on the following questions: First, how was it possible to 
establish the co-official languages also in the ASSRs with low pub-
lic support for sovereignization? What were the different interests 
behind the official designation of the state languages? Second, what 
route did the designation of the state languages take in the Finno-
Ugric Republics? What factors influenced the outcome of this pro-
cess? Third, what were the different functions of the state languages 
that underlay the reasons for their designation? How do the func-
tions change if both the majority and minority languages have par-
allel official status, as it is the case in the Republics? Fourth, how did 
the official status fit into the context of language revival? How was 
this status institutionalized in language legislations with regard to 
its functions? Fifth, how was the status of the state languages imple-
mented beyond symbolic and formal designation? What were the 
different patterns of implementation?
7.1.  The Role  of  Ethnic  El i tes  in  the Sovereignizat ion 
of  the Finno -Ugr ic  Republics
The Republics titled after Finno-Ugric peoples are situated in the 
European part of Russia and their territories have been under 
Russian imperial rule for at least four and a half centuries. Before 
the conquest, the groups speaking Finno-Ugric languages had not 
yet formed large-scale political communities and lacked an urban-
ized ‘high culture’, to use Gellner’s term. For this reason, they 
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did not have their ‘own’ historical statehood either, nor were the 
upper strata of their communities included after the conquest into 
the nobility of the Russian Empire, as was the case for some other 
groups, such as the Tatars, Poles, Georgians or Finns (see Kappeler 
1982, 2001). They were mostly peasants who had been baptized and 
in that respect, they did not differ from the majority population in 
terms of their religion. Due to centuries-long mixing of the popula-
tion their phenotypes usually do not significantly differ from the 
majority population and the most important ethnic marker, apart 
from traditional culture and some animist beliefs, is the language, 
which according to genetic classification belongs to a different 
language family than Russian. Up to the First World War and the 
October Revolution in 1917, the villages continued their isolated life, 
in which the vast majority of peasants remained illiterate. 
The industrialization and collectivization of the 1930s in the 
early Soviet times destroyed traditional lifestyles and embroiled 
the Finno-Ugric peoples in the wave of modernization and urban-
ization (see, e.g., Taagepera 1999, Chapter 2). Accomplishments of 
the early Soviet language planning were remarkable. The written 
standardized languages were often created from scratch and were 
then proliferated in the school system, so that the first generation of 
national intellectuals emerged. In the following years, not all lan-
guages retained their achieved positions. Among the languages of 
the ASSRs, the attempt to introduce the written form for Karelian 
was short lived (see Article 2: 139–141). With the shift in languages of 
instruction from the native language to Russian, which started with 
the 1958 education reform and reached its fullest extent in the 1970s, 
a whole generation of parents emerged who had never had native 
language instruction and were fluent in Russian (see Bilinsky 1981, 
also Article 6: 89–90). 
As a result of migration policy and ever-accelerated language 
shift and ethnic assimilation among the non-Russians to Russian, by 
the time of the disintegration of the USSR, ethnic Russians outnum-
bered the titular groups in the ASSRs titled after the Finno-Ugric 
peoples, as in many other ASSRs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, unlike 
in many SSRs and in some ASSRs, in the Finno-Ugric ASSRs there 
was less ground for nationalist mobilization in the late 1980s, which 
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resulted in relatively weak national movements (see, e.g., Beissinger 
2002). The cultural demands did not enjoy wide popular support, 
but there was some support for political demands, mostly for more 
regional powers. The general atmosphere of the processes of disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union and, in particular, chain effects made 
sovereignization possible also in the ASSRs. However, in many 
ASSRs, unlike the SSRs, it was mostly a top-down project and the 
role of elites in its initiation was decisive (Article 3: 337–338). 
The study of elites is crucial for understanding the processes 
of sovereignization in the Finno-Ugric Republics. However, the 
elite theory has found only some reflection in the Russian regional 
studies (see, e.g., Regiony Rossii 2000, 2003) and practically no place 
in the Finno-Ugrian studies (see Sections 4.3. and 4.4). The studies 
conducted in the Volga Turkic Republics demonstrate that ‘ethno-
cratic elites’ held power in Bashkortostan and to a lesser degree in 
Tatarstan (Galljamov 1998). While no such studies have been con-
ducted on the Finno-Ugric Republics, there is some evidence that 
the ethnic elites were only minor stakeholders in the Republican 
pie (see, e.g., the dynamics of minority ethnic representation in the 
Republican parliaments in Article 2: 149, Article 4: 136–137, Table 1). 
It is no wonder, then, that most demands of the national movements 
for establishing ‘ethnic institutions’ in constitutions were rejected 
by the majority in the Republican parliaments. However, the co-
official status of the titular and Russian languages, and sometimes 
preferential support for the titular languages, was included in the 
package of the regional elite settlement in the constitutions of the 
Finno-Ugric Republics (Article 3: 338–339). How did ethnic elites 
succeed in lobbying at least these demands?
To answer this question, some excurse into the historical devel-
opment of elites is needed. The national intellectuals and bureau-
crats emerged as a product of the 1920s ‘nativization’ policy (see, 
e.g., Simon 1991: 38–42). This policy failed in, among other aspects, 
spreading the knowledge of local languages among the ethnic 
Russians. Therefore, abandonment of the ‘nativization’ policy did not 
exclude the demand for ‘national cadres’ for whom ethnicity became 
their social lift. Although since the 1930s, economic considerations 
had come to the forefront (Hirsch 2005: 62), the principle of ethnic 
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representation in bureaucracy was not abandoned throughout the 
Soviet times and ‘national cadres’ got used to being appointed as a 
result of their ethnicity. For example, it was unwritten Soviet practice 
that the first figures in the SSRs and some ASSRs would be of local 
ethnic origin (Simon 1991: 274–278). There were never formal lan-
guage requirements, because local languages were practically not in 
use as the working languages of authorities. However, ‘national cad-
res’ were chosen not only based on their ethnic descent, as members 
of the working classes of proletarians or peasantry were co-opted 
into Soviet bureaucracy based on their social descent. The ethnic 
descent was not enough, as the peasants also had to recognize the 
representative as ‘theirs’. The national language could mark belong-
ing and serve as the instrument that allowed the Socialist message 
to be conveyed to the masses. There was thus a link between the pre-
dominantly rural population and the ‘national cadres’, although for 
the latter their belonging to nomenklatura could be more important 
than their nationality. 
After the collapse of the USSR, little changed in the composi-
tion of the political elites in many Russian regions. Depending on 
the region, up to 80–85% continued to be the offspring of the old 
Soviet nomenklatura (Gel′man & Tarusina 2003: 196), who effectively 
changed their posts in the Communist Party, Soviet bureaucracy 
or Komsomol to the economic positions of heads of previously state 
owned and now privatized enterprises, and then back to their posts 
in the Republican state apparatus. Despite the authoritarian politi-
cal regimes that had been established both at the federal level and 
in regions since 1993, it was only in some regions that a political 
situation emerged that can be characterized by the formula ‘winner 
takes all’ (Galljamov 2003: 315–316), while in most regions the elite 
settlement appeared to be possible.
The terms of this settlement as regards its ethnic aspects 
depended on many factors. As the analysis demonstrates, an impor-
tant political resource of the ethnic elites was their contact with 
national movements as the focus of popular mobilization (see Article 
2). By the end of the Soviet times, most non-Russians in the RSFSR 
possessed at least some knowledge of Russian, so the monopoly on 
communication with the population among members of ethnic elites, 
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who usually originated from the countryside, was not as important 
a factor as it was in some SSRs, in comparison to the support they 
enjoyed on the side of national intellectuals. Also in the other con-
texts, the national intelligentsia has typically been the most numer-
ous group among those who publicly expressed their concern over 
language loss and assimilation and spread awareness among politi-
cal elites or, in other words, were involved in the activities which 
Miroslav Hroch conceptualized as Phase B in the development of 
national movements of small nations in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Hroch 1986: 179; see discussion in Article 2: 148). 
In the Finno-Ugric Republics, writers, teachers and those in 
other creative professions were the most active force of mobilization 
in the late 1980s. Their activities, however, never reached the scale of 
mass mobilization, which Hroch described as Phase C. Many mem-
bers of ethnic elites sympathised with the national demands but 
were reluctant to join the national movements openly because they 
did not want to be labelled minority nationalists with no chance 
to become part of the ruling elite (Article 2: 150–151). Unfit for the 
new conditions, with the abolition of the Soviet system of quota for 
‘national cadres’ ethnic elites were rapidly losing political weight. 
However, there was demand for justification of the republican state-
building ‘from above’ on the side of the nomenklatura which in a 
changed situation was looking for legal and political legitimacy 
of its power and in some instances directly supported activities of 
national movements, because ethnicity was the precondition for 
the existence of republics. According to the nation-state model, the 
upgraded republic as the state had to acquire also its nation and lan-
guage. Therefore, in the ASSRs state building was, even on a larger 
scale, a top-down project, or amounted to Phase D in Terry Martin’s 
wording (Martin 2001: 15; Article 2: 147–148). 
As unilateral upgrading of the political status of republics 
was against the Soviet laws, it was important for the governing 
elites that national movements would present their demands as 
the expression of the popular will. They were therefore formulated 
as the decision of national organizations and, somewhat later, the 
national congresses, bodies of ethnic representation (on the problem 
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of representation see: Osipov 2011). The idea to form such bodies, 
like many other ideas, was borrowed from the experience of the 
SSRs. Notably, the Estonian Citizens’ Committees and the Congress 
of Estonia were taken as a pattern, which, however, had not ethnic 
but civic legitimation by the means of legal continuity with the pre-
war Republic (see Raun 2001: 228).
Success of ethnic elites in including national revival as part 
of the elite pact depended on their ability to negotiate and co-oper-
ate with other segments of elites as opposed to outright confronta-
tion, as opposite scenarios in Komi and Mari El demonstrate (see 
discussion in Article 3: 345–350). The authorities have taken into 
account ethnic diversity, inter alia, because the Soviet system had 
its devices, such as law enforcement as well as public opinion moni-
toring and propaganda bodies, which tried to keep a hold on and 
direct the developments in society, the importance of which grew 
especially under the conditions of social mobilization in the times 
of perestroika. Inter-ethnic clashes in some former SSRs played their 
role both in spreading awareness among the majority elites of the 
need to take ethnic issues into account and in their unwillingness 
to grant ethnic institutions, which could be used instrumentally by 
ethnic elites to take hold of power and engage in further national-
ist mobilization. This is why most demands for the establishment of 
ethnic institutions were not included in the elite pact. However, the 
dominant Russian-speaking elites had to make at least some conces-
sions to the ethnic elites. 
Above all, all segments of regional elites needed national 
symbols to legitimize Republican statehood in order to be able to 
bargain for more power in the face of federal authorities (Article 2: 
151–153). The official status of state languages was an institution that 
fitted the latter end: it was the national symbol, much like a national 
flag or anthem. Russian-speaking elites only wanted the status to be 
cleared of its associated risks, such as its possible instrumental use 
in political processes and the potential financial expenditure for its 
implementation. However, the official designation of the state lan-
guages went beyond its symbolic aspect due to multiple functions of 
official language.
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7. 2.  Stages  in  the Designat ion of  State 
Languages  in  the Finno -Ugr ic  Republics
The comparative study of the process and circumstances of the 
adoption of official documents that established the political status 
of Finno-Ugric Republics in the 1990s sheds light on the main rea-
sons for the designation of their state languages that appear across 
the cases, and also reveals some independent variables that became 
obstacles or have otherwise influenced the outcome. First of all, the 
timing is crucial in understanding the dynamics of state-building in 
Russia’s Republics (see Table 1). 
If SSRs had virtually no formal restrictions in shaping their lan-
guage policy, then the ASSRs, with some exceptions, adopted their 
declarations of state sovereignty, and later constitutions and lan-
guage laws, after the according documents were adopted in Russia. 
The Republican policy and legal acts reproduced most provisions of 
the Russian documents, except for some, such as the designation of 
their state languages.
The sovereignty declarations were the political acts that unilat-
erally changed the political status of the ASSRs by establishing them 
as sovereign states within the USSR. If approval of the sovereignty 
declarations of the ASSRs was inspired by the RSFSR leader Yeltsin, 
then establishing the state languages was a step that ASSR authori-
ties initiated themselves, copying the experience of SSRs (Article 2: 
128). While the Finno-Ugric ASSRs, with the exception of Karelia, 
designated their co-official state languages in their declarations of 
1990, it took time for constitutional designation and designation by 
language law. Designation in constitutions and laws proved to be 
impossible without declarative designation, as the case of Karelia 
demonstrates (Klementyev et al. 2012). If the regional elite had not 
found it necessary to include the state languages in their common 
vision of the future polity embodied in the sovereignty declaration, 
its inclusion at the further stages became problematic.
What changed in language politics after the approval of the 
ASSRs’ sovereignty declarations was the position of Russian, which 
acquired the status of the state language of the whole country first 
in Russia’s language law and then in the Russian constitution. Both 
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documents recognized the right of the Republics to have their state 
languages, which means that since their adoption, status planning 
in the Republics has remained within Russia’s legal space. Neither 
of the documents said that Russian was to become another state 
language of the Republics. Theoretically, those Republics, that have 
not yet designated their languages, could have followed the route 
taken by the Tuvinian ASSR and proclaimed the titular language 
as their sole state language. Therefore, also after 1991 the co-offi-
cial status of languages was not so much predetermined by federal 
design but largely reflected political developments inside the ASSRs 
themselves.
Constitutional recognition in the Finno-Ugric Republics of 
Russia took place in the period 1994–95, whereas recognition by law 
occurred in 1992–2001. There were only some sequential exceptions 
in the case of the constitutions and the language laws of the ASSRs, 
and among the Finno-Ugric Republics it was only in Komi that the 
language law was adopted before the constitution (in 1992; see Table 
1). In other words, with the exception of the Komi Republic, the three 
stages in the assertion of the official status typically followed one 
another, but they did not constitute a predetermined sequence and 
do not demand chronological order for their study. One regularity, 
however, should be pointed out: in general, the earlier the steps for 
language status planning were taken in a Republic, the stronger 
impact they had on the framing of ‘ethnic institutions’ within the 
political system. 
For example, Komi and Mari El were the only Finno-Ugric 
Republics in which professional language requirements were estab-
lished in the language laws that were adopted early (accordingly, in 
1992 and 1995; see Table 1). Furthermore, learning of the state lan-
guages was made compulsory at this time for all students in the 
language laws of Komi and Mari El, but only in 2004 in Mordovia. 
The latter obligation is based on the recognition of bilingualism as a 
feature of the multinational societies in these Republics.
Altogether, the processes of the development of the language 
legislations and, particularly, the adoption of the language laws in 
the Republics resulted in significantly different configurations of the 
domains where the use of the titular languages became compulsory. 
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Table 1. Stages in the Designation of the State Languages in the Republics.
RSFSR / Russian Federation Karelia Komi
Declaration of State 
Sovereignty of the 
Russian SFSR
Declaration of State 
Sovereignty of the 
Karelian ASSR
Declaration of 
State Sovereignty 
of the Komi SSR
12 June 1990 9 August 1990 29 August 1990
No provision on the 
state languages
No provision on the 
state languages
The equal functioning 
of Komi and 
Russian as the state 
languages (Para 15)
Constitution of the 
Russian Federation
Amendment to the 
KASSR Constitution 
Constitution of the 
Komi Republic
12 December 1993 24 December 1993 17 February 1994
Russian as the state 
language of the Russian 
Federation; the right 
of the Republics to 
establish their state 
languages (Art. 68)
The right of the 
Republic to designate its 
state languages by the 
Republican law (Art. 1)
Komi and Russian as 
the state languages 
of the Republic (Art. 
67); Komi as an object 
of particular state 
concern (Preamble)
Law “On the Languages 
of the Peoples of RSFSR”
Law “On the State 
Support of the Karelian, 
Veps and Finnish 
languages in the 
Republic of Karelia”
Law “On the State 
Languages of the 
Komi Republic”
25 October 1991 19 March 2004 28 May 1992
Language requirements 
can be introduced 
in the RSFSR and its 
Republics (Art. 15)
No provision Language requirements 
for some professions of 
both state languages 
(Art. 7, 13, 18) 
Russian to be learnt 
in all education 
institutions; state 
languages of the 
republics according 
to their legislation 
(Art. 9, 10)
Native language as 
a subject (Art. 5)
Native language as 
a subject; Komi and 
Russian as the state 
languages in all 
schools (Art. 19)
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Udmurtia Mari El Mordovia
Declaration of State 
Sovereignty of the 
Udmurt Republic
Declaration of 
State Sovereignty 
of the Mari SSR
Declaration on the 
State Legal Status of 
the Mordovian SSR
20 September 1990 22 October 1990 7 December 1990
Russian and Udmurt 
as the state languages 
of the Republic 
and guarantees 
for their equal 
functioning (Para 7)
The equal functioning 
of Mari (Hill, Meadow) 
and Russian as the 
state languages of the 
Republic (Para 5)
Moksha, Erzya and 
Russian as the state 
languages of the 
Republic; guarantees 
for equal-in-rights 
functioning (Para 7)
Constitution of the 
Udmurt Republic
Constitution of the 
Republic of Mari El
Constitution of the 
Republic of Mordovia
7 December 1994 24 June 1995 21 September 1995
Russian and Udmurt 
as the state languages 
of the Republics 
(Art. 9 (later 10))
The Mari (Hill and 
Meadow) language and 
the Russian language 
as the state languages 
of the Republic (Art. 
15). Knowledge of 
state languages by 
President (Art. 76)
The Russian language 
and the Mordvin 
(Moksha and Erzya) 
language as the state 
languages (Art. 13)
Law “On the State 
Languages of the 
Udmurt Republic and 
Other Languages of 
the Peoples of the 
Udmurt Republic” 
Law “On the 
Languages of the 
Republic of Mari El”
Law “On the State 
Languages of the 
Republic of Mordovia” 
27 November 2001 26 October 1995 24 April 1998
No provision At least some bilingual 
employees with 
some command of 
languages (Art. 14)
No provision
Native language as 
a subject (Art. 13)
Native language
instruction; Mari and 
Russian as the state
languages in all 
schools (Art. 11, 62)
Native language
instruction; optional 
study of the state 
languages of the 
Republic (Art. 10).
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Among other issues, the amount of institutionalized support for 
the expansion of official languages differs greatly depending on the 
Republic (see Article 4: 138–139). How one can explain these findings, 
which have revealed dissimilar circumstances and outcomes in the 
promotion of the state languages among the Republics? 
Pure sociolinguistic factors, such as the presence of more 
than one form of the titular language as in Mordovia, Mari El and 
Karelia, somewhat postponed the status planning, and thus had an 
indirect but not crucial impact. Arguably, it was not a lack of the 
written form itself and the corresponding impossibility for a lan-
guage to function in the public sphere, but the resulting absence of 
the demand on the side of the national organization that prevented 
Karelian from becoming official (Article 2: 140–141). 
In addition to the chronological determinacy, ‘political factors 
are important to the point of being decisive’, Michael Kirkwood notes 
(1989: 7). He also lists a number of factors that influenced language 
planning. All in all, the analysis demonstrates that socio-demo-
graphic factors paired with political factors were central for status 
planning in all five Finno-Ugric Republics (see Article 3 and 4). 
The sociological fact that the titular groups were the minorities 
in the total populations of their titular Republics appeared to have a 
direct impact on the balance of political powers in the Finno-Ugric 
Republics especially at the time of the adoption of constitutions 
and language laws. Here, in fact, the socio-demographic factors are 
reinforced by socio-psychological factors. The lower the share of the 
titular group, the further the trends of language shift were gone that 
caused deformations in the sociolinguistic situation of languages. 
More importantly, the low minority participation in the political 
process, including policy-making and decision-making, correlated 
with low political representation that usually did not proportion-
ally reflect even the actual share of the titular groups. Furthermore, 
there is no strict determinacy between the support of a parliamen-
tarian for linguistic and ethnic demands and his or her ethnicity, 
even if it is fixed in the passport, as it used to be in Russia up to 1998.
In this situation the laws that favored minority demands could 
not get enough votes to pass through the majority vote (see Article 
4: 140–142). Yet, for example, in Bashkortostan’s population ethnic 
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Bashkirs were the third group by size after Russians and Tatars and 
their share was only from one quarter to one fifth, but the titular 
elite was predominant both in regional parliament and government 
as well in local administrations (see Galljamov 1998, 2000). The 
question is then not in the share of the group per se but in ability of 
its elite to ensure the control over the regional authorities; and the 
higher share of the ethnic group in the republican population makes 
this an easier task (see Article 4: 138–139). 
One can broadly conclude that the lower the share of the titular 
group, the smaller the ability of leadership of national movements 
and the ethnic elite to bargain and co-operate with Republican 
authorities (Article 3: 360). What was the meaning and reasons for 
the designation of the state languages in different documents and 
varying contexts?
7.3.  Three Types  of  O f f ic ia l  Designat ion 
of  State  Languages
Developing a normative theory, Alan Patten (2001: 695–697) distin-
guishes three interests on the side of language speakers in official 
multilingualism as a model of language recognition: communica-
tion, symbolic affirmation and identity promotion. By the interest 
of communication he means accommodation of the communica-
tion needs by persons who lack fluency in official languages, which 
makes them unable to get access to public services. 
According to the data of population censuses, since the intro-
duction of the obligatory learning of Russian in 1938 the level of 
Russian knowledge among non-Russians constantly increased and 
by the time of the disintegration of the USSR, very few non-Russian 
monolinguals were among Russia’s inhabitants. The process of expan-
sion of Russian continues and today virtually all non-Russians in the 
Finno-Ugric Republics have at least some knowledge of Russian. 
More relevant for the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian reali-
ties are the other two interests: the interest in symbolic affirmation, 
which is rooted in the need for respect, and the interest in identity 
promotion, which is a part of a strategy directed at a group’s survival 
S u M M A r y
9 8
because for many groups language lies at the core of their identity 
(see Patten 2001, Taylor 1994). Further, Patten (2001: 697–700) argues 
that official multilingualism is an appropriate solution also to bal-
ance the interests that speakers of different languages have in public 
recognition of their languages, because it manifests their symbolic 
equality.
If Patten’s model is applied to the finding of this empirical 
study, the interests in symbolic affirmation, the balance of interests 
and identity promotion roughly correspond with the three types of 
designation of the state languages in Russia’s Republics: symbolic, 
political and legal designation. Symbolic designation conveys infor-
mation about the society as a whole and creates its self-image, politi-
cal designation fixes the political balance between different ethnic 
or national groups, and legal designation promotes certain identities 
through enforcement of the legal norms, including the compulsory 
use of languages, upon individuals, and changes their language atti-
tudes and language practices. 
It is important to add to Patten’s model that these were eth-
nic elites who represented all interests in the name of the group. 
Based on the elite theory and its application to the findings of the 
case studies in the Finno-Ugric Republics, I would like to propose 
the model of understanding the power relations behind the different 
stages of official designation of languages that reveals the corre-
lation of elite interests with different functions of the official lan-
guage. Symbolic designation was usually done in the sovereignty 
declaration, designation in the Republics’ constitutions because of 
its formal character tended to be more political and designation in 
the language laws more legal, although all documents contain ele-
ments of each type of designation to a different degree. All in all, 
the reasons for the three acts of recognition correspond to different 
functions of the state languages:
(1)  The echelons of Soviet nomenklatura reflected the hierarchy 
of Soviet federalism and were composed of the level of central and 
regional elites, the latter including elites in SSRs as well as ASSRs 
and other territorial units within SSRs (see Section 4.3 for the dis-
cussion on terms). Under the conditions of the collapse of the USSR, 
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USSR: CPSU + Nomenklatura
SSRs: ‘National’ ‘Russian’ nomenklatura
(RSFSR)
ASSRs: ‘Russian’ ‘National’ nomenklatura
 Mobilized population
the ‘parade of sovereignties’ and unclear future perspectives, the 
regional elites tried to justify the upgraded polity emerging. The 
Declarations of State Sovereignty of the ASSRs were the channel for 
the demand for greater self-governance. Regional elites in SSRs and 
ASSRs strived to maximize their benefits in the conditions of the 
centrifugal processes of the year 1990 by challenging the legitimacy 
of central authorities on the basis of the nationality principle. 
In the multilayered set of power relations, the alliance between 
the RSFSR democrats and regional elites of its ASSRs against central 
authorities proved to be crucial for providing the context for the 
officialization of languages. Russian democrats needed regional sup-
port in the face of central authorities, while all segments of regional 
elites had a common interest in designating the state languages as 
yet one more attribute of national sovereignty and needed to jus-
tify the emerging polity (see Figure 1: here and in the following fig-
ures those power relations that were significant for officialization 
are marked with white arrows; the most important dimension of 
power relations for the stage is marked with a black arrow; double-
edged arrows mark relations that brought mutual benefits for the 
elite segments and unidirectional arrows mark the ability of a group 
or population to advance for its interest over those of the group or 
population the arrow is directed at). 
Figure 1. State languages as the national symbol 
in the sovereignty declarations (1990).
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The presence or absence of demand for state languages in a dec-
laration did not become an indispensable element in justification 
of greater rights to self-governance. For example, in Karelia, such 
demand was not included into the Declaration of 9 August 1990. 
There are a number of circumstances that all could have contributed 
to the absence of demand in the Karelian declaration, starting from 
the weak position of the ethnic elite in the present up to the recent 
collective memory of the previously existed higher level of state-
hood in the form of a Union Republic that might have compensated 
for the lack of other justifications. However, as it has already been 
pointed out above, the absence of the political demand on the side 
of national organization was arguably the most important among 
these (see also Article 2). 
Nevertheless, the argument for the importance of the state lan-
guages also for the Republic of Karelia is reinforced by the fact that 
later also this Republic used its right and established its state lan-
guage, although a titular language was not designated (see Article 
2: 139–141). Both Union authorities and Russian authorities sought 
the support of regional elites. It was, however, the call of Yeltsin 
that triggered the sovereignization in the ASSRs. There was no con-
flict over the designation of two languages at that stage, because 
the symbolic capital that could be obtained from this act did not 
suppose the ‘zero-sum’ game between the regional elites as all their 
segments won.
(2)  After the collapse of the USSR, the political regime in Russia 
was stabilized and fixed in the Russian constitution of 1993 that sig-
nificantly curtailed regional powers but still approved the upgraded 
status of the Republics. With the Republics’ political status ensured, 
the regional political elites continued competing over powers 
within the upgraded political units. In this context, the recognition 
of state languages was no longer seen as a mere symbolic act, but 
the very division of powers depended on it, because ethnic elites 
attempted to employ the language requirement for top officials as 
an instrumental resource in the elite bargaining, while Russian-
speaking elites were intended to prevent this from happening (see 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. State languages as instruments and 
institutions in the constitutions (1994–1995).
The new political regimes fixed the balance of power in the con-
stitutions of the Republics. This elite pact established the regime 
that included, inter alia, the state languages as an ethnic institution 
which structured horizontal power relations by ensuring the bal-
ance of ethnic groups and that, however, could not be used as an 
instrument in the political processes (with some exceptions, e.g., 
in Tatarstan and Mari El: see Article 3: 361). Apart from language 
requirements, implementation of actual official bilingualism was 
not in the elite settlement agreement and had to be negotiated sep-
arately in connection with the language laws. This disconnection 
was in the interest of the Russian elites, who usually preferred the 
settlement not to be prevented by a disagreement about language 
status but did not have an interest in its actual implementation, 
especially when such measures lacked popular support. Common 
origin of elites in nomenklatura and their transformation in infor-
mal clientelistic networks led to the establishment of authoritarian 
regimes and enhanced elite settlement (see Regiony Rossii 2000, 2003 
on clientelism in the Finno-Ugric Republics). 
Ethnic elites were not powerful enough in the Finno-Ugric 
Republics to push their interests through and also preferred to reach 
an agreement rather than being excluded in the ‘winner takes all’ 
situation (as happened in Mari El in 2001). In Tatarstan, for example, 
the constitutional pact was ‘thicker’ and contained more language 
provisions. In the light of later changes in the balance of pow-
ers between elites and possible challenges to this pact, especially 
since the mid-2000s, when the interference and changing the local 
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republican leadership with the ‘Varangians’ from Moscow also to 
‘stronger’ regions, like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, became a com-
mon approach of the federal center in dealing with regions (inter-
ference occasionally happened in ‘weaker’ regions also before, e.g., 
in Mari El in 1997). It is important to note, however, that the consti-
tutions by their nature of ‘basic law’ are intended to embody stand-
ing solutions, because they contain not just political compromise 
between elites but constitutional compromise in principles (see 
Réaume 2000: 258–259).
( 3)  Simultaneously with bargaining in the political processes, eth-
nic elites advocated for the adoption of language revival projects as 
government policies. In the latter case, the status of the state lan-
guages was seen not so much as a symbol nor as political instru-
ment advancing the group interest to reach appropriate solution in 
balancing the interests of different groups but as a tool for the pro-
motion of group identity by the expansion of the titular languages 
in the public sphere through the adoption and implementation of 
the language laws (Article 4: 125–126). The language laws related to 
two groups of interests: those of the elites and those of the popula-
tion. The laws promoted the use of titular languages in activities of 
public authorities, their communications with the population and 
the provision of public services (see Section 3.4) through a top-down 
approach (see Figure 3). 
The language laws also contained a compromise of elites: on 
the one hand, the policy-makers included as one the legislative goals 
Russian Federation: Central ‘national’ elites
 
Republics: ‘Russian’ ‘Ethnic’ regional elites
 
 Population
Figure 3. State languages as institutions in the language laws (1992–2004).
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‘the maintenance and development of languages’ (the official term 
for ‘language revival’: see Article 4: 140), but, on the other, they also 
produced the co-official status of languages, which restricted the 
law’s potential for the promotion of titular languages. This compro-
mise embraced not only the level of goals of the laws, but also their 
content through the institutionalization of elements of the official 
status in provisions of language legislation and the implementa-
tion of these provisions, which should be studied separately (see 
Zamyatin 2014a).
The question about the possibility to use the official status as 
a tool of language revival deserves separate consideration, because 
researchers vary in their opinions about the link between the offi-
cial status and language revival: while in many countries the pro-
active government policy enhanced language revival, in some cases, 
such as that in Ireland, official recognition ‘from above’ is said to 
have discouraged the grassroots enthusiasm of activists (Sallabank 
2012: 116–117).
7.4.  Ins t i tut ional izat ion of  the Elements  of 
O f f ic ia l  Status  in  the Language Laws
While the mere recognition of the official status is sufficient to sat-
isfy the interest of the titular group in symbolic affirmation of its 
political status, the group’s interest in identity promotion can be 
accomplished through language planning. Republics’ language leg-
islations included measures of all its types: status planning, corpus 
planning and acquisition planning. Started in the Soviet times, work 
on corpus planning and acquisition planning was continued in the 
new realities. Language boards were created in all republics that 
approved neologisms and prepared dictionaries. Research institutes 
in the field of education prepared textbooks and teaching materials, 
developed teaching methods and trained native language teachers 
(see Zamyatin 2013a for more details).
Status planning provided for expansion of the parallel use of 
the titular language throughout the domains of the public sphere. 
The first function of the state languages as the working languages 
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of state authorities touched directly upon elite interests. Language 
legislation scarcely institutionalized elements of this function and 
they were rarely used in practice. For example, the right to speak in 
one’s language at the parliamentary sessions is enshrined in rules of 
procedure of all Finno-Ugric republics but it was never used except 
for greetings and other symbolic acts of speech. 
As for the second function of the languages in authorities’ com-
munication with the population, language requirements for some 
professions were established in several Republics, although were 
not in use (Article 4: 136–140). Members of ethnic elites themselves 
often lacked the knowledge of titular languages and the exclusive 
use of titular language as the means of communication was not on 
the agenda, inter alia, because the non-discrimination principle pre-
vented it. Typically the official status of the titular languages was 
not institutionalized in this part except for some symbolic aspects 
such as the language of signposts, road signs, etc. Among the public 
services, the school system remained the sector where titular lan-
guages were most institutionalized in legal provisions and the lat-
ter were implemented to some degree (see also Zamyatin 2014a on 
institutionalization). 
7.5.  Implementat ion of  the Language Laws
The revival of titular languages was equated to the expansion of 
their official functions through implementation of the language leg-
islations. The problem of the first wave of language laws both in 
SSRs and ASSRs, many of which were adopted at the time when 
the USSR still existed, was that their provisions were written in the 
Soviet style as declarative statements that did not have implemen-
tation mechanisms and left too much at the discretion of executive 
officials (Solomon 2008: 118–119). 
In the former SSRs, after their independence, the second wave 
of language laws was no longer declarative but contained legal 
norms promoting the compulsory use of the sole state languages 
in all public domains. In Russia, too, even if later, the Federal Law 
on the State Language of the Russian Federation (1 June 2005) laid 
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down the lists of domains where the use of the Russian language 
was obligatory (see Article 1: 127–128). Among the former ASSRs, 
Tatarstan only recently adopted the according Law On the Use of 
Tatar as the State Language of the Republic (12 January 2013). In 
Russia’s other republics such laws that would prescribe the compul-
sory use of state languages by composing a list of the domains were 
never adopted. 
That is why a legal-institutional analysis in a study of the 
regional laws provides only the first layer of understanding, while 
the study of implementation from the perspectives of both politi-
cal science and sociology offers deeper insights into language pol-
icy. Political scientists, as Peter Solomon witnesses, long ago iden-
tified implementation as a distinct phase of the political process. 
Implementation of a policy becomes complicated, inter alia, by such 
conditions that were present in Russian republics as their stay in 
federal structure, consequent involvement of many actors in the 
policy-making and the policy adoption as a series of decision (see 
Solomon 2008: 119–120, also Section 3.3).
The peculiarity of this phase is that official and other actors 
in charge of implementation may have their own interests in the 
issues at stake or may be influenced by external forces. Many fac-
tors, including bureaucratic inertia, lack of commitment and oppo-
sition to the policy as well as self-interest may form the position of 
officials. Inertia and lack of commitment are likely if new ideology 
contradicts the officials’ own perceptions. For example, the goal of 
expansion of titular languages has not found understanding espe-
cially among regional Russian-speaking officials, first of all, because 
of the issues of efficiency and economic cost, but also because of 
inconsistency of such policy with their language attitudes, accord-
ing to which these were undeveloped languages of the countryside. 
Furthermore, they were sensitive to the signs of a gradual shift from 
Soviet multilingual ideology to Russian monolingual ideology com-
ing from the center. 
A new policy is likely to provoke opposition, also because many 
interests are already invested in the status quo. Self-interest of offi-
cials consists mainly in career-related incentives. For example, the 
case of language requirements in the republics is a clear example of 
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negative incentives for officials (see Solomon 2008: 120–121, 127–128, 
also Zamyatin 2014a). 
While the problem of the influence of officials’ self-interest 
on the policy (non-) implementation is common for the bureaucra-
cies of many countries, democracies have usually the institutional 
mechanisms of constraints in their pursuit. However, in Russia, as 
Steven Solnick witnesses, the decay of formal institutions in the 
late Soviet times led to their substitution by informal ones (Solnick 
1998). ‘The actual interests of officials relating to power and policy 
are more likely to derive from informal institutions such as clien-
telistic networks’ and, thus, officials ‘are more likely to impede or 
distort the implementation of policies through such techniques’ as 
selective, virtual or manipulative compliance (see Solomon 2008: 
130–131). 
All these obstacles contributed to the situation when regional 
officials were typically reluctant to expand the use of titular lan-
guages (Article 5: 26). Nevertheless, if there was the political will in 
a republic, the wide proxies of executive officials and their informal 
institutions actually enhanced implementation of the language pol-
icy (see previous section). Even the absence of official status or a long 
absence of language law did not become a principle obstacle for lan-
guage revival, for example, in Karelia (see Article 4: 133–134). All in 
all, the implementation of language policy in Karelia was assigned 
with more funds in the executive programs than, for example, in 
Mari El (Article 4: 139–140).
One should not mix up government officials, including those 
of titular nationality, and members of ethnic elites who lobby for 
their vision of ethnic settlement (Article 2: 152–153). While those in 
government are comprised of the ruling elite, the latter group is 
part of broader political elites, who have a say but do not directly 
influence political decision-making. Another meaningful divide is 
between ethnic elites and activists, where the latter are members 
of civil society. Yet, the leadership of national movements, chairs 
of national organizations were often co-opted into ethnic elites or, 
in the later years, rather members of elites were appointed to lead 
national NGOs to keep activists under control and part of the sys-
tem. The Soviet legacy of discouraging activism and substituting it 
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with hopes for the protective state resulted in the prevalence of ‘top-
down’ policy in Russia, which is a problem from the perspective of 
the revival of minority languages. The problem is aggravated by the 
virtual absence of self-executing individual language rights, which 
hampers language revival ‘from below’ (see Section 4.2). 
The question is, then, whether language revival can be 
enhanced by language laws in principle and in that case, what are 
the minimum standards for their effectiveness. A separate evalua-
tion, not included in this study, was conducted on how the language 
laws in Republics were institutionalized against their own goals and 
implemented against the measures prescribed (Zamyatin 2014a). In 
the current study, the implementation of language policy in educa-
tion was taken for the purpose of an in-depth evaluation, because 
it turned out that the introduction of the compulsory study of lan-
guages to students of titular nationality or to all students (in addi-
tion to language preferences for some professions) became one of the 
central measures directed at language revival (Article 4: 127–128). 
Since the 1920s, it was assumed that students would study in 
their native language, and learning of the native language was com-
pulsory in the sense that in 1930 universal education was established 
for all. Yet, first by the introduction of obligatory learning of Russian 
since the late 1930s and then by the element of free choice of lan-
guage learning introduced in the context of the 1958–9 education 
reform, both the principle of native language of instruction and the 
obligation to learn the native language were removed (see Blitstein 
2001, Kreindler 1989, also Article 5). Drawing parallels with the 1920s, 
ethnic elites wanted to use the same mechanism of compulsory 
teaching in the early 1990s. However, since the late 2000s, the free 
choice of language learning is again being used against compulsory 
teaching of titular languages and for the promotion of Russian in 
the framework of nation-building. In effect, the compulsory teach-
ing of non-Russian languages either as native or as state languages 
of Republics has been removed (Article 5: 40–42). The quantitative 
evaluation of the access to minority language learning in the Finno-
Ugric Republics demonstrated that the existing system of minority 
language education does not ensure the reproduction of language 
knowledge by a significant part of students (Article 6: 98–99). 
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Another article, supplementary to this study, addressed the 
implementation of regional education policy for the revival not only 
of state languages of the republics but also for the other categories 
such as the languages of numerically small indigenous peoples and 
the languages of ‘national minorities’ in a narrow sense (Zamyatin 
2013a). The comparative data on education in different types of con-
stituent units provides evidence in support of the argument that 
since the Soviet times and up to the present time different patterns 
in policy could be still identified behind seemingly inconsistent 
policy (see Grant 1989: 72–73). Furthermore, these patterns can be 
found not only between different types of constituent units but also 
between individual units in the same type, for example, among the 
republics. While there might be some in-between cases, in general, 
different patterns for Volga Turkic and Finno-Ugric republics can be 
observed (see Article 6: 16, 18). 
7.6 .  Result s  of  the Empir ical  Study
The empirical study demonstrated that one should distinguish at 
least three types of official designation of the de facto minority lan-
guages that were parts of parallel processes with different goals, 
meanings and consequences. These types of designation reveal dif-
ferent functions of the official status and correspond to the three 
types of recognition: symbolic, political and legal recognition. The 
first of these should be viewed, above all, as being a part of the 
center-periphery relations, the second should be considered in the 
context of the political bargaining between segments of regional 
elites, and the third interpreted mainly in terms of the interactions 
between authorities and the population.
In the historical situation, when the central authorities were 
weak, elites in Russian regions strived to maximize their self-gov-
ernment and bargained for the higher political status of their regions, 
inter alia, using ethnic and linguistic justifications. The officializa-
tion of languages by the regional authorities directly depended on 
the presence of a corresponding demand put forward by ‘national 
congresses’. The absence of a timely demand in Karelia resulted in 
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the denial of official status to a titular language. Despite the prob-
lems of representation, the demand of national congresses expressed 
as the will of the peoples (conceptualized as ‘ethnoses’) were at a 
certain point an argument strong enough for titular elites to per-
suade the other segments of regional elites of their common interest 
and to include the official status of languages into the elite pact. The 
analysis highlights the role of ethnic elites as the key advancers of 
the official status demands.
Titular elites presented language revival as the goal of offi-
cialization. Under certain conditions, official status can serve as a 
device for the revival of minority languages. Policy documents of 
the Finno-Ugric Republics approved since the mid-1990s had only 
some statements relating to their state languages and in some 
cases explicitly promised to guarantee support for their revival (see 
Article 1: 113–116). However, in these Republics the institutionalized 
set of conditions proved to be unfavorable for titular language pro-
motion due to the weak position of ethnic elites inside the Republics. 
Compulsory use has largely failed to become the mechanism of 
expansion of titular languages, with some notable exceptions in 
education. In effect, the official status of titular languages was only 
fragmentarily implemented. By contrast, status planning in some 
other Republics, notably, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, was more 
successful. However, also there it only slowed down but did not 
reverse the language shift.
Both attempts of extensive planning of minority languages in 
Russian history of the 20th century appeared to be short-lived. In 
the early 1990s, Russian authorities remained quite detached. When 
it comes to Russia’s language policy documents approved since the 
mid-1990s, neither the 1996 Concept of the State Nationalities Policy, 
the 2006 Concept of the State National Education Policy nor the 2012 
Strategy even mention state languages of Republics (see Article 1: 
127, Zamyatin 2013b, 2014b). Given the failure of democratization 
and the establishment of an authoritarian regime, it is easy to feel 
reassured in pessimism about Russia. Yet, this study attempted to 
avoid oversimplifications and proposed the answers to what might 
be the level of the problem in language policy.
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Despite the policy variations throughout the Soviet and post-
Soviet times in the ethno-political pendulum from the promotion 
of diversity to assimilation, synchronically Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia’s language policy is a symbiosis of different goals depend-
ing on the target group. Seemingly contradictory tendencies coex-
ist: there is a trend of ever increasing valorization of the Russian 
language, delivery of some bilingual public services through official 
territorial bilingualism for titular languages of the republics and 
autonomous districts, and plain assimilationist policy towards the 
other languages. Reflecting the theoretical debate, since 2000 lan-
guage planning shifted from the sociolinguistic to the instrumental 
type with an emphasis on the economic side (see Kirkwood 1989: 1), 
and the further expansion of official use in the observable future is 
unlikely (even if there are attempts, as in Udmurtia).
The empirical analysis provides the basis for the further theo-
retical discussion about the specifics of the official status in the case 
of minority languages and distribution of functions between the 
co-official languages. It remains a topic for sociolinguistic study to 
establish how the language planning has actually influenced lan-
guage practices (for some results see: Karjalainen et al. 2013).
8.  Some Implicat ions  for  the Theoretical 
Understanding of  Speci f ics  of  the Of f icial 
Status  in  the Case of  Minor it y  Languages
National movements emerged in the Republics in the late 1980s out 
of popular concerns and dissatisfaction with the state of inter-eth-
nic relations. The ethnic elites claimed to articulate these concerns 
and justified their demand for the official status of the titular lan-
guages as a part of their endeavor towards political recognition of 
the ‘titular peoples’. 
The elites argued that this status was needed as a part of the 
national revival of the ‘titular peoples’ and, in particular, for the 
revival of their languages. There were direct borrowings from the 
practice of language policy in other countries: for example, in draft-
ing the first Estonian ASSR language law of 1989, the text of the 
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Charter of the French Language, a provincial law in Quebec, was 
consulted (see Rannut 2002). Moreover, the elites looked for scien-
tific substantiation for their revivalist claims in the cultural argu-
ment and the ideas from theories like that of Joshua Fishman (1991). 
Fishman proposed the model of reversing language shift (RLS), 
which was viewed as an achievable task that implied a set of actions 
(Fishman 1991: 381; the RLS concept is self-explanatory and less ideo-
logically charged than the concept ‘language revival’). 
Some Russian scholars (e.g., Guboglo 1998, Alpatov 2000; see 
Section 6) objected to the sincerity of the revivalist rhetoric and 
interpreted activities of national elites as actually intending to use 
the official status of languages instrumentally to ensure a privileged 
position for the titular groups and, above all, for themselves. At the 
same time, international scholars have illuminated a special role 
that institutions had in the Soviet ‘construction of nations’ and post-
Soviet nation-building (e.g. Brubaker 1996, Gorenburg 2003), which 
should also have relevance in the language policy.
The ethnosymbolist approach to ethnicity and nationalism 
was proposed by Anthony D. Smith (2009) as an alternative to a 
primordialist-constructivist divide and is largely shared and used 
in relation to language by John Edwards (2009, 2011). This approach 
attempts to reconcile the primordialist and constructionist views in 
that it emphasizes importance of symbols, myths, values and tradi-
tions in the formation and persistence of the modern nation-state, 
while recognizing an invented and constructed nature of identity. 
The plan in this section is to discuss the results of the empiri-
cal study in the light of symbolist, revivalist, instrumentalist and 
institutionalist theories in order to find out what implications study 
might have for conceptualization of the official status in the case of 
minority languages. What specifics might the official status have 
in the case of a minority language? What are the peculiarities in 
its symbolic and practical use? How does this status fit revivalist 
and constructivist argumentation? What are the strong points of 
the instrumentalist and institutionalist explanations? What were 
the reasons for the official designation of minority languages?
The section addresses the following questions: First, how the 
symbolist function works in the case of minority languages? Do 
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symbolist and revivalist motives in official designation complement 
or contradict each other in the case of minority languages? Second, 
what influence were different configurations of the official status 
able to have on language revival? What were the elements of the 
official states that impeded its use as a tool of language revival? 
Third, is the instrumentalist argument for the designation of the 
state languages valid also for understanding the processes in the 
Republics with low support for nationalism? What were the possible 
instrumental uses that the official status could bring? Fourth, what 
is the function of the state languages as ‘ethnic institutions’? What 
interests do elites have in establishing ethnic institutions and how 
does society in general benefit from their existence?
8 .1.  Symbolic  Perspec t ive
The conceptual framework of the ethnosymbolist approach fits well 
in comprehending the social role of language. John Edwards notes 
that members of the mainstream society might not distinguish the 
communicative and symbolic functions of their language. When 
language is in a dominant position, its symbolism is not obvious 
and remains unmarked but is always present implicitly, because 
languages are not neutral (Edwards 2011: 95–113). Moreover, Pierre 
Bourdieu argued that ‘language should be viewed not only as a 
means of communication but also as a medium of power’. The domi-
nant social group exercises most symbolic power and, by defining 
the value of languages, re-translates social and economic differ-
ences. The state then imposes the dominant language by designating 
it with an official status and, thus, delegitimizes other languages. In 
this way symbolism of language reinforces the social order as a set 
of social structures, institutions and practices (Bourdieu 1991: 51–59).
For the minority-group members the two functions of language 
are separable. Minority members are typically among those who have 
less access to the legitimate competence of the dominant language 
that functions as linguistic capital within the linguistic market. The 
desire to succeed in life may compel them to acquire the dominant 
language and improve knowledge up to the level of excellence, if 
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not by themselves then by the choice of school for their children. 
Diglossia causes a typical two-generation language shift towards 
the dominant language which is the highway of assimilation. 
Yet, change of identity is not the only option available. Despite 
all political pressures to change the language, the ability of the 
people to retain their language can be remarkable (see, e.g., Raun 
2001). Furthermore, while stigmatization and oppressive conditions 
may have already caused communicative language shift, the people 
continue to identify themselves with their ‘native’ language and 
resist the symbolic order (see, e.g., Fought 2006: 23). Erving Goffman 
suggested the concept of the interactional order to describe how 
humans are not just passive recipients of the state policy but how 
individual interactions form the foundation for the social structures 
(Hoffman 1983: 6–8). 
In this context, the official status for a minority language pro-
vides the locus for reference and functions as the channel that rein-
forces people’s ethnic and linguistic identity. In the case of minor-
ity languages their official status works always and often only as a 
national symbol. Officialization has significance as yet another act 
of symbolic affirmation of the place of minority groups in society 
through the political and constitutional recognition of the multilin-
gual characteristics of national statehood. 
Yet, the act of officialization itself does not automatically bring 
change in the symbolic order because the latter demands also a 
change in language practices. The study of institutionalization of 
official status for titular languages in language laws demonstrates 
that among the institutionalized and actually implemented mea-
sures these were mostly symbolic elements (see Section 7.3 above; 
Zamyatin 2014a). Symbolism of the official status manifests itself 
not only in the act of recognition, but also continues to be present 
in its legal regime through the elements contributing to linguistic 
landscapes such as bilingual street signs etc. and sometimes through 
symbolic acts of speech and, therefore, creates conditions for change 
in practices. 
At the same time, in separation of symbolic and communica-
tive aspects of language lies a potential danger for minority lan-
guage, because toleration of symbolic recognition is not the same 
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as promotion of actual communication. After all, a symbol can be a 
sign of the idea that does not have its counterpart in the world: e.g., 
the state language of the republic conveys the message about the 
republic as the state, which, however, does not have other substan-
tiation in political reality. That is to say, the corresponding duality 
of the official status allows authorities to disconnect the symbolic 
recognition from the promotion of language use. 
Exploring Russian policy of diversity management, Alexander 
Osipov writes about ‘systemic hypocrisy’, when ‘deliberate avoid-
ance of implementing certain normative provisions generates no 
criticism in the given society and goes in combination with the 
overall silent consent on this state of affairs of all the stakeholders, 
including minority activists themselves’. As he points out, ‘symbolic 
policies aimed at ethnic relations become values in themselves as a 
non-controversial ground of communication for different social and 
political actors and thus supersede instrumental policies’ (Osipov 
2012: 425). Osipov describes this situation in Russia as typical also 
for the other countries, but a case-specific analysis can provide some 
insights into this particular phenomenon. 
For one thing, his explanation of ‘systemic hypocrisy’ seems 
to lack a diachronic perspective when he considers as a lasting phe-
nomenon such its aspects as the absence of genuine federalism or 
drawbacks of laws. In the conditions, when controversial principles 
were laid down in the country’s language policy (see Article 1), a 
delay in implementation and its initial limitation to those measures 
that correspond to explicitly stated non-controversial grounds, such 
as symbolic recognition, is perhaps not surprising in the short run in 
terms of the elite settlement. Furthermore, a lack of such settlement 
manifests itself in the inconsistency of laws themselves. However, 
instead of being the sign of the regime consolidation through 
symbolic discourse, chronic non-implementation might reveal the 
inability of elites to change the overall settings. 
Peter Solomon (2008) might have come closer to explaining 
specifics of the Russian public administration by displaying an 
important role of informal institutions. Indeed, the political cul-
ture that overcomes criticism on the side of non-systemic actors 
through systemic hypocrisy must be very specific. An oppressive 
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political regime and pressure on minority nationalisms are likely 
to be behind the silencing of the activists who are controlled and 
governed through subordinated NGOs. A Soviet legacy of ‘folk-
lorization’ of identities could be named among the mechanisms 
that promote nation-building by establishing the hegemony of the 
Staatsvolk. Therefore, establishment of the official status of minor-
ity language as a mere symbolic act instead of language promotion 
might actually be a form of hegemonic control, which makes it even 
more challenging to reunite communicative and symbolic functions 
of minority languages in language practices in an attempt of lan-
guage promotion.
8 . 2.  Rev ival is t  Perspec t ive
The instrumentalist interest of elites might have been important in 
some former SSRs in the designation of their sole state languages, 
but dramatic expansion in the use of the titular languages in the 
public sphere at the cost of Russian had an immediate effect on the 
population and resulted in a total shift in the sociolinguistic situ-
ation in favor of local languages. In the former ASSRs, both those 
with a titular demographic majority or minority, it proved to be 
impossible to effectively employ the titular state languages either 
as political or as language revival resources due to their co-official 
status. The study data in this part reassert the proposition that only 
selective language recognition, when a minority language becomes 
the only official language in a region of the country, could be an 
appropriate device of language maintenance and language revival 
(Kymlicka 2001: 79). Otherwise, co-official designationin itself does 
not guarantee the maintenance of the minority language or any sig-
nificant expansion in its official use, even if it is accomplished as a 
legal designation. In the latter scenario, many more sociolinguistic 
and extralinguistic variables are at stake than just the official policy 
(Patten 2001: 705, Laitin 1998). 
The co-official status of the minority languages, even if for-
mally equalized, differs in its function as the language in office from 
the corresponding status of the majority language. When the goal 
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of status planning is precisely to expand the functions of minority 
language into prestigious domains, this a difficult task to achieve 
(see Fishman 2001: 9–13). The revivalist idea was that the minority 
languages would continue to retreat and disappear unless they were 
used in the domains associated with contemporary life. However, it 
was the revivalist project that posited the goal of expansion of the 
minority language in the public sphere not through redistribution 
of functions between the languages, e.g., in territorial solutions that 
would allow exclusive use of minority languages in some domains 
and territories but through the establishment of official nation-Rus-
sian bilingualism. 
In this endeavor, the revivalist project had to constrain its goal to 
the formal compulsory use of both languages as working languages. 
In this respect, its compulsory character as an attribute of the official 
status did not contradict the freedom to choose one’s language of 
communication or other individual freedoms. However, if the com-
pulsory character use is unquestioned as one of the main features of 
the official language in the case of majority languages, then it is not 
self-evident in the case of minority language. Unsurprisingly, the 
majority public opinion did not favor such measures and language 
attitudes also had their impact on the state policy by complicating 
and in many instances even preventing its implementation. 
Using the experience of the former SSRs, ethnic elites in former 
ASSRs also insisted on the quick implementation of language revival 
projects. However, for example, even in Estonia the 1989 language 
law had a three-year implementation period and only after the USSR 
collapse did the second-wave language laws impose radical changes. 
In a quite different sociolinguistic situation inside Russia, the forced 
implementation was unrealistic not only because language attitudes 
changed slowly, but because the languages themselves lacked a tra-
dition of being used in public affairs. 
These were ethnic elites who knew the official language and 
rushed expansion was in their interest, because the clock was tick-
ing and the window of opportunity for change closing. After all, 
such moves as, for example, the translation of laws into the titular 
language, as is done in Komi, do not need many resources and help 
to develop vocabulary in new domains. However, the population was 
8 .  S O M e  i M p l i c A t i O n S  f O r  t H e  t H e O r e t i c A l  u n d e r S t A n d i n g
1 1 7
and is currently still estranged from the standardized official lan-
guage, especially since a large portion of individuals who continue 
to identify themselves with the group did not have the possibility to 
acquire the standard form in school. Presence of several standard 
varieties disorients the people even more. A lack of standardiza-
tion as well as language shift and insufficient language knowledge, 
code-switching and code-mixing did not allow the closing of the gap 
between communicative and symbolic functions and failed to bring 
positive change in the language attitudes. All these circumstances 
contributed to the lack of support for language revival on the side of 
the titular group.
Another complication was that proponents of the creation 
of unified standard forms from existing varieties of minority lan-
guages in the Republics considered their standardization to be the 
precondition for the possibility to make their study compulsory for 
ethnic Russians and this way to promote mutual national-Russian 
bilingualism. The idea might have been good but its forced imple-
mentation typically led to intra-elite conflicts. Moreover, the prob-
lem with the main varieties is only the tip of the iceberg. In co-
official language settings, the policy advocates should have been 
cautious and more sensitive with regard to language attitudes. Yet, 
this was exactly a likely deficiency of top-down language revival 
that it largely ignored the attitudes and needs of the group actually 
speaking that language. 
This experience demonstrates how important it is to distin-
guish two aspects of compulsory use depending on the target group: 
whether the language is made obligatory to use only as the ‘native 
language’, i.e., for the according ethnic group, or as the state lan-
guage for all, including the majority population. With the given atti-
tudes, language revival might have been more successful if it had 
been restricted to compulsory use only as one’s ‘native language’, 
i.e., the language of one’s ethnic group. Compulsory use in this nar-
row application might have been more effective by appealing to 
one’s ethnic identity, because in the sociolinguistic situation, when 
individuals could always use the majority language, it was indeed 
possible to let people to learn and speak minority languages only 
under constraint. 
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The campaign in the 1990s for language revival through exten-
sive expansion of non-dominant language use in Russia’s Republics 
is sometimes compared with the Soviet ‘nativization’ policy of the 
1920s. In the 1920s, the central authorities forced ‘nativization’ upon 
the often reluctant regional authorities. What made the attempt to 
expand the local languages in the 1990s distinct from the compara-
ble efforts of the 1920s was the inversed position the central authori-
ties. Given a lack of pressure ‘from above’ in the 1990s, the regional 
policy-makers were satisfied with symbolic designation of the state 
languages and supported, but did not actually intend to implement 
the official status for the titular language (see Osipov 2012). 
The symbolic and formal designation of the official language 
was disconnected from its legal designation. In some cases, the 
adoption of language laws was significantly postponed. A pro-
claimed equal-in-rights or equal-in-functioning status typically is 
a part of symbolic politics, while in political reality the use of non-
dominant language is narrower than that of the dominant language 
and the extent of the use depends on power relations. A co-official 
non-dominant language has not become another working language 
of many state authorities and public institutions. The de facto policy 
did not aim for the promotion of actual bilingualism, which is still 
one-sided, as very few Russians know the titular languages.
Therefore, it could be argued that, unless the minority language 
is the sole official language in the region, the official status has only 
a limited value as a tool of language revival. De Varennes sceptically 
evaluates the capacity of official language as a tool of its ‘promotion’ 
and contrasts it with the actual compulsory use of official languages 
(de Varennes 2012: 52–56). According to him, ‘to use the language 
is not the same as to promote its use’. While in the former case, the 
authorities have no other excuse but to use the language according 
to their obligations in detail provided in the legislation, then in the 
latter the authorities only express their ‘commitment’ and leave the 
issue of implementation at the discretion of public officials. 
Incidentally, Russia was criticized by the Advisory Committee 
on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities for the fact that ‘in most cases the relevant norms lack 
mechanisms that would guarantee their implementation, leaving 
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too much discretion in the hands of the executive authorities’ 
(ACFC Second Opinion on Russia of 11 May 2006). This said, it 
should be noted that even if the official status of Finno-Ugric lan-
guages does not influence language practices directly, its symbolic 
function without any doubt contributes indirectly to language 
revival through raising prestige.
8 .3.  Ins trumental is t  Perspec t ive
The discourses of the theories of language policy and the studies of 
ethnicity and nationalism partly overlap: in both, the revivalist and 
instrumentalist approaches are represented in understanding of the 
conjoined phenomena of ethnicity and language. Both national and 
language revival are ideologically charged, because they are con-
nected to nationalism and nationalist mobilization. The difference 
is that within sociolinguistics and the theories of language policy, 
languages are not seen as reducible to their instrumental use and 
language revival is considered as a legitimate goal, although this 
project would still need a normative justification, e.g., in the con-
text of human rights, minority rights or on the basis of language’s 
expressive value for cultural identity (Kraus 2008: 38–41). The par-
ticular language as a complex system of communication can be 
revived in its social dimension as the reversal of language shift and 
in its linguistic dimension in the form of corpus planning. Fishman 
was careful to emphasize that most of those who support RLS are 
not primordialists but understand constructedness of the phenom-
ena around ethnicity and language (Fishman 2001: 8–9) and for that 
very reason consider it an achievable task.
Yet, the dominant constructivist understanding in the studies 
on ethnicity and nationalism denies the validity of revivalist argu-
ments, because it sees them as an example of primordialist claims. 
According to the constructivist interpretation, the nation itself is 
usually viewed as a ‘chimera’, a social construct (e.g., Brubaker 1996, 
Tishkov 1996). Instead of the revival of the nation and its culture, 
those looking at the phenomena from the instrumentalist perspec-
tive see behind the accomplishment of a national revival project 
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the interests of ethnic entrepreneurs and the invention of new tra-
ditions. The instrumentalist argument in the theories of language 
policy is complementary to this and sees in the language revival the 
attempts of the entrepreneurs to reach their political ends by using 
the language demands as a political instrument (see, e.g., Robichaud 
& De Schutter 2012).
Professional language requirements particularly would be used 
as evidence for the instrumental use of language. In connection 
with the official language, the demand for compulsory knowledge 
of minority language by top officials or parliamentarians often is 
presented as an example of instrumental use. However, this inter-
pretation is already laden with a presupposition that de facto minor-
ity language is not working as a language in office. If one goes to the 
extremes with this logic, even activities for the promotion of minor-
ity languages in education could be interpreted instrumentally as 
the attempt of ethnic elites to reinforce their social capital for the 
future. Yet, the European Court of Human Rights recognized as 
legitimate the demand for official language knowledge to be elected 
not only to the national parliament (see the case Podkolzina v. Latvia 
2002) but also the knowledge of regional language to regional parlia-
ment (Birk-Levy v. France 2010). 
Another issue is that when language preferences are established, 
they also have to be justified, because when official language creates 
a distinction based on language, this can be discriminatory from the 
perspective of international human rights law. Yet, when justified 
and reasonable, authorities must use another official language, in 
order not to be discriminatory, because this is a part of decentraliza-
tion and, thus, ensures the stability of government (see the analysis 
of the Belgian linguistic case 1968 and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt 
v. Belgium 1987 in de Varennes 2012: 26–35). Indeed, some authors 
stress the importance of perceived labor discrimination as a resource 
for nationalist mobilization (Gorenburg & Giuliano 2012). 
It seems that one problem here is that the instrumentalist 
approach oversimplifies the nature of the relationships between eth-
nic elites and popular movements by setting their interests in oppo-
sition, even though they have not been, at least, by the adoption of 
the sovereignty declarations (see Article 2: 126). Ethnic elites, indeed, 
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attempted to include ethnic institutions, such as language require-
ments for top officials, into constitutions and language laws that 
could be used instrumentally in the political process (see Section 6 
above). Yet, in doing so, they not only pursued their own goals but 
also envisaged these instruments as a part of a national revival in the 
broader nationalist agenda. Failure to include language preferences 
into constitutional systems in many former ASSRs became an obsta-
cle for national aspirations because it does not allow the language 
to be spread to the upper social strata. However, as Miroslav Hroch 
argued, a necessary condition for the successful national project is 
that the ethnic group must be represented at all strata of society.
At the same time, language requirements for ordinary profes-
sions in public services and in the school curriculum could not be 
used as political instruments by default, but rather enhance the cre-
ation of the strata who earn a living from working with language. 
They could be better understood as a reaction to language attitudes 
among the population, which were also instrumental, because the 
people perceive the dominant language as more advantageous and 
choose first and foremost the language of opportunity for their chil-
dren and themselves. However, in explaining the activities of the 
elites, the revivalist and instrumentalist options are not mutually 
exclusive but are, in fact, complementary to each other. The eth-
nic elites may advocate for language revival on behalf of the people 
they claim to represent because it is, after all, in their interest to 
maintain the support of the people.
Both revivalist and instrumentalist arguments have their influ-
ence on the normative thinking of political science and law that 
elaborate models for ethnic and linguistic diversity management in 
forms of political institutions or legal rights. Ethnic elites are aware 
of the vulnerability of the revivalist argument and often present 
their endeavor to preserve group identity as demands for language 
rights rather than as national demands. At the same time, the ruling 
elites wish to have and preserve a monopoly over the instrumental 
use. Nevertheless, the official status and other devices of language 
policy could not be used as instruments, either for the advancement 
of particular group interests or for the purpose of language revival, 
without the creation and functioning of ethnic institutions.
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8 .4.  Ins t i tut ional is t  Perspec t ive
Based on the findings of the institutionalist theories, this study 
extends the institutionalist view to the official status of state lan-
guages. The institutionalist approach explains why the ethnic elites 
advocated for inclusion of institutional solutions to ethnic and lin-
guistic issues in the foundational documents of the Republics that 
were built in the political system in the 1990s. The results of the case 
studies demonstrate that the official status for minority languages 
could be considered yet another ‘ethnic institution’. It proved to be 
possible to use the official status of languages as an ‘ethnic institu-
tion’ that structures the relationships between the authorities and 
the population as well as between groups. This institution had only 
a restricted symbolic significance for the reinforcement of ethnicity 
and did not serve as an actual instrument of nationalist mobiliza-
tion. However, it continues to work effectively as an element that 
balances the interests of different groups and keeps society together. 
A century ago, the founders of the Soviet State believed that 
the establishment of the federal structure on the nationality princi-
ple and the promotion of national construction of the Soviet nations 
would provide a permanent solution to the ‘national question’. 
As Walker Connor notes, one nation-building is another nation-
destroying (Connor 1972). Almost a hundred years later, the opposite 
approach in contemporary Russian politics holds that the removal of 
‘ethnic institutions’ up to the liquidation of ethnically defined feder-
ative units would solve the ‘national question’. An unstated assump-
tion is that if ‘ethnic institutions’ disappear, ethnicity will not be 
politicized. The main concern is the territorial integrity of the State 
and the main threat to it is believed to be the political mobilization 
of ethnicity. In the longer run, integration and assimilation of non-
Russians into the single Russian nation is viewed as the solution. 
Federalism as a model for ethnic diversity has begun to be pre-
sented as a temporary compromise. The ethnically defined units of 
the federation are being challenged, their nations deconstructed. 
Ethnicity is declared a cultural issue and not a political one. 
However, even according to normative liberal theory, on ‘the mar-
ket of ideas’, the idea of Tatarstan as a civil nation of the Tatarstani 
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people is as justified as the idea of the Russian civil nation. What is 
a better polity? This is not only an issue of power relations, but the 
problem is how authorities will manage to justify the level of state-
hood (Zamyatin 2004). One can expect over the longer perspective 
that the policy of recognition through the federal structure will be 
stopped and the existence of the Republics as the constituent units 
of the legal-political landscape will be under challenge. One can 
expect that the policy of recognition will be challenged also in its 
linguistic dimension.
However, the salience of national identities varies and they 
may move to the background of politics and may again come to 
the forefront (Roeder 2012: 172–173). The problems not actualized 
through minority political representation might provoke conflicts. 
Instead of solving the ‘national question’, this approach might pro-
voke minority nationalism and lead to a new aggravation of inter-
ethnic tensions (see Gagnon 2003). Contrary to the rhetoric often 
used in recent Russian political discourse, it might not have been the 
ethnic institutions established in the 1920s and 1930s that were the 
reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the policy directed 
at their erosion in the later Soviet period that provoked nationalist 
resentment among non-Russians. 
Institutions are the means of conflict resolution that create a 
framework for negotiation of diverging interests. Even if an institu-
tion is established in the interest of a particular group, society in 
general benefits from its existence. Power relations in society are 
fixed in institutions and the way in which they structure the inter-
action between authorities and population. In the context of conflict 
prevention, federalization and autonomization became widespread 
as institutional methods of diversity management, power-sharing 
and territorial solutions (McGarry & O’Leary 1993: 4). Based on 
analysis of post-communist regimes, Brubaker and some other 
scholars argued that multinational federations are doomed to col-
lapse (Brubaker 1996), but other scholars see ethno-federalism as a 
viable solution (see, e.g., McGarry & O’Leary 2005, Requejo 2001, 
Tully 2001). In the same way, an official status for non-dominant lan-
guages has an important capacity as a social institution that struc-
tures social relations.
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9.  Conclusion
What does it mean that a language is designated official? In the 
framework of this study it was argued that official status has two 
main functions. First of all, the language with an official status 
serves as the working language of authorities and, second, in addi-
tion it may be also used as a symbol of identity. What are the rea-
sons for the designation of a minority language with an official sta-
tus? First, the official status of minority languages serves foremost 
as a symbol of identity and, second, this status may also provide an 
opening for the language to access political or administrative office.
Whether a minority language becomes a working language 
also in reality depends on the configuration of its official status with 
regard to the majority language and the limitations imposed on it by 
the state, e.g., through its federal structure. If a minority language is 
designated as a sole official language in the region, its practical func-
tions would not principally differ from those of a majority language, 
but its symbolic status will be always present. If a minority language 
is designated as being co-official along the majority language either 
in a region or in the whole territory, then, again, first of all, in their 
designation the minority language functions as a symbol of group 
identity and, thus, is an element of recognition. The issue of practical 
use in the case of co-official status is more complicated.
In the political discourse both functions are typically assumed 
to be two sides of the same coin and associated with the undividable 
official status. This assumption causes a logical vacuum of mismatch, 
if the ideal image representing a duality of functions of the official 
status is not reflected in social reality, when minority language is 
designated official but remains a mere symbol and does not work 
as the language in office. Perception of mismatch becomes stronger 
in a more frequent situation, when, along with being a symbol, the 
minority language penetrates some areas of official use. The lan-
guage activists, then, interpret this situation as ‘systemic hypocrisy’ 
and call for the expansion of official use of minority languages in 
the name of ‘language revival’.
In practice, it is usually a certain degree of implementation 
of the co-official status that could be seen as a mark on a range 
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of extent in official use spreading from the score ‘0’ representing 
the absence of any practical use beyond the symbolic recognition 
to the score ‘1’ of the complete expansion of the minority language 
to all elements of official status that amounts to full-scale official 
bilingualism, which, however, hardly ever happens. The problem is 
that due to functional distribution of diglossia the co-official status 
leads to a ‘zero-sum’ game where either the majority or minority 
language has to win over the other. Typically, the dominant major-
ity language already functions as a full-scale official language and 
has the score ‘1’, while the minority language often starts from ‘0’. 
What makes the problem even bigger for minority language 
is the circumstance that the score of the dominant language has 
to remain ‘1’ because of the design of co-official status that makes 
the use of the dominant language compulsory. The move to expand 
the use of minority language in real communicative situations is 
opposed on the basis of the ‘efficiency assumption’. The communi-
cative use of more than one language is perceived as superfluous 
and utterly non-pragmatic. For example, if a deputy used his or her 
right and started speaking in the non-dominant language at a par-
liamentary session, this speech has to be translated simultaneously 
or even consequentially back and forth. This situation would be con-
sidered as a violation of the symbolic order despite the co-official 
status, because everybody is expected to know and use the domi-
nant language.
In other words, the co-official status does not in itself auto-
matically change the symbolic order but could be filled with inter-
actional practices that contest it. Such contestation will naturally 
be counteracted not only by the wider public, but also by those 
who are responsible for policy formation and implementation: par-
liamentarians and public officials. And due to political correctness 
and formal obedience to the symbolic order, this counteraction 
would rather remain unexpressed publicly, but implementers would 
‘thumb their nose’ at minority activists behind their back and ham-
per fulfillment even of those status elements that were instituted 
(see Section 7.5). Therefore, non-complete implementation is typical 
and its extent reflects the strength of the ‘push’ beside the minority 
language.
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Implementers are more ready, inter alia, as concession to 
minority demands in political bargaining, to expand the minority 
language use in the elements of domains that do not demand oral 
communication and, therefore, are not perceived as a part of ‘zero-
sum’ game. These elements are, e.g., the names of authorities in two 
languages, bilingual street signs, even short audible announcements 
in public places such as bus stations and train stations, sometimes 
addresses and rarely speeches of public officials and the like. These 
are elements of practical use but they simultaneously perform sym-
bolic function. Moreover, those elements that are not associated 
with symbolism but exclusively with practical use, simultaneously 
add visibility or audibility to the language, i.e., also perform a sym-
bolic function. In effect, official bilingualism functions to a fuller 
extent in symbolic function.
What are the reasons for the designation of a de facto minor-
ity language with an official status? Three possible avenues have 
been explored: revivalist, instrumentalist and institutionalist expla-
nations. While the study reveals documented evidence for the link 
between the demand of elites, legitimized as the popular will, and 
the officialization of languages, the motives behind the demand 
remain controversial and can be only inferred from the resulting 
configuration of the official status. Regarding the revivalist argu-
ment, what defines how successful expansion of the de facto minor-
ity language will be in the public sphere? The designation of the 
official language is an act that could best be understood within the 
dimension of power relations. In the case of the co-official status in a 
region, the key variable is whether the local ethnic elite is dominant 
and, in that case, how restricted it is in term of power-sharing.
In addition to the motive explicitly presented in their revivalist 
rhetoric, some evidence can be found that ethnic elites also pur-
sued their own interests in attaining power by means of the instru-
mentalist use of compulsory knowledge of languages. However, 
the co-official status of minority languages has become neither an 
effective mechanism of language revival nor a political instrument 
for attaining power because of the position of majority elites. The 
majority elites are reluctant to support the move of the expansion 
of the de facto minority language on the ‘integration assumption’ 
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that the change in language practices would challenge their politi-
cal status and trigger further ethnic demands. Furthermore, guided 
by instrumentalist considerations, the majority elites do not see that 
this move of the expansion would benefit them and see that it ben-
efits only the ethnic elites. 
A compromise among the elites results in a configuration of the 
co-official status, where the de facto minority language performs, 
first of all, the symbolic function, because this benefits all segments 
of regional elites providing the regional political unit with politi-
cal legitimacy. The elite settlement typically includes the co-official 
status of languages in their function as a symbol of the multina-
tional society but also as an ethnic institution. The institutionalist 
explanation connects the institutional level to identity politics in 
the logic of ethnosymbolism: institutions promote identity which 
might benefit certain instrumental interests but which is also the 
way to achieve a more stable society. 
In summation, the official status of the minority languages 
is, first and foremost, the symbol of identity. Under certain condi-
tions, this status can also serve as an instrument of minority lan-
guage promotion, although not very effectively. Official status is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for language revival. It is 
also a political and social institution that structures power rela-
tions between different branches of authorities in their horizontal 
and vertical dimensions as well as the authorities and citizens. It is 
enforced less through obligatoriness of its use and more through its 
symbolic power. 
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